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1Introduction
The study of the relation between a state’s form of government
and its levels of inequality is well rooted in economic and political sci-
ence research, and in the last decade it even experimented a renewed
interest. As it will be deeply discussed later, the divergent results pro-
duced by the corpus of research elaborated so far on this subject, both
theoretical and empirical, raise the question about whether it is possible
that the classic theories on which the research relied could need to be
refined and improved.
The divergent empirical results, indeed, may be the symptom of
methodological issues, but they could also depend on the fact that the
theories on which they are based fail to consider aspects, variables, and
mechanisms that influences the relation between the two variables.
Consequently, the purpose of the present work is twofold: on the
one side, it aims to try to develop a more efficient theoretical framework
by refining the classic theories present in the literature; on the other side,
it aims to quantitatively analyze the refined theoretical framework pro-
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duced, in a cross-national perspective, in order to assess if, how, and to
what extent the form of government of a state and its levels of inequality
are related to each other, trying to produce generalizable results.
It is worthy to stress from the beginning that even if the study of
the relation between the form of government of a state and its levels of
inequality has somehow become part of the research strand on the deter-
minants of democracy, as it will be discussed in the next sections, this
work will mostly leave aside the processes of democratization focusing
instead, in a more static perspective, on the overall relation between the
two variables.
But before proceeding with the different steps of the research,
it is also useful to discuss some preliminary considerations and clari-
fications. For this reason, in the next sections: i) I will discuss how
the research strand on the relation between the form of government of
a state and its levels of inequality started, how it evolved through the
decades, how it experimented a renewed interest in the last years, and
moreover why the study of this relation is still important within the
field of political science; ii) I will present the main theories of democ-
ratization incorporating in some way the relation between the form of
government of a state and its levels of inequality; iii) I will discuss some
theoretical and methodological issues that, inherent in the study of the
relation in object, needs to be taken into account before proceeding with
the theoretical and the empirical analysis; and iv) I will present the re-
search strategy employed in the present work, and the different stages it
encompasses.
2
1.1 Why does the study of relation between
the state’s form of government and its lev-
els of inequality still matters?
The empirical study of the relation between democracy and in-
come inequality is puzzling scholars at least since the 1970s. Begun
as an economic approach to the study of democratic transitions, it sub-
sequently became part of the research strand on the determinants of
democratic processes within the discipline of political science. These
processes have long been studied in political science and economic lit-
erature, and several theories have been proposed to disentangle, and
to explain, the role played by the different factors and actors involved,
the main variables affecting them, and under which conditions they are
more likely to occur. At the principle, therefore, the research was fo-
cused on the impact of inequality on the states’ form of government.
Notwithstanding, very soon, the study of this relation also evolved as
a distinct research strand and the focus started to be posed also on the
effect that the form of government could have had on inequality.
When this research strand begun the world was divided into two
political and ideological counterposed blocks and non-democratic coun-
tries consistently outnumbered democratic ones, and the aim of at least
a part of the scholars involved in this kind of research was also to show
the advantages of democratic vis-à-vis non-democratic regimes, in the
hope that this would have helped spreading and fostering democratic
practices and institutions all over the world. From the beginning, in
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fact, one of the assumptions of the theory was that one of the advan-
tages of democracy was the reduction of income inequality.
Therefore, the attention given by the scholars to this topic de-
rived from several aspects but, looking at it from a historical perspec-
tive, four main factors appear to have mainly triggered (and to be still
triggering) the debate. Moreover, these facts can explain why, in the
last years, the interest to the study of the dynamics governing the rela-
tion between democracy and inequality has considerably and constantly
grown, among scholars of different disciplines, and why the study of re-
lation between the state’s form of government and its levels of inequal-
ity still matters.
Firstly, after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold
war, the unfreezing of the international arena showed the will of a con-
sistent number of states, persuaded by the advantages the democratic
form of government was promising, to adopt the democratic form of
government. Even if not all the democratic transitions have succeeded,
and in some cases there have been setbacks and reversals, the demo-
cratic form of government has spread all over the world in the last fifty
years (Figure 1.1).
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Figure 1.1: World total number of democratic countries by year
Source: Author’s elaboration on Polity IV data (Marshal, Gurr, and
Jaggers, 2017). Countries are classified as democracies if have a score
comprised between 6 and 19 (included)
Secondly, in the second half of the twentieth century and in par-
ticular after the end of the Cold War, extreme poverty dropped signifi-
cantly, and the proportion of the population living in extreme poverty1
diminished from 42 per cent in 1981 to 10 per cent in 2013. But, on the
contrary, in spite of the democratic spread, as noted by several authors
income inequality increased in most countries worldwide, particularly
among developed countries (Freeman, 2001; Piketty, 2014; Pianta &
Franzini, 2016; Milanovic, 2016; Alvaredo et al., 2017). Figure 1.2
shows how, at global level, the share of the total income held by the top
1 per cent of the distribution rose from 16.2 to 20.5 between the years
1Data from World Bank (2017).
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1980-2016.
Figure 1.2: Global Top 1 percent national income share
Elaboration of the author on data provided by Alvaredo et al. (2016)
Thirdly, in recent years, the democratic spread seems to be facing
a phase of stagnation, and some authors have even pointed out that this
stagnation would begin to give way to a phase of democratic regres-
sion. Foa and Mounk (2016) highlighted how the number of citizens
starting to be sympathetic to the perspective of being ruled by “strong-
men” is growing, and the satisfaction with existing institutions, in both
consolidated and young democracies, has started to decline. Freedom
House (2018) stated that: stated that “For the 12th consecutive year,
according to Freedom in the World, countries that suffered democratic
setbacks outnumbered those that registered gains. States that a decade
ago seemed like promising success stories —Turkey and Hungary, for
6
example— are sliding into authoritarian rule”. It is still unclear if the
spread of what have been called the “populist infection” (Archibugi &
Cellini, 2018a), which have been claimed to be responsible of this re-
versing, could contribute to the worsening of the quality of government
within states or if, in a more pessimistic scenario, it could lead to a
more worrying generalized non-democratic backlash. What it seems to
be quite clear, however, is the fact that the populist spread is associated
with the worsening of citizens’ living conditions who followed the start
of the 2007 economic crisis (Archibugi & Cellini, 2018b), one of the
most evident symptoms of which is the consistent increases of income
inequality.
A fourth factor, of methodological nature, which from the 1960s
considerably boost the empirical research on this subject, as well as on
other subjects in social sciences, is the great expansion of data collec-
tion, and the evolution of the capacity to process and to analyze data,
thanks to the production of more sophisticated statistical and computa-
tional tools. Moreover, the progressive technological development ex-
perimented in the second part of the twentieth century made the col-
lection of data more and more inexpensive, allowing social scientists to
launch themselves in challenges that only a few decades earlier would
have seemed impossible.
Therefore, the successful spread of the democratic form of gov-
ernment after the end of the cold war, and the somehow unexpected
increase of the level of inequality in most countries of the world fol-
lowing the third wave of democratization, can explain the interest that
scholars showed on this research strand. Interest that contributed, in
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the last decades, to the production of several theoretical and empirical
researches aimed at theorizing and testing how democracy and income
inequality interact, and even if inequality can be listed among the de-
terminants of democratization. At the same time, the more recent con-
cerns about the health state of democracy explain why the interest on
this topic is still present in academia and why the study of the relation
between the state’s form of government and its levels of inequality con-
tinues to be of great importance. Understanding the dynamics of the
relation between these two variables, in fact, could help to understand
why democracy seems to face a stagnating phase and how to avoid that
this phase can be followed, as in the most pessimistic previsions, by a
phase of non-democratic backlashes.
1.2 The main theories of democratization
From a theoretical perspective, scholars have pointed out several
actors and key variables that would influence the democratic process,
elaborating different theoretical frameworks aimed at explaining insti-
tutional change. Institutional, political, social, as well as external fac-
tors have been identified for explaining these processes (Morlino, 2012),
each theory stressing the relative importance of a certain factor over the
others. Among the most important elaborated so far, one can mention
the modernization theory, the transition from above theory, the tran-
sition from below theory, and the redistributive theory of democracy,
which are those who have contributed most to the theoretical and em-
pirical development of the subject. All of them with different focuses
also investigate the relation between the form of government of a state
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and its levels of inequality.
The modernization theory firstly developed by Lipset (1959) stresses
the importance of economic development in shaping countries’ institu-
tional setting. The mechanism proposed is quite straightforward, the in-
creases of individual economic well-being, mainly through the improve-
ment of the education, would change so deeply individual preferences
that the masses would not anymore accept to live in a non-democratic
regime. Even if Lipset does not directly address the relation between the
political regime of a states and its levels of inequality, his seminal works
have been employed as the basis of most of the subsequent theories on
this topic.
Focusing on different actors, the transition from above theory em-
phasizes the role of agency, and the dynamics of transition among so-
cietal groups. According to this theoretical strand, the processes of de-
mocratization and democratic consolidation are basically the outcome
of the struggle between different elites, pursuing different objectives.
O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986), Przeworski (1991), and
Przeworski et al. (2000) focus on the strategy, beliefs and calculations
of the elites’ leaders who lead the democratization at critical junctures.
These authors claim that other factors, such as economic development
and movements’ dissent, can influence the processes, but they cannot
explain alone why democratization and democratic consolidation suc-
ceed in some cases while failing in others.
The transition from below theory challenges the elite-driven tran-
sition theory, stressing the importance of the pressure from below, com-
ing from citizens’ mobilization. Within non-democratic regimes, protests
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reveal the presence of an opposition able to mobilize large segments of
population, and to pose a threat to the regime. According to this theory,
mass mobilization can influence the processes of democratic transition
and consolidation in different ways. For instance, protests increase the
government’s cost for repression and, in some cases, it might push the
government to make political concessions. At the same time, protests
can favour elite’s division about the way in which to face political chal-
lenges and doing so it can increase the likelihood of democratic con-
cessions (Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013). In addition, the pressure from
below can affect also democratic countries. Within democratic regimes
in fact, especially in the context of young democracies, high levels of
protests may push the elites to implement repressive and undemocratic
policies to maintain their power. In both cases, according to the theory,
to show their effect protests have not to be necessarily violent and, ac-
cording to a recent theory’s development, to better understand the role
of protests in shaping the democratic processes, it is necessary to make
a distinction between violent (or armed) and non-violent (or peaceful)
protests (Ulfelder, 2005; Karatnycky & Ackerman, 2004; Teorell, 2010;
Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Celestino & Gleditsch, 2013; Schock,
2013).
The redistributive model of democracy incorporates different ele-
ments, such as inequality, distributive conflicts, and the strategic deci-
sions of two societal groups, the citizens and the elites, which interact to
explain how a society can transition from a non-democratic to a demo-
cratic political system (Boix, 2003; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005). In a
dynamic perspective, the redistributive model of democracy claims that
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the income’s difference between the two groups shapes their preferences
for the institutional form of the government. Poor citizens would prefer
democracy because of its redistributive potential, while the elites would
prefer non-democratic forms of governments since they would enable
them to maintain their power. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) empha-
size the role of masses because of their numbers, the majority, poor
people, can “challenge the system, creating significant social unrest and
turbulence, or even pose a serious revolutionary threat". Therefore, the
solution of the conflict between poor citizens and the elites would de-
pend on the distribution of political power, that in turn is a function of
the "de jure" and the "de facto" political power. Within the Acemoglu
and Robinson’s model, therefore, the only way with which poor citizens
can transit from a non-democratic to a democratic regime is through
protests, which would have the role of detonating the democratic pro-
cess.
Notwithstanding, nowadays, after almost forty years of studies
on this topic, there is no agreement about how the relation between
the state’s form of government and inequality would shape nor how
the causal mechanisms would work, and some scholars even deny the
presence of any causal relation between the two variables (Jackman,
1974; Hewitt, 1977; Bollen & Grandjean, 1981).
1.3 Conceptual and methodological issues
The lack of consensus regarding the shape and the causal direction
that the relation would assume may depend on several factors, either
conceptual and methodological, some of which need to be considered
11
and discussed before proceeding with this work since they can condition
both the theoretical and the empirical analysis.
From a conceptual standpoint, first and foremost, both democracy
and income inequality can be defined in different ways. The conceptual
and the operational definitions of both variables will be discussed in
dept in Chapter 2, preliminary it is sufficient to stress that democracy
can be defined such as to consider only two dimensions, for instance as
proposed by Dahl (1971) contestation and competition, or it can include
other dimensions such as the respect for specific civil rights. Similarly,
inequality can be defined according to different understanding, it can
be defined in terms of economic resources as inequality of income, but
also in non-economic terms such as proposed by Amartya Sen (1992)
among others.
But apart from the definition of democracy and inequality, from
a theoretical perspective, at least two other issues recur in the study of
the relation between the state’s form of government and its levels of
inequality. The first concerns the nature of democracy and its relation-
ship with liberalism, while the second is the way in which the economic
concept of rationality influenced the study of this relation.
With respect to the first issue, the liberal conception of democracy
have been long considered hegemonic (Della Porta, 2013), and even to-
day when speaking about democracy social scientists usually refer to
liberal democracy, so as that in recent years the concept of democracy
and liberalism "have become almost hopelessly conflated and confused,
especially in the work of social scientists" (Miller, 2018). This is evident
also looking at the attempts to quantitatively measure democracy. Many
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of the most influential and employed democratic indices, discussed in
Chapter 2.1.3, employ a definition of democracy based on a liberal un-
derstanding, as if liberal democracy would be the only possible form of
democracy. For this reason, it is worthy to make some semantic as well
as theoretical considerations about the meanings of the term liberalism
and how it relates with democracy.
In the Italian language two distinct terms have been coined, "liber-
alismo" and "liberismo", to indicate respectively the ethic-philosophical-
political and the strictly economic dimensions of the concept attached
to the English term liberalism. This linguistic development did not hap-
pen without a heated debate about the opportunity to use two distinct
terms, and the ideological clash between Benedetto Croce, the propo-
nent of the linguistic distinction between the two terms, and Luigi Ein-
audi, who was instead convinced of the wrongness of this distinction,
became paradigmatic. With his philosophical background, Benedetto
Croce probably dreaded a contamination of the idealistic nature of lib-
eralism with the utilitaristic traits of the laissez faire, and for this reason
he intended to separate the moral aspect of political liberalism from the
more trivial ones of commerce and business (Croce, 1928). Croce criti-
cized economic liberalism for its pretension of converting the utilitaris-
tic principles into a supreme law guiding the social life of a country.
Luigi Einaudi with his economic background, on the contrary, denied
the fact that the economic and the ethical aspects of liberalism could
and should be disjointed, claiming that economic liberalism is not an
economic principle that contrast with the ethical liberalism, but rather it
is a concrete solution that often economists employ to find those in-
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struments able to reach certain philosophical, moral or ethical goals
(Einaudi, 1931). According to Croce political liberties did not need
the support of a particular economic structure, while according to Ein-
audi all the freedoms were integral with each other including therefore
economic freedom. In this work, the discussion between Croce and
Einaudi is important not simply because its semantic consequences,
rather because it warn about the advisability of considering political
and economic liberalism as inseparable features of democratic political
systems. Moreover, it also shed light on the necessity that economy
be guided by ethical and moral considerations and not by mere eco-
nomic laws. At the same time, the discussion between the two authors
warns about the possibility that the equation could be inverted, namely
the possibility that economic laws could be employed alone to decide
which kind of policies a country should implement, without considering
their philosophical and ethical consequences.
In English, instead, the term liberalism is employed to indicate
several distinct scopes, which nevertheless often interpenetrate each
other, and it may be preceded by adjectives denoting the specific area
of competence. However, for what interests the present work, following
the suggestions of Benedetto Croce, it is important to distinguish polit-
ical and economic liberalism. The former refers to a corpus of philo-
sophical conceptions constructed starting from (and around) the concept
of liberty, which had their maximum expression in the formation of lib-
eral democracies. The latter, which can be considered a product of the
former since indeed it is based on its philosophical political theories,
refers to a corpus of economic theories, which gave birth to several eco-
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nomic practices. But the concept of liberty is a contested concept (Bu-
facchi, 201), and Liberal tinkers have developed distinct and competing
conceptions of liberty that have different consequences when translated
into political and economic applications.
Liberals’ disagreement about the concept of liberty lead to differ-
ent conception about the role governments should play in democratic
societies (Gaus, Courtland & Schmidtz, 2018). Important here is the
difference among the negative and the positive types of liberty, and in
particular its negative conception. In his essay “Two concept of liberty”,
Isaiah Berlin (1958) describe and discuss these two concepts arguing
that negative freedom can be thought as the mere absence of external
obstacles that prevent an individual action whereas positive freedom
can be understood as those internal factors which determine individual
action. Beyond these two definitions, there is a variegated range of in-
terpretations of the concept of freedom. It is not the scope of this work
to examine in depth these different interpretations or to enter the philo-
sophical discussion on the term, instead, it is important to highlight how
the negative interpretation of liberty can influence the definition of what
a liberal democracy is and what its aims are. The negative conception
of freedom usually restricts the range of obstacles constraining freedom
to those imposed by other agents (Carter, 2018), negative in this context
refers to "the lack of interferences, obstacles, or constrains, in short,
freedom from" (Bufacchi, 201) something. And this understanding of
negative freedom, long present in the liberal discourse even before the
disentanglement of the two conceptions of liberty, is what give birth to
the economic theory of market’s self-regulation that, in turn, can influ-
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ence economic equality within countries.
Starting from the concept of invisible hand elaborated by Adam
Smith (1756; 1776) and subsequently interpreted by many economists,
the idea that markets have the capacity of self-regulating themselves
has become well rooted in the economic liberal and neo-liberal theories.
The consequence of such self-regulating capability is that according to
liberal and neo-liberal economists states should limit their intervention
in the economic life of their citizens since "The Market" is able by itself
to allocate the resources of a country in the best possible way. Prac-
tically speaking, one of the consequences is that, in this view, govern-
ments should not impose taxes beyond what it is needed to regularly run
the governmental apparatus.
The distinction between political and economic liberalism, there-
fore, is important because more a country follows an economic liberal
attitude more it will be reluctant to implement redistributive policies
that, whether taking the form of a higher taxation for the rich in favor
of greater support for the poor, or for example the imposition of a min-
imum wage, would involve a state (and therefore external) intervention
that would interfere with the ability of the markets to self-regulating
themselves.
All this reasoning also points out to another important distinc-
tion that is worthy to stress, namely the one between liberal and social
democracies. As already said, in contrast with the attitude of demo-
cratic indices to conflate the concept of democracy with that of liberal
democracy, the latter is not the only possible type of democracy. At
least another important type can be traced, and it is precisely the social
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democracy. This distinction is particularly important for the present
work since as highlighted by Margalit (2013) "Social democrats are
more concerned about the distribution of income than are liberals. For
the social democrat, it is not just taking from the rich and giving to the
poor. Rather it is about caring about equality all the way down the slope
of the income curve". This different attitude toward redistribution obvi-
ously affects the type and level of redistributive policies that a state will
decide to implement and that citizens will decide to ask for, and con-
sequently the states’ levels of inequality. And citizens’ attitude toward
redistribution is connected with the second theoretical issue, namely the
influence of the concept of rationality on the study of the relation be-
tween countries’ regimes and inequality.
Most of the empirical research carried out on this topic (discussed
in Chapter 3.2), in fact, assumes that citizens are always economically
rational in their choices. The classical theory, thoroughly discussed in
Chapter 3.1, assumes that: within a democratic country, where all the
citizens have the right to participate to the political life and consequently
to influence the implementation of specific policies through their votes,
and where the poorest section of the population is usually bigger than
the richest section, most voters would prefer political forces committed
to the implementation of redistributive policies. The reasoning at the
basis of the theory is quite straightforward, poor citizens must be inter-
ested in the implementation of redistributive policies since they would
improve their individual well-being. At the same time, the theory pro-
vides also that the richest section would not favour redistributive poli-
cies since they will endanger their economic interests.
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But this reasoning has two strong implications. Firstly, it takes for
granted that poor citizens always perceive inequality as a social problem
that the government must address, and the implementation of redistribu-
tive policies as the answer to that problem. Secondly, it takes for granted
that richest citizens must always oppose redistribution. Such attitudes,
however, can depend obviously on factors different from citizens’ be-
longing to a specific economic group, such as for instance citizens’
philosophical, ethical, and political believe. The struggle among two
distinct societal groups, interpreted in different ways, is also at the basis
of the four theories of democratization mentioned above: the transition
from above, the transition from below, and the redistributive model of
democracy. Even if not always explicitly, the theories strongly rely on
the economic assumption which consider the human being to be a ratio-
nal actor, and its choices to be mainly driven by rationality. However,
how I will discuss in Chapter 6.1.1, taking for granted that citizens per-
form their choices in an economically rational way can produce a biased
interpretation of the relation between the state’s form of government and
its levels of inequality.
From the methodological perspective, discussed in depth in Chap-
ter 2, other issues arise when moving from the theoretical to the empir-
ical realm. The process of operationalization and the choice of the in-
dicators needed to proceed from the theoretical to the empirical realm,
the choice of employing a set of data instead of another, or an equa-
tion model over another, as it can be intuitively noticed, even if usually
guided by the literature, require abundant doses of subjectivity that can
lead to divergent results when the empirical analyses are carried out.
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1.4 The research strategy
The lack of agreement among scholars about the shape, and in
some case the very existence, of the relation between a state’s form of
government and its levels of inequality should not be taken as a sign
of a total lack of relation, and the difficulties implicit in the measure-
ment of social phenomena should not discourage the empirical research
in this field. On the contrary, these considerations should spur schol-
ars to try to develop and test more and more refined theories, and to
find more and more valid instruments to measure social variables and
to test those theories. Accordingly, the strategy of the present work is
to address in a cross-national and mainly cross-sectional perspective the
relation between the regime type of a state and its levels of inequality
from a political science rather than a purely economic viewpoint, devel-
oping a more complete theoretical framework abandoning some of the
economic premises mostly employed insofar.
To do so, Chapter 2 defines the two concepts of form of govern-
ment and inequality, discussing the different ways in which they can be
conceptualized and measured, and presenting and discussing the mea-
surements exercises most employed in the empirical research on the
subject, as well as those that will be employed in the present work.
Chapter 3 introduces and discusses the theoretical and the empirical
literature on the topic. It firstly identifies and expounds four main the-
oretical strands on the relation between regime types and inequality.
Secondly, it presents and analyses the most important empirical studies,
how they are developed, the samples and the methodologies they em-
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ployed and the results they reached. Chapter 4 presents some method-
ological premises, discussing and justifying the strategy employed to
analyze the relation between the state’s form of government and its lev-
els of inequality. In particular it explore the usefulness of employing
a mixed method approach in which the development of the theoreti-
cal framework, of the hypotheses to be tested, and of the empirical
econometric analysis, is preceded by the analysis of specific case studies
that, through the use of an inductive approach typical of the qualitative
methodology, aims to identifies mechanisms and relations influencing
both the state’s form of government and its levels of inequality. Based
on these premises, Chapter 5 analyses some specific cases of countries
that in several ways deviate from the established theories identified in
Chapter 3. These are the cases of United States, Hungary and China.
Based on the theoretical and empirical literature review as well as on the
insights derived from the analysis of the deviant cases, Chapter 6 tries to
elaborate a theoretical framework capable to explain the relation at the
centre of the present work by discussing how the state’s form of gov-
ernment influences inequality and vice versa, as well as how other fac-
tors influence both variables. Chapter 7 presents the quantitative analy-
sis. Firstly, it describes the hypotheses to be empirically tested, derived
from the theoretical framework elaborated. Secondly, it presents the
data employed and the dataset from which they are retrieved. Thirdly,
it discusses the econometric strategies and models employed to test the
hypotheses formulated. And fourthly, it presents and discusses the re-
sults of the econometric analysis. Lastly, Chapter 8 further discusses
the findings of the research and the conclusions it reached, as well as
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some prospects for future research.
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2Defining the core concepts:
form of government and
inequality
Before beginning the journey toward the analysis of the relation
between the form of government of a state and its levels of income
inequality, it is essential to define the core concepts employed in the
research. The form of government may be defined in several ways based
on different focuses, as for instance by the structure of power, the source
of power, the ideology, or other attributes.
At the same time, also inequality can be defined in various ways.
In a general sense the term inequality indicates lack of equality. How-
ever, depending on the aspect one chooses to consider, there could be
many forms of inequality, for instance: political inequality, gender in-
equality, wealth inequality, or income inequality.
Therefore, both form of government and inequality are contended
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concept, which can be defined, conceptualized, operationalized, and
measured in different ways. Let us start with the definition of the form
of government.
2.1 Conceptual and operative definitions of
form of government
The term form of government in political science is often em-
ployed with different connotations and it can refer to different concepts,
as mentioned above, depending on the characteristics one chooses to
consider: the structure of power, the source of power, or the ideology.
The definition based on the structure of power focuses on the way in
which the different decision powers are allocated between the differ-
ent institutions forming the state. The definition based on the source of
power, instead, focuses on the subjects to which the power to govern
ultimately pertain. While, the definition based on the ideology, focuses
on the set of ideas and ideals upon which the governing body rest on.
It is worthy to highlight that, in political science, sometimes the term
political regime is preferred to the term form of government while other
times the two terms are employed interchangeably, and that within the
present work I choose to follow the second path and I will employ the
terms form of government and political regimes as synonyms.
In this work, the attention is posed mainly on the definition of the
form of government based on the source of power, according to which a
government can be democratic, oligarchic or autocratic. However, even
though each of these typologies has its own definition and fundamen-
23
tal characteristics as well as within typology differentiation, oligarchies
and autocracies are usually defined in terms of lack of democratic at-
tributes. While democracy has positive definitions, non-democracies
are negatively defined based on the definition of democracy. This ap-
pears clear when one looks at the exercises aimed at assessing the form
of government or the quality of government within states. In fact, this
is due through the development of democratic indices in which non-
democratic forms of government are assessed only by the lack (or the
degree of the lack) of those attributes one chooses to deem essential for
the definition of democracy.
As already discussed, the source of power, however, is not the
only characteristic upon which the form of government can be defined.
Beyond that the state’s form of government can also be defined based
on its ideology, and this definition can play an important role in the
relation between the form of government and inequality. For this reason,
it deserves to be considered. As it will be discussed in the next sections,
in contrast to the negative meaning often employed in journalistic and
popular discourses, within this work ideology is defined and understood
as a neutral term identifying a system of ideas and ideals, especially one
which forms the basis of economic or political theory and policy.
2.1.1 Form of government as the source of power
Of Greek origin, the word democracy was coined to indicate a ty-
pology of government in which the political power was not in the ends
of a tyrant or a king, but rather in the ends of the citizens. Democ-
racy, in fact, derived from the ancient Greek word "demokratia" a word
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combining the two words "demos" (which means people, but also active
majority (Musti, 2013)) and "kratos" (which means rule, but also power
(Musti, 2013)). . Therefore, in a very general and abstract sense, the
concept of democracy indicates a polity governed by the people (citi-
zens), or similarly a polity in which the power belongs to the citizens, or
to a certain majority of them. Indeed, democracy in ancient Greek was
far different from the political regimes designated by the modern usage
of the term. If it is true that the political power was in the ends of the cit-
izens, it is also true that the concept of citizenship was quite restrictive
in encompassing who was considered as such and who was not. Only
adult males who had completed the military training could be consid-
ered as full citizens (Raaflaub, Ober & Wallace, 2007). Women, slaves,
criminals, and most of foreigners were not considered citizens and they
could not enjoy the prerogatives attached to that status (Manville, 2014).
The agreement about the meaning of the concept of democracy,
however, ceases when one abandons such a general definition in search-
ing of a more detailed one. And as it happens for many concepts in
social sciences, there is not a single definition of democracy. Based on
the aspects which one chooses to deem fundamental, its definition can
change considerably.
The definitions of democracy can be based on its procedure, its
content, its results, or a combination of the three components. Based on
democratic procedure, Dahl (1971) focused its attention on participation
and the right to opposition, considering democratic all those regimes in
which the participation to the political life is guaranteed for all adult cit-
izens, independently from their sex, race, or socio-economic position,
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and in which there is the possibility to express dissent toward the gov-
ernment. Based on content, democracy has been defined as a regime
type that guarantee citizens and communities to enjoy liberty and po-
litical equality (Diamond & Morlino, 2004). And based on results, in-
stead, democracy can be defined as a responsive regime type, where
responsive means capable to adequate itself and its policies to citizens’
demands and preferences, as aggregated by the political process (Dia-
mond & Morlino, 2004). This is not an exhaustive set of definitions,
and indeed democracy can conceptually be defined in a variety of other
different ways.
However, notwithstanding the lack of agreement about which char-
acteristics should be considered essential, it is possible to divide the def-
initions of the concept of democracy into two extremes: minimal and
maximal definitions. In a general sense, minimalist and maximalist def-
initions of democracy differ with the respect the more or less large num-
ber of characteristics and aspects considered and, therefore, in practical
terms they differ about both the number of countries considered demo-
cratic and the way in which different countries pertaining to the same
category (democracy/non-democracy) are classified. The two groups
represent also a sort of continuum that is useful on the one side to trace
the boundaries of the concept and, on the other side, to assess the differ-
ences between different forms of democracies (and non-democracies).
Democracy is not an abstract concept only but also an empirical
manifestation, which scholars try to measure empirically, hence, tracing
the boundaries of the concept is essential to ensure the validity of the
measurements. And this is precisely the aim of the minimal definition.
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According to Morlino (2005), a regime may be considered democratic
if, and only if, it possesses at least the following characteristics:
1. male and female adult universal suffrage;
2. free, fair, competitive and recurrent elections;
3. more than one credible party;
4. different and alternative source of information.
To be considered democratic, a polity must satisfy all the above-
mentioned characteristics, so as that even if it would lack even only one
of these features it could not be considered minimally democratic.
But, the definition of a minimal democracy implies the existence
of it opposite, namely a maximal democracy. Since there is no agree-
ment about which characteristics a democratic country must possess to
be considered a maximal democracy, it is more correct to use the plural
and to speak about maximal definitions. Also called ideal definitions,
the maximal definitions of democracy represent a set of ideal (and of-
ten normative) rather than operative definitions. Since democracy can
evolve as a system of values and institutions, the desirable features it
should encompass can change both in time and space. The maximal
definition of democracy is extremely useful when one tries to empiri-
cally assess not only the presence or the absence but also the degree of
democracy within a country. The maximal definitions of democracy can
be understood also as a mix of definitions based on either procedures,
contents and results, but particularly stretched on the latter aspect. In
fact, often, the maximum definitions include characteristics that are not
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immediately attributable to democratic procedures, norms or institu-
tions, but rather represent those results to which an ideal democratic
political system should aim to, such as for instance the respect for hu-
man rights, and socio-economic or gender equality. For these reasons,
when employing maximal definitions of democracy, it would be more
correct to talk about quality of democracy rather than simply democ-
racy.
Both minimal and maximal definitions, however, generate prob-
lems when they are operationalized to be employed in measurement
exercises. Maximal definitions often conflate the concept of democracy
with other concepts that could be employed to explain democracy, or
which should be explained by democracy. At the same time, minimal
definitions often lack in providing enough distinction between regimes
(Munck & Verkuilen, 2002). In fact, when empirically put to work, on
the one side maximal definitions could give biased results. For instance,
if analyzing the relationship between democracy and human rights one
would employ a measure of democracy operationalized starting from a
definition of the concept of democracy encompassing also the respect
for human rights, the analysis would be severely biased. On the other
side, minimal definitions could not allow for a correct assessment of
the relation analyzed, especially when one tries to analyze the effect of
democracy on other variables. Continuing with the example of the anal-
ysis of the relation between a country’s form of government and human
rights, if the aim of the research is to measure the effect of a certain
form of government on the level of respect for human rights, employ-
ing a minimal definition would be quite easy to assess the difference in
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the respect of human rights between a democratic and a non-democratic
country, but it would not be possible to assess the differences between
two consolidated democracies.
The minimalist definition issue is the reason why, in the last decades,
several measurement exercises have employed more stretched defini-
tions of democracy encompassing characteristics that go beyond the
mere procedural conception of democracy. The differentiation of in-
struments capable to be employed in different types of analysis repre-
sent a valuable enrichment, since they allow to perform analysis that
otherwise would be impossible to perform. However, it is fundamen-
tal to consider what kind of measurement one employs, and that each
measurement have been constructed starting from different definitions
of democracy. In Chapter 2.1.3, I will present the democratic indices
most employed in the empirical research discussing their strengths and
limitations and justifying the selection of certain indices over the others.
2.1.2 Form of government as ideology
Beyond the definition based on the source of power, the state’s
form of government, be it democratic or not, can be also defined based
on the ideology which inspires and guides the government itself.
The very concept of ideology, however, is an ambiguous concept
which has been defined in social sciences according to different un-
derstandings and that has been employed either in neutral or pejorative
ways (McBride, 1968). In this work, ideology is defined in a general
sense, according to the English Oxford Dictionary, as “a system of ideas
and ideals, especially one which forms the basis of economic or politi-
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cal theory and policy” (Stevenson, 2010).
According to this definition of ideology, there could be many
types of governments as many are the ideologies and sub-ideologies that
have been elaborated along the centuries. For the aim of the present
work, the most important definition of the form of government is the
one based on the source of power, notwithstanding it is also important
to consider in some way the ideology behind each government.
As already pointed out, the most employed democratic indices
base their definitions of democracy upon a liberal understanding of the
democratic regime, and at the same time non-democracies are nega-
tively defined and considered only as those regimes in which there is
a lack of liberal democratic practices and institutions. This approach,
however, is tantamount to deny the possibility that within democratic as
well as within non-democratic countries there could be differences that
go beyond the practices and institutions defining liberal democracies.
Indeed, the government’s ideology could represent a great source of
differentiation for what concerns the state’s approach toward inequality,
especially but not only within non-democratic regimes.
In democratic regimes, citizens may influence the implementa-
tion of public policies, including redistributive ones, by participating
in elections. Each citizen can choose which party to vote based on
parties’ electoral programs, which in turn are usually sufficiently de-
tailed to let citizens know which kind of policies they are willing to
introduce, and which interests they are willing to pursue if they gain
governmental power. Within non-democratic regimes, on the contrary,
citizens have not the possibility to directly influence the policy mak-
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ing process since policy selection and implementation are completely
up to governing body. Indeed, as different parties based on specific
ideologies pursue different socio-economic goals, different authoritar-
ian regimes based on different ideological foundations tend to carry on
diverse socio-economic objectives.
In particular, for the aim of the present work, it is important to
stress and to consider the differences existing between rightist and left-
ist ideologies. As magisterially pointed out by Norberto Bobbio (1996),
left and right not only indicate ideologies, they also indicate counter-
posed programs with respect to many social problems for which the
solution pertains to the political action. According to Bobbio, the most
frequently employed criterion adopted to distinguish left and right is the
different attitude toward the ideals of equality and inequality. The left
is tightly linked, historically, to the idea that human beings are substan-
tially equals and that inequality is just a product of the socio-economic
structures, and therefore fundamentally unjust. On the contrary, the
right is linked to the opposite idea, namely that human beings are sub-
stantially unequal and therefore some levels and some forms of inequal-
ity are deemed to be just.
This ideological contrast about the nature and the justifiability of
inequality indeed have implications with respect to the attitude parties
and governments, either democratic or not, have toward income in-
equality and the implementation of redistributive policies. And since
within non-democratic countries, vis-à-vis democratic ones, citizens
cannot elect the political forces pursuing their preferred policies, the
distinction between leftist and rightist non-democratic regimes become
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particularly relevant for the present work.
2.1.3 Choosing among different measures of democ-
racy and democratic quality
In the last decades, several democratic indices have been created
and developed to allow researchers to better understand democracy and
how the states’ form of government relates with other important vari-
ables. Indices such as Polity IV, Freedom House, Cheibub and Unified
Democracy Scores, as it will be discussed within this section, are just
few examples of the many democratic indices created so far. The task
of creating an index capable of measuring the presence and the degree
of democracy within a country however is not an easy task. To develop
a democratic index, scholars must face a variety of difficulties, which
give birth to a variety of issues from which none of the available indices
is totally exempted. At theoretical level, the principal issue is the lack of
a commonly accepted definition of the concept of democracy. This is of
course a major problem because choosing a definition over other results
in the employment of different empirical referents that represent differ-
ent aspect of democracy (Coppedge, et al., 2011; Campbell & Sükösd,
2003). At methodological level difficulties range from the coding pro-
cedure that implies substantial subjective choices by the coders, to the
aggregation of the data (Coppedge, et al., 2011). Lastly, some schol-
ars have highlighted the political and ideological issues implicit in the
construction of a democratic index (Giannone, 2010; Levine & Molina,
2011). According to these authors, the definition of what democracy is,
which components to add to its definition, and which indicators must be
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used to measure them, may be conditioned by the political and ideolog-
ical background of the scholars.
As already pointed out, there exists not only one theory, concept
or model of democracy but a plurality of different models and concep-
tualizations (Campbell, 2008). Therefore, in specifying the meaning of
the concept of democracy, scholars must face the dilemma of which at-
tributes to add and which leave aside. Of course, the choice is guided
by the literature and the scope of the research, however, the selection
process also implies a great level of subjectivity that cannot be avoided.
According to Munck and Verkuilen (2002) even if there are no
rules to determine which attributes must be added, when defining a
concept, it is important to avoid the temptation to employ maximalist
or minimalist definitions. On the one side, maximalist definitions can
raise the problem of the inclusion of attributes pertaining to other con-
cepts and doing so can undermine the validity of the measurement. On
the other side, the employment of minimalist definitions can raise the
opposite problem, namely the failure to include all the attributes per-
taining to the meaning of the concept. Hence, of course trades-off exist
between the employments of these two typologies of definition. Mini-
malist definitions give usually strongest results in term of validity, while
maximalist definitions are usually considered more satisfactory in term
of reliability (Norris, 2008). Most of the existing indices of democracy
have tackled this task with considerable acuity (Munck & Verkuilen,
2002) relying, with different degrees, to the influential definition pro-
posed by Dahl (1971) in which democracy is defined by two attributes
(contestation or competition, and participation or inclusion) (Munck &
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Verkuilen, 2002). .
Therefore, a first distinction between democratic indices can be
based on the choice to employ a definition of democracy more oriented
to a minimalist or a maximalist pole. The classification is based on the
number and moreover the types of attributes that the indices include in
their definitions of democracy. Table 2.1 reports the classification of the
most used democratic indices: Bertelsmann; Boix, Miller and Rosato
(BMR); Cheibub; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU); Freedom House
(FH); Global States of Democracy Indices (GsoD); Polity IV (PIV); and
Unified Democracy Scores (UDS). .
Table 2.1: Minimalist versus maximalist oriented classification of
democracy definitions employed by the most used democratic indices
Minimalist Oriented Maximalist Oriented
Cheibub Economist Intelligence Unit (EUI)
Boix, Miller and Rosato (MBR Bertelsmann
Polity IV (PIV) Freedom House (FH)
Unified Democracy Scores (UDS)
Global States
of Democracy Indices (GSoD
Source: Author’s elaboration
Most of the indices reported in Table 2.1 rely, to some extent,
upon the definition of democracy proposed by Dahl (1971). On the one
side, in some cases in the minimalist oriented category, we find indices
such as Cheibub and BMR in which contestation and participation are
the only attributes included. On the other side, in the maximalist ori-
ented category we find indices that stretch, with different degrees, the
definition of democracy by including several attributes that would not
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be immediately linked to the meaning of the concept. For instance, FH
and Bertelsmann include in their definition some attributes that seem
to pertain to concepts different from democracy. FH includes attributes
such as “socioeconomic rights”, “freedom from gross socioeconomic
inequalities”, and “freedom from war”. Bertelsmann includes the at-
tribute of “political and social integration” in which components such
as the development of social capital are considered. Table 2.2 reports
the detailed composition of all the democratic indices considered.
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Table 2.2: Detailed composition of the democratic indices considered
Name Attributes Composition Source
EIU
- Electoral process
and pluralism
- Functioning of government
- Political participation
- Democratic political culture
- Civil liberties
- 12 components
- 14 components
- 9 components
- 8 components
- 17 components
Economist
Intelligence
Unit (2014)
Cheibub
- Contestation
- Participation
- 2 components
- 2 components
Cheibub et al.
(2010)
Bertelsmann
- Stateness
- Political Participation
- Rule of law
- Stability of democratic
institutions
- Political and social
integration
- 4 components
- 4 components
- 4 components
- 2 components
- 4 components
Stiftung
(2014)
BMR
- Contestation
- Participation
- 2 components
- 1 components
Boix et al.
(2013)
FH
- Political liberties
- Civil liberties
- 9 components
- 13 components
Gastil (1991)
PIV
- Participation
- Balance of powers
- 2 components
- 3 components
Marshall et al.
(2016)
UDS2
- Arat, BLM, Bollen, FH,
Hadenius, PALC, PIV,
Poliarchy, PRC, Vanhanen
- Each component
included in each
democratic index
Pemstein et al.
(2010)
GSoD
- Representative Government
- Fundamental Rights
- Checks on Government
- Impartial Administration
- Participatory Engagement
- 8 components
International
IDEA (2017)
Source: Author’s elaboration
2Themeasure was drawn from the following sources: Arat (2003); Bowman, Lehoucq,
andMahoney (2005); Bollen (2001); Freedom House (2017); Hadenius (1992); Prze-
worski et al. (2000); Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010); Marshall, Jaggers, and
Gurr (2006); Coppedge and Reinicke (1991); Gasiorowski (1996); Reich (2002); and
Vanhanen (2004).
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When a definition is settled, and each attribute and component has
been decided, the second step to follow for elaborate a democratic in-
dex is the selection of indicators capable to measure the intended char-
acteristics. As pointed out by Bollen (1989), even when a concept is
correctly specified the components at the lower level of abstraction are
rarely observable themselves, and for this reason it is necessary to form
measurement models transforming unobserved “latent variables” to ob-
servable variables or indicators.
Sometimes, especially in social sciences, there are concepts that
embed characteristics that are not directly observable. Without entering
into the details of the coding process of each democratic index con-
sidered here it is worthy to stress that, even if carried out according
to the insights provided by the literature, also the coding process and
the aggregation of data that follow the selection of indicators imply a
great level of subjectivity by the scholars. Likewise, the subjectivity
issues can occur with respect to the information used to derive the mea-
sures. Scholars can gather information through objective facts (events
the occurrence of which are not difficult to ascertain) and observational
criteria (the analysis of official document such as the constitutions), or
through subjective evaluations (Cheibub, et al., 2010).
The subjectivity issues can be mitigated by employing rigorous,
transparent, and public coding rules, allowing the community of schol-
ars to scrutinize and challenge the choices that shape the generation of
data (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002). Unfortunately, not all the democratic
indices do make public their coding procedure and the sources from
which data are generated, or they do it only in part. Table 2.3 shows
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the classification of the indices analyzed with respect to their coding
transparency.
Table 2.3: Indices’ classification of the coding system’s transparency
Name Coding Transparency
EIU Transparent
Cheibub Transparent
Bertelsmann Transparent
BMR Not Transparent
FH Not Transparent
PIV Transparent
UDS Partially Transparent
GSoD Transparent
Source: Author’s elaboration
A democratic index is classified as “Transparent” if it employs
objective indicators and measurements or if it makes public the entire
system of scores used to generate the index, as well as all the disag-
gregated data (as for instance the case of the Bertelsmann index or the
PIV index). On the contrary, a democratic index is classified as “Not
Transparent” if it completely relies on experts’ judgments and it does
not make public its scoring system, or if its scoring system allows for
high subjectivity and it provide just aggregated data. For instance, FH is
classified as “Not Transparent” because on the one side it only relies on
experts’ judgments, and on the other side its scoring system aggregates
the attribute’s sub-components scores, without guiding the experts in
the assignment of every single sub-component composing the attribute.
An exception is represented by the UDS that is generated aggre-
gating ten of the most employed democratic indices, and it is classified
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as partially transparent since on the one side it makes public the process
of creation of the index but, on the other side, it incorporates indices
that are coded in a non-transparent way.
Once the concept of democracy is defined and operationalized,
the indicators selected, and the coding rules settled, the following step
in the construction of a democratic index is the formation of the sample,
operation that is influenced by different factors.
Firstly, the samples’ construction depends on the availability of
data, which in turn, on the one hand depends on the conceptualization
and operationalization of the concept of democracy and, on the other
hand, on the selection of indicators and the coding rules settled to as-
sign the scores. Employing maximalist definitions of democracy, and so
increasing the number of attributes defining the concept, can reduce the
possibility to find or collect data. Similarly, the choice to rely on objec-
tive indicators instead of expert’s judgment can reduce the availability
of data, excluding from the sample those countries for which required
data are not available.
Secondly, the selection of the sample depends on the scope of the
index and the aim of the scholars who develops it. For instance, an index
can have a smaller sample than another if its scope is to analyze coun-
tries pertaining to a specific region, having a certain level of economic
development, or sharing some other characteristics.
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Table 2.4: Democratic indices coverage
Index
N of Countries
(and territories)
Covered Years Range Value
Cheibub 202 1946 - 2008 0 | 1 (dummy)
BMR 221 1800 - 2015 0 | 1 (dummy)
EIU 167 2006 - 2017 +1 | +10
Bertelsmann 129
2006 - 2014
(biennial)
+1 | +10
FH 225 1972 - 2018 +7 | +1
PIV 194 1800 - 2017 -10 | +10
UDS 199 1946 - 2012 -2.2 | +2.2
GSoD 155 1975 - 2015 0.0 | + 1.0
Source: Author’s elaboration
For these reasons, the samples of the different democratic indices
(Table 2.4) consistently vary both in term of space and time. With re-
spect to the number of countries (and territories) included, the samples
vary from 155 countries of the Global States of Democracy Indices,
to 221 countries (and territories) of the BMR Index, with intermediate
sized samples such as the Bertelsmann Index which, focusing its analy-
sis only toward developing countries, includes 129 countries.
Similarly, with respect to the covered years, while some indices
such as PIV and BMR cover a long time-frame comprised between 1800
and respectively 2017 and 2015, other democratic indices such as the
EIU and the Bertelsmann cover a more modest time-frame.
Lastly, it is worthy to note that existing indices consistently vary
also with respect to the scale employed to classify the polities consid-
ered (Table 2.4 – column 4). The selection of the scale, which usually
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occur in conjunction with the development of the coding rules, similarly
to the selection of the sample is considerably conditioned by scholars’
scopes and aims. If the scope is only to assess if a certain country is
democratic or not, one can simply adopt a dummy codification so that
a country is coded as 1 if it is democratic or as 0 if it is not. This is the
case of the BMR, and the Cheibub democratic indices. If the scope is,
instead, not only to classify a polity as democratic or non-democratic
but also to assess the degree of democracy (and non-democracy) within
a polity, then one must employ a numeric scale either discrete or con-
tinuous which allow to better distinguish cases pertaining the same cat-
egory.
As discussed, existing democratic indices considerably vary in
terms of concept definition and operationalization, construction’s trans-
parency, composition and size of the sample, and measurement scales
employed. Notwithstanding, at an aggregate level the indices consid-
ered show a high correlation, and a high agreement in classifying a
polity as a democracy or an autocracy. For the derivation of the cor-
relation coefficients, two different calculus have been performed, a first
for the indices having a measurement scale and a second for the dummy
indices. How shown by Table 2.5, the correlation among the indices
considered vary among the different couples of indices, but it results
relatively high in all the cases. In fact, it ranges from a minimum of
0.835 between the Bertelsmann and the PIV democratic indices, to a
maximum of 0.949 between the FH and the UDS, and the EIU and the
UDS democratic indices.
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Table 2.5: Correlation matrix of the considered democratic indices for
the years 2006-2008
Democratic
indices
with
measurement
scales
PIV UDS Bertelsmann FH EIU GSoD
PIV 1.000
UDS 0.919 1.000
Bertelsmann 0.835 0.922 1.000
FH -0.873 -0.949 -0.940 1.000
EIU 0.854 0.949 0.907 -0.909 1.000
GSoD3 0.858 0.905 0.855 -0.894 0.856 1.000
Dummy
democratic
indices
Cheibub BMR
Cheibub 1.000
BMR 0.911 1.000
Source: Author’s elaboration. The correlation has been performed on
458 observations for which data were available for all the indices
However, a different picture appears when one scrutinizes the
democratic indices at a more disaggregated level. When the indexes
are evaluated more closely, some of those created to measure not only
the presence but also the quality of democracy within a country present
issues that must be considered when choosing the index to employ in
an empirical analysis. The first concerns the rating of single countries
over time, while the second concerns the rating of different countries
in a same year. These issues are both conceptual and methodological
3The correlation for the GSoD have been calculated for the index “Representative
Government”.
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and can undermine the results obtained when they are used for analyz-
ing the democratic phenomena, and how democracy relates with other
variables.
Concerning the rating of a single country over time, whichever
measurement scale one chooses to employ, there is the need to set up a
minimum and a maximum value. For minimum value, in this context,
we refer to that value below which a country cannot be considered as an
actual democracy.
From a conceptual perspective, while the setting up of the mini-
mal requirements a country must meet in order to be considered demo-
cratic do not present considerable problems, to set up a fixed maximum
value for the level of democracy can be problematic, and conceptually
misleading. The literature mostly agrees on a minimal definition of
democracy, which is fundamental to gauge the shift of a country from
a non-democratic to a democratic form of government, and the liter-
ature provides insightful help. As mentioned above (Chapter 2.1.1),
according to Morlino (2004), for instance, to be considered democratic,
a regime must have at least the following characteristics: male and fe-
male universal suffrage; free, competitive, recurrent and fair elections;
more than one party; various and alternative forms of information.
On the contrary it does not exist any similar definitive maximal
definition, and indeed it is not easy, nor it is desirable, to fix once
for all a maximum level for democracy. Of course, there are various
normative maximal definitions of democracy, but they are intellectual
exercises that often cannot be translated in term of quantitative vari-
ables. In term of rights or democratic procedures, assuming a maximum
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means that the final level of democracy can be dictated in advance and
this is quite much against the very nature of democracy, which on the
contrary should be interpreted as an open system able to identify new
challenges, and to achieve new targets (Archibugi 2008; Archibugi &
Cellini, 2015).
Even from a methodological perspective, to fix a democratic cli-
max can represent a serious issue, but this seems to be ignored by most
democratic indices. Democratic indices such as FH and PIV, are calcu-
lated year by year and constructed as panel datasets. In such a contest,
if a maximum democratic value is fixed in a certain year, according to
certain parameters, when a country reaches that value there is no more
room for improve it. For instance, if one calculates a democratic in-
dex with a sample N for a time-frame from 1990 to 2010, employing
a scale ranging from 1 (fully non-democratic) to 10 (fully democratic),
and one fixes the maximum level of democracy once for all, those coun-
tries that in 1990 received a score of 10 could not improve their rating
in the following years, even in the case the actual level of democracy
would increase. But since rights as well as democratic procedures can
always improve without an actual limit, there is the real possibility that
a country that scored 10 in 1990 will improve its level of democracy
without having track of it.
Ignoring this issue can considerably affect the results when one
employs the indices in order to study the relation between the level of
democracy and other variables such as the level of economic develop-
ment, the level of income inequality, the level of environmental care,
and so on. Quantitative analysis can be constructed, according to the
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focus of the research, in order to study a certain relation within a single
country over time, or more likely to analyze simultaneously a relation
within a sample of countries over time. In all these cases, if the dif-
ferences in the level of democracy, between different states, as well as
over the years within a single state, are not carefully evaluated, the re-
sults obtained from the employment of the indices will produce biased
results, because they will tend to underestimate, overestimate, or not
estimate at all the effect of the quality of democracy on other variable,
or the effect of other variable on the quality of democracy.
Looking at the data provided by the different indices considered
one can find that often they suffer from the issue highlighted, in fact,
in many cases, the rating assigned to a country along the time does not
vary for very long periods. This happens with various countries (in
particular with western consolidated democracies), but a curious and
paradigmatic case is that of United States (US) reported in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Quality of democracy in United States from 1946 to 2018
measured by the considered democratic indices
Source: Author’s elaboration
Let’s consider the question more closely. PIV, for instance, with
his data affirms that US was a full democracy yet in 1809, and that
from 1873 to 2016 the quality of American democracy did not make
any improvement (FH affirms the same for the period between 1972 to
2016). But, are those claims supported by objective facts? The answer
to this question should probably be negative, and the reason must be
found primarily in the differences between the past and present level of
political and civil rights.
In 1810, slavery in US was still a present phenomenon; it ended
only after the conclusion of the civil war, when president Lincoln pro-
mulgated the Emancipation Proclamation (1863) and the Thirteen amend-
ment to the Constitution (1865) that formally outlawed slavery in the
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Country (Walvin, 2014). However, even if slavery was banned and
racial segregation formally prohibited, southern states followed to apply
racial segregation norms and by the late 1880s segregation was a solid
institution in most of them. In 1896 the American Supreme Court sus-
tained the legitimacy of the segregation norms in the state of Louisiana.
Looking at a recent history, Massey and Denton (1988) published a re-
search in which emerged that some form of segregation, in the form of
what they called hyper segregation, was still in effect at the time of their
study.
A similar discourse can be made for woman’s political rights since
woman’s suffrage, for instance, was formally introduced in the US con-
stitution only in 1920. Similarly, other civil rights such as the right to
divorce have followed an evolution that cannot be left aside when eval-
uating the level of civil rights of a country throughout the time.
Following these considerations, it appears evident the error to
classify US as a full democracy since 1810 while, because at least until
1920 it did not meet neither the requirements needed to be considered
a minimal democracy, and even after the suffrage became universal,
American democracy as well as American democratic procedures, and
political and civil rights continued to evolve.
But the issue of the rating of a single country over time is not the
only concern when dealing with democratic indices. The problem to
set up a maximum level of democracy, once for all, also has the disad-
vantage of not allowing a correct assessment of the different levels of
democracy among countries pertaining to the fully democracy category.
Assessing the level, or the quality, of democracy in a cross-national
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perspective should imply the evaluation of the differences not only be-
tween non-democratic and democratic countries, but also among coun-
tries pertaining to the same category.
Looking more closely at the indices considered, one can find that
the evaluation of single countries, in a cross-national perspective, does
not consider appropriately the differences in the levels of democracy
among countries pertaining to the same category, again, especially for
what concerns fully consolidated western democracies. Table 2.6 re-
ports the countries to which the indices assigned the maximum score in
the year 2008.
Table 2.6: Countries that have achieved the maximum score in the year
2008
PIV UDS Bertelsmann FH EIU GSoD
Australia Denmark Costa
Rica
Andorra Denmark Costa
Rica
Austria Finland
Czech
Republic
Australia Iceland
United
Kingdom
Canada Iceland Estonia Austria Netherlands
United
States
Cape
Verde
NetherlandsSlovenia Belgium Norway
Chile Norway Uruguay Bahamas Sweden
Costa
Rica
Sweden Barbados
Continued on next page
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Table 2.6 – continued from previous page
PIV UDS Bertelsmann FH EIU GSoD
Cyprus Switzerland Canada
Denmark Cape
Verde
Finland Chile
Germany Costa
Rica
Greece Cyprus
Hungary Denmark
Ireland
Czech
Republic
Italy Finland
Japan Dominica
Lithuania Germany
Luxembourg Estonia
Mauritius Hungary
Mongolia France
Netherlands Micronesia
New
Zealand
Ireland
Norway Lithuania
Poland Iceland
Portugal Luxembourg
Continued on next page
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Table 2.6 – continued from previous page
PIV UDS Bertelsmann FH EIU GSoD
Slovakia Kiribati
Slovenia
St. Kitts
and Nevis
Spain St. Lucia
Sweden Liechtenstein
Switzerland Netherlands
Taiwan
Marshall
Islands
Trinidad
and Tobago
Malta
United
Kingdom
New
Zealand
United
States
Norway
Uruguay Poland
Portugal
Nauru
Slovakia
Palau
Slovenia
Spain
Continued on next page
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Table 2.6 – continued from previous page
PIV UDS Bertelsmann FH EIU GSoD
San
Marino
Sweden
Switzerland
United
Kingdom
Tuvalu
United
States
Uruguay
Source: Author’s elaboration
From Table 2.6, we can see how both PIV and FH, in the year con-
sidered, assigned the maximum score to countries that are very different
among them. But is their level of democracy really the same? To an-
swer this question, one must look more closely to specific countries. In
doing so, we will not consider any single country on the table, instead,
we will select two countries present in in most of the samples of the
indices considered: US and Sweden. In addition, we will not consider
here all the variables considered by the two indexes because it would
be a superfluous work. After all, even if a single indicator would show
little accuracy in differentiating the scores of consolidated democracies,
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it would be sufficient to question the accuracy of the entire index. For
this reason, I will focus on an aspect included in most of the indices
considered, namely the guarantee of civil liberties.
To assess the possible differences in the level of civil rights guar-
anteed in US and Sweden, I rely on data provided by Cingranelli, Richards,
and Clay (2014) in their Human Rights Data Project. In their dataset,
throughout the employment of different sources, such as the US State
Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, and Amnesty
International reports, they coded the level of protection of a series of
civil rights, among which: unlawful deprivation of life; disappearance;
torture; freedom of speech and press; freedom of religion; freedom of
domestic movement; freedom of foreign movement and travel; freedom
of assembly and association; worker’s rights; women’s economic rights;
women’s social rights. Table 2.7 reports the score of any indicator, for
US and Sweden, for the year 2008.
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Table 2.7: Sweden-United States comparison of the Human Right Data
Project scores for the year 2008
Civil Rights Sweden USA Score’s Scale
Physical integrity right 7 6 0-8
Forced disappearance 2 2 0-2
Extrajudicial killing 2 1 0-2
Torture 1 1 0-2
Freedom of assembly and association 2 2 0-2
Freedom of foreign movement 2 1 0-2
Freedom of domestic movement 2 2 0-2
Freedom of speech 1 2 0-2
Freedom of religion 1 1 0-1
Worker’s rights 1 1 0-3
Women’s economic rights 3 2 0-3
Women’s social rights 3 2 0-3
Total 27 23 (max.) 32
Source: Author’s elaboration on data provided by Freedom House
(2017), and Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay (2014)
Data show that, even being coded as two fully democratic coun-
tries, Sweden and US differ about the level of protection of certain civil
rights. In particular, US results weaker for what concerns the protection
of the physical integrity right, the freedom of foreign movement, free-
dom from extrajudicial killing, worker’s rights and woman’s social and
economic rights. Calculating the total of the scores for the two coun-
tries analyzed, we can see how, in the year 2008, Sweden received a
total score of 27 while US a total score of 23. Therefore, if social rights
are considered in the assessment of the level of democracy, appears ob-
vious that Sweden, in 2008, should have received a higher score than
US.
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This simple analysis seems to confirm the concerns about the little
accuracy with which some of the democratic indices assess the differ-
ences in the level of democracy between democratic countries. And
as in the case of the failing to address the evolution of a democracy
over the time, the consequence is that employing such a biased data,
in whichever quantitative analysis, would return biased results. As ex-
pected, the indices adopting a discrete measurement scale are more af-
fected by these issues since the discrete scale allow for a minor differ-
entiation, however, even the indices employing a continuous scale have
the tendency to fix a maximum level of democracy in a given year and
therefore are often not exempted from this kind of issues.
Since the aim of this work is to assess the relation between the
regime type of a state and its levels of inequality, but also the dif-
ferent effects that different degrees of democracy and non-democracy
may have on inequality and vice versa, I will mainly employ a maxi-
mal definition of democracy. Therefore, within this work, in principle
I will consider democratic those regimes that meet the characteristics
of a minimal democracy as identified by Morlino (2005) and reported
in Chapter 2.1.1. But beyond that I will also consider the quality of
the regime based on characteristics such as the respect for civil liber-
ties, gender equality and participatory engagement. As regimes’ mea-
surements, for different purposes, I will employ different democratic
indices: The UDS, the PIV index of democracy, and the GSoD.
The UDS, employed as the principal indicator of democratic qual-
ity, as already mentioned is a democratic index that merges and harmo-
nizes ten of the most employed democratic indices available, by em-
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ploying a Bayesian latent variable approach4. Merging several datasets
the UDS does not employ a single definition of democracy, rather it
uses a democratic definition that could be considered the sum of the
definitions used by the indices it incorporates. However, since it in-
cludes indices oriented toward a maximal definition of democracy, it
could be considered an index employing a maximalist oriented defini-
tion. The main advantage of the UDS is to avoid the arbitrary decision
of choosing a democratic index over another, in favour of a cumulative
approach allowing to simultaneously leverage the measurement efforts
of different scholars.
The PIV is a well-known democratic index, and it has widely em-
ployed by social scientists to study the relation between democracy and
other social and economic variables. PIV, here, is used mainly to con-
trol the results obtained by the employment of the UDS. According to
the PIV index:
“Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent ele-
ments. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which
citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and
leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the
exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liber-
ties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participa-
tion. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems
of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or
specific manifestations of, these general principles. We do not include
4For the complete list of the indices employed and for the methodology use to merge
and harmonize them, see: Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton, 2010.
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coded data on civil liberties.” (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers, 2016).
Therefore, PIV employs a democratic definition that can be con-
sidered minimal-oriented, and mainly procedural. As previously dis-
cussed, PIV index presents some problem that should be kept in mind
when one employs it in quantitative analysis. At the same time, how-
ever, it also presents some advantages, the principal of which is the great
extension of the dataset in terms of both time and space. The sample of
the Polity index of democracy, in fact, includes more than 160 countries,
covering a time-frame that spans from 1800 to present days.
The GSoD indices, instead, is a set of different indices elaborated
by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(IDEA) (2017). The objective behind the GSoD is “to provide system-
atic and nuanced data that captures trends at the global, regional and
national levels related to International IDEA’s comprehensive under-
standing of democracy” (Skaaning, Jimenez, Noonan & Tufis, 2017).
Therefore, rather than creating a single score overarching democracy
index per country, the GSoD indices provide measurements of distinct
aspects of democracy, which are emphasized by one or more major tra-
ditions within democratic thought.
The GSoD includes indices and sub-indices for five attributes of
democracy: i) representative government; ii) fundamental rights; iii)
checks on government; iv) impartial administration; and v) participatory
engagement. As it immediately stands out, the GSoD adopts a maximal
definition of democracy, based either on procedures, content and results.
As other democratic measurement, the GSoD have some limitation, for
instance its data came back only to 1975, and it codes its variables based
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also on subjective evaluations. However, it is important to stress that it
presents an important advantage when employed to assess the relation
of the regime of a state with other variables and phenomenon: providing
different indices for different characteristics of democracy, it allows to
assess how each characteristic influences the variables studied.
For what concerns the definition of regime type as ideology in-
stead, as discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 7.3, I will employ a
simple dummy variable classifying each country’s government for each
year considered as leftist of rightist oriented.
2.2 Conceptual and operative definitions of
inequality
2.2.1 What is inequality?
According to the Oxford Dictionary of English, in its broader
sense the term inequality indicates a difference in size, degree or cir-
cumstances among two or more subjects (Stevenson, 2010). Putting
it differently, it means lack of equality. Contrarily to the concept of
democracy, in principle the concept of inequality has a clear and straight
significance. However, beyond the general meaning, in social science
the noun inequality is generally preceded (or followed) by other nouns
that qualify the typology of inequality one is considering. Depending
of the noun preceding (or following) the word inequality, one can form
several distinct concepts: political inequality, gender inequality, income
inequality, economic inequality, social inequality, and so forth. There-
fore, it is useful to define the concept of inequality I will employ before
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proceeding with the present work, making clear what I will consider
when I speak about inequality.
Within this work, I will address inequality within countries by fo-
cusing on inequality of income. Indeed, it is important to stress that
income inequality is not the only mean through which assess inequal-
ity within countries and maybe, theoretically, it is not even the more
correct. Amartya Sen (1992), among others, criticized the economists’
tendency of focusing merely on the measurement of income inequal-
ity since this approach would imply to focus the attention only toward
inequality of results, leaving completely unexplored inequality of op-
portunities. Inequality of results is interpreted as the difference in the
results obtained by individuals that are basically unequal, namely that
have different factors such as physical or intellectual characteristics, for
example, individual talent. Inequality of opportunities occurs when in-
dividuals do not have access to the same possibilities, and it is normally
associated with a lack of fairness and social justice. Phrasing it differ-
ently, inequality in opportunities means that, although individuals are
essentially equal, they do not have the same resources to pursue their
own well-being. The motivations at the basis of the research on in-
equality of opportunities derived from the intuition of a fundamental
issue, namely that the importance of income is instrumental and context
contingent rather than intrinsic and categorical.
Inequality of opportunities are usually considered in some way
more intolerable than inequality of results. Equality of opportunity lit-
erature, in fact, points out how the source of opportunities is what re-
ally matters from an ethical point of view (Roemer & Trannoy, 2015).
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However, as pointed out by Okun (1975) the concept of inequality of
opportunities is way more elusive than that of inequality of income, and
it poses serious problems when one tries to measure it. Of course, the
difficulties and issues of the task have not stopped researcher to try to
conceptualize and measure inequality of opportunities.
An interesting work trying to quantify inequality in this sense is
the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), created by
Mahbub ul Haq in the framework of United Nations Development Pro-
gramme. The IHDI is based on the Human Development Index (HDI),
a composite index that include country-level variables such as life ex-
pectancy, education and per capita income. Both HDI and IHDI are
based on Sen’s work, in particular on the concept of capabilities. The
IHDI accounts for the degree of development a human being can reach
by considering the opportunities a person has to do desirable thing in
life once inequality is included, therefore in some sense it can be con-
sidered an index measuring inequality of opportunities across countries.
The HDI, however, has been strongly criticized on several grounds, both
theoretically and statistically (Wolff, Chong & Auffhammer, 2011).
For all these reasons I will employ a purely economic definition
of inequality. In economic terms, inequality can be defined at least in
two main different ways: income inequality, and wealth inequality. The
first is a measure of the flows of individual incomes, while the second
is a measure of the stocks of individual wealth.
In general terms, income inequality can be defined as the differ-
ences in the levels of income among different considered units, usually
households. More specifically, income inequality can be divided in two
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typologies, pre-tax and post-tax. Pre-tax and post-tax income inequal-
ity. Pre-tax inequality is defined as the differences of income among
the considered units before the payment of taxes and the receiving of
transfers, while post-tax inequality is the difference of income after the
payment of taxes and the receiving of transfers. Depending on the type
of analysis one would carry out, it will be more appropriate to employ
the former or the latter. Wealth inequality, instead, can be defined as the
differences of wealth among the considered units, where wealth is not
only defined as the income gained by the unit in a certain year, but also
as the unit’s savings, investments, and property holding (Okun, 1975).
Put it differently, wealth is usually defined as the sum of financial and
non-financial assets owned by the considered unit minus their financial
liabilities (Alvaredo, et al., 2017).
Within this work, when not otherwise specified, I will employ the
terms inequality and income inequality alike, to indicate the inequali-
ties of income post taxes and transfers within the population of a given
country. The choice to employ such a definition of inequality is that,
considering inequality only once citizens have paid taxes and have re-
ceived income transfers allows to take into account the redistributive
effects of governments.
2.2.2 Choosing among different datasets measuring in-
come inequality
Tomeasure income inequality, I will employ the well-knownGINI
coefficient. Elaborated by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini (1912),
the GINI coefficient (or GINI Index) is a measure of the inequality of a
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certain distribution, and it is widely employed as a concentration index
to measure inequality within the distribution of income or wealth. The
GINI coefficient can be used to measure inequality of income or wealth
within different distributions, for instance it can be used to measure in-
come inequality within a country or across countries. The coefficient
takes the form of a number comprised between 0 and 1 (or sometimes
between 0 and 100), where 0 and 1 correspond respectively to a com-
pletely equal and a completely unequal distribution.
The GINI coefficient is usually based on the mathematical con-
cept of the Lorenz Curve (Lorenz, 1905) of the distribution plotting the
proportion of the total income cumulatively earned by the population
considered, and it is related to the area comprised between the 45 de-
grees line representing a perfect distribution, namely a distribution in
which all units (individuals or households) have the same share of in-
come. The GINI coefficient can be defined as the ratio of the area lying
between the line of equality and the Lorenz curve over the total area
under the line of equality (Figure ), so as that: G = A/ (A + B).
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Figure 2.2: Graphical representation of the Lorenz Curve
Source: Author’s elaboration on Lorenz (1905).
The derivation of the GINI index is well codified and accepted by
the entire scientific community, and there are several different datasets
available for cross-national and over-time analysis. Unfortunately, due
to differences in the population covered, the geography, the unit of anal-
ysis, the scale of equivalence employed, and the definition of welfare
and other items, most of the data are not comparable among them (Solt,
2016), so as that deciding which database on Gini to employ, one faces
a trade-off between coverage and comparability. On the one side one
can find datasets providing a very high level of data comparability both
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among countries and years but covering very small samples. On the
other side, one can find datasets covering large samples both in terms of
time and space but providing less comparable data.
Among the cross-country Gini datasets currently available some
of the most employed in the empirical research are: The European
Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) provided
by the Eurostat, the All the Ginis (ATG) dataset presented in Milanovic
(2016), theWorld Development Indicators (WDI) provided by theWorld
Bank Group, the Estimated Household Income Inequality Data Set (EHII)
produced by the University of Texas, the Luxembourg Income Study
Database (LIS) provided by the LIS Cross-National Data Center in Lux-
embourg, the StandardizedWorld Income Inequality Database (SWIID)
compiled by Frederik Solt, and the Income Distribution Database (IDD)
produced by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD). Table 8 presents a summary of the relevant characteris-
tics of the Gini data provided by the different datasets.
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As shown in Table 2.8, the data on Gini of the considered databases
consistently vary in terms of countries and years covered, as well as in
terms of data comparability. In terms of sample size, on the one side
the EU-SILC, the LIS and the IDD cover small samples providing a
small number of country/year observations, respectively 545, 286 and
340. On the other side, the ATG, the WDI, the EHII, and the SWIID
cover a large sample providing a rather large number of country/year
observations, respectively 2218, 1372, 3872, and 5145. While in terms
of comparability, data differ about the equivalence scale employed as
well as the unit of analysis they refer to. However, notwithstanding all
the differences, the Ginis considered show a high degree of agreement
on the evaluation of income inequality within countries and year. Table
2.9 reports the correlation matrix between the Gini indices considered8
and shows how the correlation coefficients between the indices take on
average quite high values, ranging from 0.538 between the EHII and
the WDI, to 0.981 between the LIS and SWIID. Indeed, the differences
can be explained by the differences in the characteristics reported in Ta-
ble 2.8, such as the employment of different definition of welfare and
different equivalence scales.
8Due to the great differences of coverage in terms of time and space, to increase the
number of observations for each computation the correlation has been computed sep-
arately for each pair of indices. Each correlation, therefore, is calculated on a differ-
ent number of observations.
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Table 2.9: Correlation matrix of the considered Gini indices
Gini Indices EU-SILC ATG WDI EHII LIS SWIID IDD
EU-SILC 1.000
ATG 0.860 1.000
WDI 0.908 0.948 1.000
EHII 0.602 0.605 0.538 1.000
LIS 0.855 0.971 0.985 0.768 1.000
SWIID 0.931 0.844 0.899 0.721 0.981 1.000
IDD 0.943 0.915 0.964 0.747 0.976 0.979 1.000
Source: Author’s elaboration
As already pointed out, when deciding which database on Gini to
employ, one faces a trade-off between coverage and comparability. But
comparability, and thus the overall quality of the data provided, strongly
depends on the coverage of the dataset in terms of countries. When data
on Gini are collected and elaborated by a single institution, they are
usually more comparable and therefore they provide better quality. At
the same time, data on Gini produced within developed countries are
usually more reliable than those produced within developing countries.
Therefore, producing high quality and comparable data on Gini has a
cost in terms of sample size.
The data on Gini provided by LIS, which are considered the high-
est quality and internationally comparable ones (Atkinson, 2004), in
fact, cover only 286 country/year observation for only 49 developed
countries. Similarly, the EU-SILC and the IDD dataset provide highly
comparable data but at the expense of the number of observations and
countries covered. On the opposite sign, the ATG, the WDI, the EHII
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and the SWIID provide a high number of country/year observation, un-
fortunately, they often provide data that are way less comparable among
countries.
However, since the aim of this work is to provide an assessment
of the relation between a states’ form of government and its levels of
income inequality able to produce generalizable results, I must face the
above-mentioned trade-off. In fact, if on the one hand the concerns
about the comparability of data would suggest relying to the employ-
ment of datasets such as the LIS, the EU-SILC, or the IDD, on the other
hand limiting the analysis to the countries covered by those datasets
would mean limiting it to a less consistent share of the world population,
and almost exclusively to the richest and more developed countries. Ta-
ble 2.10 reports some of the relevant characteristics9 of the countries
covered by the different datasets. To compare them, I considered the
observation of the year 2012, which is the last year covered by the UDS
dataset.
9Data on GDP, GDP per capita, and total population are retrieved from theWorld Bank
Database.
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Table 2.10: Characteristics of the countries covered by the different
datasets in the year 2012
Dataset
Countries
Covered
Average
UDS
Average
GDP
(billions)
Average
GDP
per capita
World
Population
Covered
(%)
Total
Population
Covered
(billions)
EU-SILC 34 1.325 571 34051.78 8.5 0.60
IDD 42 1.315 1510 34823.11 61.4 4.36
LIS 49 1.238 1600 35050.9 43.0 3.06
EHII 149 0.434 516 16549.63 95.5 6.78
WDI 164 0.401 439 11950.86 98.4 6.99
ATG 166 0.394 455 13193.83 97.4 6.92
SWIID 192 0.343 416 13866.63 98.7 7.01
Source: Author’s elaboration
As shown by Table 2.10, relying on the data provided by LIS,
EU-SILC and IDD, would imply limiting the analysis to 59 countries
that are on average more democratic, with a high Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP) and GDP per capita, and which account only for the 64.85
per cent of the world population. Therefore, employing one of these
datasets would severely limit the possibility to generalize the results
obtained by the empirical analysis. For all these reasons, for choosing
a measure of income inequality to employ in the empirical analysis, I
turned my attention to the datasets providing less comparable data but
covering a larger sample in terms of countries/years: the ATG, the EHII,
the WDI, and the SWIID. None of the four datasets however is devoid
from issues, and each of them presents some strengths as well as spe-
cific pitfalls that need to be considered and evaluated before employing
them in empirical analyses.
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The ATG is a compilation of several Gini coefficients from eight
different sources, employed to generate one standardized Gini coeffi-
cient (Giniall) for each observation. The generation of Giniall is reached
by aggregating the preferred Gini coefficients for each observation, rank-
ing them according their overall quality (Smeeding & Latner, 2015).
Overall, the ATG is a very transparent dataset, and for each Giniall ob-
servation, it also provides all the relevant information (the source, the
welfare definition, the unit of analysis, the quality ranking, etc.) so as
that scholars can autonomously decide what data employ and how to
combine them according to their needing. But the ATG also presents
two main issues that affects its usability. Firstly, employing all the ob-
servations on Gini provided by the Giniall, implies merging together
coefficients which are constructed starting from different concepts, def-
initions, and aggregation’s methods. Of course, as already pointed out,
scholars may easily decide to employ only comparable coefficients, but
when data are selected according to comparable characteristics (the wel-
fare definition, the unit of analysis, the quality ranking) the coverage in
terms of both countries and years is severely reduced. Secondly, the
Giniall coefficients are constructed without employing any equivalence
scale, namely without accounting for the fact that there are greater costs
associated with larger households and economies of scale in consump-
tion that are generated by cohabitation (Smeeding & Latner, 2015).
The EHII is a panel of estimated Gini coefficients based on the
table of measures of the Industrial Statistic of the United Nations Indus-
trial Development Organization (UNIDO), which consist of the between-
groups components of the Theil’s T statistics calculated across indus-
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trial categories introduced in 1999 (Galbraith et al., 2016). The esti-
mates produced by EHII are based on regressions that demonstrate the
close relation between inequalities of industrial pay and household in-
equalities, across time and space. The EHII offers to the researcher the
major advantage of covering a large sample in terms of both countries
and years, also well covering the different regions of the world. More-
over, even if the coefficients’ estimate is based on inequality in indus-
trial pay instead of inequality among households, as shown by Galbrait
et al. (2014) the EHII does an effective job of estimating gross house-
hold inequality. However, the EHII also presents two issues: the first
is a general issue affecting the overall employment of the Gini coeffi-
cients provided, while the second is an issue specifically affecting the
research presented in this work. On the one hand, the EHII does not em-
ploy any equivalence scale and therefore, similarly to the ATG, it does
not account for the greater costs associated with larger households and
economies of scale. On the other hand, the EHII considers gross house-
hold inequality instead of net household inequality. But since the aim
of this work is to assess the effect that the form of government has to
the levels of national inequality, employing gross household inequality
would not account for the effect of redistribution on the distribution of
income, overestimating inequality within those countries implementing
greater redistributive policies.
The WDI is a large database compiled by the World Bank Group,
providing cross-country comparable data on development (World Bank
Group, 2017). WDI data are based on primary household survey data
obtained from government statistical agencies and World Bank country
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departments. With respect to the coverage, the WDI provides a large
sample of Gini observations both in terms of countries and years. The
WDI dataset on Gini has two major strengths that make it one of the
most employed dataset for the empirical study of inequality. Firstly,
as already pointed out, it covers a large sample of both countries and
years, offering an excellent coverage in term of different world regions
as well. Secondly, in addition to the overall Gini, the WDI also provides
several other measures of inequality such as quintiles and shares. How-
ever, even the WDI presents some issues that must be considered. On
the one hand, its Gini is calculated based on different national surveys
that employ different welfare definition (of per capita income and con-
sumption) without any serious attempt to standardize them (Galbraith
et al., 2016) and this severely affects its comparability across countries
as well as within countries across years. On the other hand, similarly to
the ATG and the EHII, it does not employ an equivalence scale rather it
employs a raw adjustment for household size.
The SWIID, elaborated by Frederick Solt (2016), which is the
index that will be employed within this work, aims to provide schol-
ars with a dataset of income inequality that maximize comparability
for the amplest possible sample in terms of both time and space (Solt,
2009). And the two major strengths of the SWIID dataset are, in fact,
the size of the sample, which is so far the amplest in terms of both
countries and years covered, and the harmonization of the data compos-
ing on Gini, which assure a great level of comparability both among
countries and years. The SWIID accomplish this task, by using the
data collected by the Luxembourg Income Study as the standard unit,
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while incorporating data on Gini from the IDD, the Socio-Economic
Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) generated by
the Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales (CEDLAS),
the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) compiled by the United
Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Re-
search (UNU-Wider), the UN Economic Commission for Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean, national statistical offices around the world, and
academic studies. The process of data aggregation is carried out min-
imizing reliance on problematic assumptions by using as much infor-
mation as possible from proximate years within the same country (Solt,
2016). The standardization is done by employing various imputation
techniques to estimate the ratios of different coefficients and to create
comparable data, in particular, using multiple (MI) imputation estimates
for filling the missing values in the LIS database (Dorn, 2016). How-
ever, also SWIID data are not exempted from criticisms. Critics are
focused on the reliability of the results of the imputation techniques
employed, especially for less developed and developing countries, for
which reliable baseline observations are scarcer (See: Jenkins, 2015;
Solt, 2016).
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3Form of government and
Inequality: Comparing
Theories and Researches
3.1 What we theoretically know about the re-
lation
The systematic study of the relationship between economic in-
equality and democracy is fairly recent, it started in the 1970s thanks to
the growth of data collection and the progressive evolution of computa-
tional and statistical tools.
Many scholars have engaged in the disentanglement of the puzzle
concerning the relation among the two variables but, although research
tools have evolved at theoretical, statistical and computational level,
works on the subject both theoretical and empirical did not reached ho-
mogeneous conclusions. Theorists elaborated several models trying to
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explain the causal mechanisms and the causal direction of the relation,
each of which, proposing different frameworks and different outputs,
and empirical researchers testing those models found, from time to time,
evidences in favour and against each of them. Researches show, in fact,
divergent conclusions both regarding the very existence of a causal re-
lation between democracy and inequality, and the causal direction that
such a relation would assume.
Throughout a carefully analysis of the literature, however, it is
possible to identify four main theoretical strands that pinpoint to differ-
ent causal relations between a state form of government and its level of
inequality:
1. Linear relation in which the form of government influence in-
equality;
2. Linear relation in which Inequality influences the form of govern-
ment;
3. Non-linear relation in which the form of government influences
inequality, the so called inverted "U";
4. No relation between the two variables.
3.1.1 Linear relation in which the form of government
influence inequality
The first hypotheses about the effect of the state’s form of gov-
ernment on inequality go back in time to philosophers of the ancient
Greece. Such intuitions, even if referring to concepts having different
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meanings with respect to their modern usage, have been followed and
refined, through the history, by several thinkers. However, only after the
formation of the modern form of state, and moreover after the birth of
modern democracies, they have started to be systematized in a coherent
corpus of knowledge. John Stuart Mill (1862), in his essay “Consider-
ation on Representative Government” claims that liberal governments
help to reduce inequality. According to Mill, a proof supporting this
thesis would be the fact that, in spite of the claims for an increase of
rights for disenfranchised citizens, conservative political elites have of-
ten opposed to the enlargement of such rights, fearing that it would have
undermined their status and their wealth. A pattern of this kind can be
traced back in the second half of the nineteenth century, when the suf-
frage has been progressively widened in most of European states. The
idea behind Mill’s thesis, on the wake of the Aristotelian thought, is that
within a democratic system the relative weight of the poorer section of
the population, bigger than that of the richer one in terms of number of
votes, would push the state to implement greater redistributive policies
asked by the former at the expenses of the latter.
Almost a century after Mill’s writings Lipset (1959), studying the
determinants of democracy, gave birth to the theoretical strand known as
modernization theory according to which economic development would
be the very engine of the processes of democratization. In a dynamic
perspective, the theory claims that the increase in the level of economic
well-being would produce a series of societal changes, such as urbaniza-
tion, industrialization, and mass education, which in turn would trigger
a process of change in individuals’ political preferences and attitudes,
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so that public acceptance for repressive political regimes would become
weaker. In practical terms, the increases of individual economic well-
being, mainly through the improvement of the education, would change
so deeply individual preferences that the masses would not anymore
accept to live in a non-democratic regime.
In a more static perspective, as pointed out by Sirowy and Inkeles
(1990) "democracies are conceived so as to be relatively more open to
the struggles about resources’ redistribution". Thanks to the electoral
mechanism and to the right of opposition, they cannot enforce growth
policies that directly undermine the resources of specific social groups,
but at the same time they cannot even entirely ignore the voice of the
worst-off sectors of the population that organize themselves in order
to defend their legitimate needs (Lipset, 1959). Later, analyzing the
role of the elections in industrial democracies, Lipset (1960) deepen
his thought and claims that democratic political structures give rise to
elections that are expression of the democratic class struggle. With the
enlargement of the suffrage, occurred in many states from the twen-
tieth century, including smallholders in the electoral process, political
competition in industrial countries has noticeably increased, pushing
states, gradually but manifestly, to implement redistributive leftist poli-
cies (Bollen & Jackman, 1985).
It is important to highlight that Lipset’s theory, even not address-
ing directly the relation between regime’s types and inequality, strongly
influenced all the subsequent research about this topic. Lipset’s theory
distinguishes two logical steps: on a first step processes of moderniza-
tion lead to democratization processes; on a second step, through the
76
enlargement of the suffrage and the recourse to elections as expression
of the class struggle, democratization would allow worst-off citizens to
ask for the implementation of redistributive policies.
According to the authors viewed so far, in a dynamic perspective
with the enlargement of the suffrage and the formation of democratic
institutions, the poorer sectors of the population would acquire, more
or less gradually, the capability to influence the policies implemented
by the governments, and to demand for redistributive policies, and this
would have the effect of reducing income inequality. While in a static
perspective, the same democratic structures and institutions would guar-
anty lower levels of inequality rather than non-democratic ones.
Lenski (2013), throughout his stratification theory, reaches quite
similar conclusions. According to Lenski, democratic ideology would
affect inequality because it would legitimize a greater distribution of
political power in favour of the majority, for the benefit of the most dis-
advantaged individuals within the society. The distribution of political
power would generate a distribution of material resources so reducing
inequality. Lenksi deepens his argument claiming that, given the exis-
tence of an egalitarian political structure, it is plausible to expect that
in the long run the most disadvantaged sectors of the population would
organize themselves in unions or other interest groups, and that they
would develop a solid electoral base, which would allow them to gain
sits in the parliament, taking part in the management of the government
machinery.
All the authors cited so far provide a reading of the relation that
highlight the bond between political and economic inequality. Thanks
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to their structures and their institutions, democratic regimes would tend
to generate, naturally, more egalitarian societies with a strong middle
class, and they would enforce more egalitarian policies, that would
reduce the levels of economic inequality. Therefore, a main channel
through which the regime type of a state would influence its level of in-
equality is represented by the requests of redistributive policies made by
the population. Indeed, redistribution can be achieved not only through
the implementation of fiscal policies increasing taxes on the rich to sub-
sidize the poor. Tanks to the possibility to organize themselves in trade
unions, possibility usually excluded within non-democratic regimes,
poor citizens can struggle against the rich ones in order to obtain higher
salaries. Therefore, for all these reasons, dynamically the transition
from a non-democratic to a democratic regime should entail a reduction
of inequality while, statically regimes with higher levels of democracy
should tend to present lower levels of inequality compared to regimes
with lower levels of democracy, as well as of course compared with
non-democratic regimes.
Redistributive requests, however, are not the only channel through
which the regime type can affect income inequality. Another important
channel, identified by the literature, through which democracy would
influence the formation of a strong middle class, so reducing inequality,
is the improvement of citizens’ education. As pointed out by Burkart
(1997), public education is one of the features, and at the same time
a product, of democratic systems, implemented in order to create citi-
zens who meet the requirements of a State governed by the people. And
theorists, such as Mill (1862), argue that creating more informed cit-
78
izens, public education decreases economic inequalities within states.
Put differently, as for their structures and institutions, also throughout
public education, democratic regimes are pushed, in a natural way, to
strengthen the middle class within states. The reason is that, in order
to arise, and moreover to survive, democratic regimes need a well-
developed bureaucracy, which in turn can be realized only through the
growth of an educated middle class capable to meet the requirement of
the system itself.
A logical consequence of the arguments presented so far is that
non-democratic regimes should present higher levels of inequality than
democratic regimes or, at least, they should be less inclined to pur-
sue policies aimed to reduce income inequality. Not having the same
need for legitimacy, non-democratic regimes can implement policies
advantaging a small sector of the population at the expenses of the ma-
jority. This happens because there are not those mechanisms allow-
ing the majority to affect government’s policies, in other words, non-
democratic regimes lack accountability mechanisms (Sirowy & Inkeles,
1990). These arguments seem to suggest that non-democratic regimes
would produce, inevitably, greater level of inequality. Therefore, politi-
cal inequality would translate automatically into economic inequality.
This pattern is confirmed by some empirical cases such as Brazil
from 1964, Chile from 1973 and Iran under the regime of the Shah.
Such a picture also appears in some traditional monarchies such as:
Nepal, Saudi Arabia, and Ethiopia under the regime of Haile Selassie.
The experience of these countries suggests that non-democratic regimes,
whether based on tradition, repression, or both, tend to present higher
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levels of inequality, since political elites are not accountable in front of
the majority of the citizens (Bollen & Jackman, 1985). The underly-
ing logic of these claims is that, needing legitimization from the base,
democratic regimes are more prone to redistribute material resources in
a more equal way, for the benefit of the poorer sections of the popula-
tion, therefore reducing the levels of income inequality.
However, neither these claims are unanimously accepted. Some
scholars, even sharing the believe according to which the regime type
of a state influences the level of inequality within states, claim that non-
democratic regimes are more capable to reduce inequality if compared
with democratic ones. Beitz (2015), for instance, suggests that author-
itarian regimes are better able to enforce more egalitarian development
policies than democratic regimes. The central idea of his thesis is that
authoritarian regimes can better protect the interests of the most disad-
vantaged sectors of the population, because the availability of political
rights, and their expression throughout elections, does not automatically
allow the poorer citizens to benefit from them.
This happens because the enlargement of political rights does not
automatically traduce in the capability to influence public policies. In
other words, according to Beitz, inequality in the distribution of ma-
terial resources, in a democracy, could turn into inequality of political
power. Therefore, contrarily to what happens in democratic regimes,
the government could enforce redistributive policies without consider-
ing the opposition of the wealthier citizens. In this regard, Gradstein
and Milanovic (2000) show how some Eastern European and Eastern
Asian countries managed to reach relatively low levels of income in-
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equality even in the presence of non-democratic regimes (for instance
Taiwan and South Korea), while in other cases, such as some ex-Soviet
countries, inequality has raised during and after the democratization
processes. To conclude, even accepting the idea that democracies are,
in general, more receptive to the redistributive requests claimed by the
member of the political community, Beitz (2015) highlight how democ-
racies do not necessarily consider all members’ request in the same
manner. Consequently, poorer citizens will not be able, as richer cit-
izens do, to defend their interests throughout democratic structures.
But beyond the dichotomy democracy non-democracy, some au-
thors have highlighted how also the ideologies to which governments
rely can influence redistribution and therefore inequality. Governments
inspired by leftist ideologies are expected to increase taxes on the rich
and redistribution to the poor, on the contrary governments inspired by
rightist ideologies are expected to do the opposite. This relation seems
to be confirmed for western industrialized countries (Korpi & Palme,
2003; Esping-Andersen, 1985), as well as for developing countries ei-
ther democratic or non-democratic (Ha, 2012).
3.1.2 Inequality affects the form of government
According to the second theoretical strand analyzed, it would not
be the regime type of a state affecting inequality levels, rather the op-
posite. This idea dates back to the time of ancient Greece. In his essay
"Politic" Aristotle notices that the distribution of economic resources
can affects the political regime of a certain political community. Aris-
totle claims that "In democracies the majority are sovereign, but in oli-
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garchies are the few [. . . ] On the contrary oligarchies originate from
the believe of the citizens of being unequal, unequal in the property
they suppose themselves completely unequal” (Laurenti, 2007). In other
words, Aristotle emphasizes the bond between the distribution of re-
sources and the political system of a state, claiming that to an unequal
distribution of property, usually correspond non-democratic forms of
government. Even without using the term, Aristotle in his writings high-
lights the importance of a well-developed middle class, as a base for the
promotion of a democratic system.
Starting from different assumptions, after more than two thousand
years, Marx (1926) points out the centrality of the middle-class’ role in
the transition toward a model of parliamentary democracy, and contem-
porary authors do not stray too far from these assumptions (Bollen &
Jackman, 1985). There is, in fact, a certain agreement about the idea
that inequality negatively affects democratic regimes and that, in some
cases, it may preclude its establishment. To work properly, a state ruled
by the people needs the presence of a specialized bureaucratic apparatus
able to run all the institutions that such a regime type requires, and this
need usually translates in the formation of a strong middle class.
Income inequality can influence the regime type of a state through-
out several mechanisms. According to Muller (1988) the hypotheses of
a direct relation between the level of income inequality and the regime
should be analyzed through two main dynamic perspectives, distinct but
complementary. He underlines that researches on the negative effect of
inequality on democracy, on the one side, should consider the question
of the genesis, answering the question: is a less unequal income distri-
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bution a necessary condition to set in motion a democratic transition?
On the other side, they should consider the question of the stability, an-
swering the question: once the democratic transition is achieved, and a
democratic regime has been established, do a less unequal income dis-
tribution increases the chances that the democratic system will remain
stable over the time?
For what concerns the question of the genesis, several authors
support the idea that a relatively egalitarian distribution of income re-
flects the raise of a strong and autonomous middle class (Moore, 1966;
Rubinson & Quinlan, 1977; Burkhart, 1997). The logical consequence
of this idea is that countries having high levels of income inequality
should show a weak middle class, and this would reduce the proba-
bility that a democratic transition would be undertaken. In this re-
gard, Dahl (1971) supported the previous thesis suggesting that extreme
forms of inequality in the distribution of material resources produces
non-democratic regimes. Since economic resources can be easily con-
verted in political resources, through several channels such as financing
political parties, financing one’s own electoral campaign, making lob-
bying activities within the various political institutions, concentration of
media, too concentrated economic resources allow the richer segment
of the population to oppose political reforms aimed to extend rights and
liberties to the poorer segments.
With respect to the question of the stability, the principal the-
sis is the one according to which income inequality generates frustra-
tion among citizens, especially within the poorer segments, and that
this frustration in turn would generate resentment and delegitimization
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for the authority and for the political system. Dahl (1971) claims that
democracies are particularly vulnerable because extreme inequalities
reduce the sense of community and the legitimization that democratic
systems need to survive. Therefore, as pointed out by Boix and Stokes
(2003) and further elaborated by Savoia et al. (2010), economic equal-
ity not only increases the chances that a democratic transition can occur,
it also increases the chances that the democratic regime manages to sta-
bilize itself.
However, even on this point, there is not a general agreement.
The empirical evidences, in fact, shows how some countries, even being
classifies as fully democratic with a strong democratic tradition, present
high levels of income inequality, without this represented a threat to
the democratic system, nor reduced its legitimacy. United States are
the more paradigmatic case of this empirical pattern, in fact, even pre-
senting high levels of income inequality (compared with other west-
ern democracies) and being one of the most ancient democracies in the
world, the legitimacy and the worth of the democratic system have not
been ever questioned.
3.1.3 Non-linear relation, the so called inverted "U"
Theories viewed so far seem to conflict among them. Everyone
hypothesizes a linear relation between democracy and inequality, but
they diverge in identifying the direction of the causal relation that would
bond them. In the last years, however, some authors tried to explain this
apparent conflict developing theories considering the possibility that the
two variables would be bound by a non-linear relation. At the base of
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this theoretical development there is the thought according to which the
increase of the democratic level within a country, and therefore increas-
ing the extension of the right to vote, initially, would tend to produce an
increase in the level of income inequality and, only later, with further
democratic improvements, inequality would tend to decline. Therefore,
in this case, it would subsist a non-linear relation that would take the
form of the so called inverted "U", also called "Kuznets curve". Si-
mon Smith Kuznets, an American scholar whose empirical studies on
economic development earned him a Nobel Prize in economics, during
his studies, analyzing the relation between economic development and
income inequality (Kuznets, 1955) found that at the initial phases of de-
velopment within an economy, the levels of income inequality tends to
increase and, only in the long term, inequality tends to decrease. This
pattern, when graphically expressed (Figure 3.1), takes the form of an
inverted "U", showing a non-linear relation between the two variables.
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Figure 3.1: Kuznets curve on the relationship between economic devel-
opment and income inequality
Source: Author’s elaboration on Kuznets (1955)
In the first years following its theorizing, the Kuznets curve model
have been explained mostly through economic factors. Kuznets himself,
looking at the European countries’ history (United Kingdom, France,
Germany, etc.) speculated about the fact that the dynamic of the curve
could be caused mainly by the passage from an agriculturally based
economy to an economy based on the industrial sector.
Contrasting with the economic reading of the Kuznets’ curve,
some authors proposed a different theory, according to which, within
Western countries, the curve would have been caused by political and
institutional rather than economic factors. According to this strand of
thought, the decline of inequality in Western Europe, experimented dur-
ing the nineteenth century, have not been a consequence of the eco-
nomic development but a product of the political changes forced by the
mass mobilization (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2002). The industrializa-
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tion process conducted to an increase of the levels of income inequality
and, consequently, there have been riots among the poorer segments of
the population. As a response to those riots, which risked giving birth to
actual revolutions, political elites have been forced to implement radical
political reforms, as the extension of the right to vote and the implemen-
tation of redistributive policies. According to Acemoglu and Robinson
(2002), the political theory of the Kuznets curve, provides that "The
capitalistic industrialization tends to increase income inequality, but
the same inequality has the seeds of its reduction, because it induces
changes in political regimes through more redistributive policies".
Inheriting his research, therefore, some authors employ the model
created by Kuznets applying it to the democracy inequality relation.
The novelty, compared to previous studies, is the attempt to measure
the level of democracy, so overcoming the dichotomous classification
democracy/non-democracy, considering instead a democracy scale ca-
pable to better gauge the differences among different democratic regimes.
Burkhart (1997) claims that, during a democratic transition pro-
cess, economic benefits tend initially to concentrate in the urban middle
class, further increasing income inequality between the urban and the
rural classes. Later, with the establishment and the stabilization of the
democratic regime, the level of income among the rural class would tend
to increase, therefore reducing income inequality. In this regard, Chong
and Calderón (2000) argument that democracy’s establishment would
produce a reorganization of the informal sector, predominantly occu-
pied by the poorest segments of the population, which in turn would
have the effect of reducing the income gained by those who work in it.
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Burguignon and Verdier (2000), among the first to hypothesize
such a relation between democratic regimes and income inequality, de-
velop a theoretical model in which public decisions are taken on the ba-
sis of the decisions expressed by the majority of voters, and where the
right to vote is limited to educated citizens (that in their model would
be the minority). The minority possessing the right to vote would gov-
ern the country. The elites could decide to subsidize the education of
non-educated citizens, the incentive would be that of enjoying the pos-
itive externalities provided by the education, while the costs would be
represented by the partial loose of political control. This model can
generate a Kuznets curve since, initially, the investment on education,
and the consequent enlargement of the right to vote for a part of the
population previously excluded would generate an increase of inequal-
ity. Later, however, with further enlargements of the voting population,
the majority of voters would begin to claim the implementation of more
redistributive policies, and that would generate a reduction of income
inequality.
The underlying logic of the theoretical model presented is that,
initially, the investment on public education and the consequent enlarge-
ment of the right to vote would concern the richer part of non-educated
citizens. For this reason, initially, inequality would tend to increase.
In the long term, however, the new portion of voting population would
be able to influence, throughout its vote, the policies undertaken by the
government, and it would push for more redistributive policies that in
turn would produce further enlargement of the educated electoral basis,
therefore reducing income inequality.
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Even Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) develop a theoretical model
showing the possibility that the relation between democracy and in-
equality assumes the form of a political Kuznets curve, when a country
starts a democratic transition because of social pressures. According to
this model, while industrialization allows the richer elites to accumu-
late resources, the poorer section of the population will not be able to
invest in human capital, and this pattern will generate an increase in in-
come inequality. When income inequality reaches a certain threshold,
the risk to end in a revolution would increase, and this risk would force
the elites to extend political rights to the segments of the population that
were previously disenfranchised. In the long term, the democratization
process would have the effect of increasing education and redistribu-
tion, and ultimately it would reduce income inequality, generating an
inverted "U" curve for political reasons (Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Political Kuznets curve on the relationship between democ-
racy and income inequality
Source: Author’s elaboration on Kuznets (1955)
89
3.1.4 No relation between democracy and income in-
equality
In sharp contrast with theories presented so far that, even in a
distinct manner, hypothesize some relation between democracy and in-
equality, some authors claim that there is no such a causal relation be-
tween the two variables. The theoretical models presented by these au-
thors can be included in the so called "skeptical model". The arguments
supporting the skeptical model can be divided in two main groups. In
the first group, we can include the supporter of the "industrialization
logic", according to which the technological development processes in-
fluence either the distribution of material resources and the structure of
political institutions. They claim that the relation observed between the
two variables would be spurious because both the distribution of mate-
rial resources and the structure of political institutions would depend,
instead, on technological development (Bollen & Jackman, 1985). This
theoretical framework, also defined as functionalist, has been also ana-
lyzed by Marsh (1979) according to which the form of government of
a state has not any effect on the social stratification, and changes in the
distribution of economic resources have to be interpreted as changes in
the configuration of the occupational structure, which would be a direct
consequence of the industrialization logic. Consequently, any relation
between the political system and the level of income inequality would
be spurious, because both variables would depend on the level of eco-
nomic development.
Even if expressed throughout different terms, the concept remains
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the same. The industrialization logics (that in different epochs have
served as the backdrop and the driving force of democratic transitions),
pursuing technological processes, would alter the social classes’ struc-
ture within states. The need for a more educated and qualified work-
force would influence directly the occupational structure, and conse-
quently the level of income inequality. In other words, according to this
approach, would not be possible to identify a clear relation between the
political system and the level of inequality of a state, since both would
be dependent variables of the technological-economic development.
In the same category, we can also place those authors referring to
the Marxist analysis, which starting from different assumptions come to
similar conclusions, founding a subordinate role of political structure in
capitalistic and pre-capitalistic societies (Marsh, 1979; Nelson, 1987).
According to the Marxist analysis, democratic structures and ideologies
not only would not have effects on income inequality, they would serve
to legitimize and to strengthen the relations already existing among so-
cial classes from which income inequality would ultimately depend.
According to the Marxist approach, the typology of political regime
would lose importance with respect to social classes’ structure, and
particularly with respect to the economic power of the capitalist class.
Therefore, to understand the mechanisms generating income inequality
and its variations, it is fundamental to study social classes’ structure and
the dynamics that influence them (Sirowy & Inkeles, 1990). Following
this approach, political systems would not influence inequality since it
would depend only on the classes structure within a country. According
to these line of thought, democratic systems not only would not be able
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to reduce inequality, they would be employed by the dominant social
classes as an instrument capable to avoid riots, and ultimately to shelve
the status quo of the existing class structure.
The second theoretical strand, instead, directly questions the ba-
sic assumptions underlying the very nature of democratic political sys-
tems. The hypothesis that democratic systems would be able to reduce
inequality are mainly based on the majoritarian democratic model (Ran-
ney & Kendall, 1951) –which would allow the poorer segment of the
population, greater in term of votes, to obtain the implementation of
more redistributive policies– but the empirical evidences show how only
a few democratic systems can be classified as majoritarian (Lijphart,
1984). For the supporters of this theoretical strand, also the assumption
that high levels of inequality can threaten democratic systems should be
revised. They argue that in order to observe such a pattern, it is fun-
damental that inequality be perceived as unjust, however, there would
be no reason to believe that this actually happen in all cases (Sirowy &
Inkeles, 1990). The cases of US and Australia could be examples of
such a pattern. In the two countries, despite an increase in the levels
of inequality, registered from the 1960s to the 1990s, neither the demo-
cratic political system nor the principles on which it is based have been
ever seriously questioned by the citizens.
3.2 What we empirically know
As we have seen, different theories have been developed to try to
disentangle the relation between democracy and income inequality in
one way or the other. Some authors claim the form of government in-
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fluences inequality, while others claim that is inequality that influences
the form of government and, lastly, some others claim that there is not
any causal relation between the two variables. In the last decades, all the
theories presented have been tested empirically, nevertheless, scholars
have not reached homogeneous conclusions. However, to have a clear
perception about the motivations behind such differentiation of results,
it is worthy to analyze the major empirical studies performed so far.
Analyzing the previous empirical studies, I will focus on the re-
sults obtained, but also on the characteristics of the models developed,
and on the methodologies employed to test their assumptions. In my
analysis, I will consider either recent and dated researches, and in gen-
eral those works that have had a decisive impact on the literature (Table
3.1).
Table 3.1: Democracy and inequality, summary of the studies analyzed
Author/s Year
Jackman 1974
Hewitt 1977
Rubinson and Quinlan 1977
Bollen and Grandjean 1981
Bollen and Jackman 1985
Weede 1989
Alesina e Perotti 1996
Reuveny e Li 2003
Chong 2004
Acemoglu et al. 2005
Source: Elaboration of the author
3.2.1 Characteristics of the econometric models employed
The choice of the econometric model, employed to test the rela-
tion, is a fundamental aspect of almost any quantitative empirical re-
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search. It depends substantially on the theoretical model one wants to
test, and from the results one expects to find.
For what concern the works considered here, a first distinction
worthy to be done is that between the research developing simultaneous
equation models and those employing single equation models. The for-
mer kind of model is developed to test the hypothesis that the relation
between democracy and inequality take the form of a simultaneous re-
lation in which the two variables influence each other simultaneously,
while the latter kind of model tests the hypothesis that only one vari-
able affects the other. In the second case, the possible reciprocity of the
relationship is not even considered, in fact, they restrict their focus to
recursive models testing only the effect of democracy on inequality, or
the opposite.
An important second distinction is that only the most recent em-
pirical studies employ dynamic models capable to assess the evolution
of the relation along the time, while the others limit their analysis at a
cross-sectional level.
A third distinction worthy to point out regards the functional form,
hypothesized and tested, that the relation would assume. This difference
depends, as that of the model, on the different theoretical approaches,
on the expected interaction among the variables considered, and on the
assumptions to be tested. Among our sample of studies, in most cases
authors choose to employ a non-linear form, either quadratic or logarith-
mic, while in a few cases the relation is hypothesized as linear. Table
3.2 shows a synthesis of the studies’ main characteristics.
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Table 3.2: Democracy and inequality studies’ main characteristics
Author Year Simultaneity
Equation
Form
Static/Dynamic
Model
Jackman 1974 No Logarithmic Static
Hewitt 1977 No Linear Static
Rubinson and Quinlan 1977 Yes Logarithmic Static
Bollen and Grandjean 1981 No Quadratic Static
Bollen and Jackman 1985 Yes Quadratic Static
Weede 1989 No Quadratic Static
Alesina and Perotti 1996 No Linear Static
Reuveny and Li 2003 No Linear Dynamic
Chong 2004 Yes Quadratic Dynamic
Acemoglu et al. 2005 No Linear Dynamic
Source: Elaboration of the author
3.2.2 Variables’ measurement and data
Another important factor, which may influence considerably the
results between empirical studies, is the operationalization process, car-
ried out to empirically analyze abstract non-directly observable con-
cepts, such as democracy and inequality. Concepts’ operationalization
allows to move down along the abstraction scale, by assigning directly
observable empirical referents to the concepts analyzed (Sartori, 2009).
In other words, operationalization allows to transform theoretical defini-
tions into operational definitions, establishing empirical indicators, rep-
resenting the different component of a concept, which can be directly
observed and measured. The differences in the choice of the essen-
tial components of a concept, the selection of the indicators to measure
them, and the quality of the data available, can lead to substantially
different results when employed in empirical researches.
The authors of the studies considered here have dealt with this
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task in different ways. For what concerns the concept of democracy,
they employed different democratic indices based on different concep-
tions of democracy. In some cases, democracy is defined only in proce-
dural terms, while in other cases it is defined also considering different
aspects. A plethora of democratic indices do exist and, as discussed
in Chapter 2.1.3, they differ about several aspects. The studies exam-
ined, employ different indices some of which classifying states through
a merely distinction between democracies and non-democracies, while
other classifying countries through more complex measurement scales.
A similar argument can be made about inequality’s measurement,
not being a directly measurable concept, as in the case of democracy
need to be operationalized. Moreover, the term inequality can refer to
multiple concepts, inequality can refer to differences in the distribution
of economic resources, but also to differences in other social aspects
(as discussed in Chapter 2.2). However, all the studies considered here
employ an economic definition of inequality, considering only inequal-
ities of income, and almost all of them measure them through the Gini
coefficient that express inequality between the values of the distribu-
tion of income within a country. Table 3.3 shows how the variables are
measured by each study, and the source of the data they employ.
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3.2.3 Samples’ dimension and composition
A third factor influencing the results of the empirical studies is
their sample’s composition. The composition and the size of the sample
are two aspects connected to each other, in fact, the choices about the
composition, namely the choices related to which characteristics the
population included in the reference sample should possess, influences
the number of cases available, and doing so it influences the sample’s
size.
Both the size and composition of the samples considerably vary
among the studies considered here. This variation depends in part from
the authors’ choices about what countries to include and which charac-
teristics these countries should possess. But in part it derives also from
a more contingent aspect released from authors’ will, namely the avail-
ability of data. For what concerns author choices, we can notice that the
principal difference among the researches considered is the inclusion
or the exclusion of developing countries. For instance, Hewitt (1977)
exclude them, focusing his study on developed countries, and Reuveny
and Li (2003) add them to their sample, but analyzing them separately.
Table 3.4 show a summary of the sample’s characteristics.
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Table 3.4: Democracy and inequality summary of the characteristics of
the samples employed in the studies analyzed
Author Year Sample Size Time-frame
Jackman 1974 60 1960
Hewitt 1977 25 1945-1965
Rubinson and Quinlan 1977 32 1960
Bollen and Grandjean 1981 50 1960
Bollen and Jackman 1985 60 1958-1975
Weede 1989 20-33 1965
Alesina and Perotti 1996 71 1960-1985
Reuveny and Li 2003 69 1960-1996
Chong 2004 51 1960-1995
Acemoglu et al. 2005 184 1960-2010
Source: Elaboration of the author
3.2.4 Findings of the empirical research on democracy
and inequality
After having considered the main differences in the construction
of the principal empirical researches on the relation between democ-
racy and inequality, it is worthy to move to their results. As previously
pointed out, the results provided by the studies show mixed empirical
evidences, and from time to time they support each of the theories pre-
viously presented. In this regard, the studies can be classified in three
categories: (A) inequality negatively affects democracy; (B) Democ-
racy negatively affects inequality; and (C) there is not any significant
relation between the two variables. Table 3.5 show the classification of
the studies according to the three categories.
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Table 3.5: Democracy and inequality, classification of the empirical
studies based on their results
Author Year Results
Rubinson e Quinlan 1977 A
Alesina e Perotti 1996 A
Acemoglu et Al. 2005 B
Weede 1989 B
Chong 2004 B
Reuveny e Li 2003 B
Jackman 1974 C
Hewitt 1977 C
Bollen e Grandjean 1981 C
Bollen e Jackman 1985 C
Source: Elaboration of the author. Key: A = inequality reduces democ-
racy: B = democracy reduces inequalities; C = no significant relation
First and foremost, we can notice that only two studies, out of
the ten considered, can be placed in the first category, showing em-
pirical evidence supporting the thesis according to which the level of
inequality can reduce the level of democracy. Rubinson and Quinlan
(1977), comparing the studies performed by Curtright (1963) and Jack-
man (1974), conclude that the main problem of the two studies was the
fact that they have been forced, for lack of alternatives, to use data on
market inequality, instead of data on individual or household inequality.
They conclude that, replicating their analysis with individual data, more
suitable that the sectorial ones, the effect of democracy on inequality
would not be significant, while the effect of inequality on democracy
would be significant. Alesina and Perotti (1996) arise directly the aim
to test the hypothesis that economic inequality, fomenting social discon-
tent, increases political and economic instability, thereby jeopardizing
the democratic systems. And the results of their work show, in fact, that
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economic inequality, in a significant number of cases, would increase
political instability, thus having a negative effect on levels of democ-
racy within states.
In the second category, may be included those studies showing
empirical evidences supporting the thesis whereby democracy would
have a positive effect on the reduction of inequalities. This category
includes the studies of Weede (1989), Chong (2004), Reuveny and Li
(2003), and Acemoglu et al. (2005). Employing different metrics to
measure democracy and different econometric approaches, Chong (2004)
reach the conclusion that there is a significant and non-monotonic rela-
tion between democracy and inequality and, in some cases, it assumes
the form of a Kuznets curve. Similar conclusions are presented by
Reuveny and Li (2003), whom in their study shown that, for both devel-
oping and developed countries, the effect of democracy on inequality is
negative, so that increasing democracy reduces inequality.
The third category includes those studies showing no significant
empirical evidence of any relation between the two variables, reach-
ing the conclusion that there is no causal relation among them. In his
research based on Lensky’s hypotheses according to which democracy
would reduce inequality, Jackman (1974) concludes that there is not any
statistically significant relation between them, and that any relation that
may appear from the analysis would be spurious. The same result is
reached in the study carried out by Bollen and Grandjean (1981) that
points out how the relation that may be observed within their sample
it is not significant. Lastly, trying to verify the existence of a simulta-
neous causal relation between the two variables, Bollen and Jackman
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arrives to the same conclusions, so not finding any significant evidence
that would suggest the existence of such a relation.
Therefore, the analysis of the empirical, as well as the theoreti-
cal, literature does not help to reach any definitive conclusion about the
existence nor the direction of a statistically significant relation between
democracy and inequality. However, taking advantage from the past
theoretical and empirical contribution, but by proposing a different ap-
proach, this book aims to shed light on the mechanisms regulating the
relation in object, and hopefully to move forward on the debate.
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4Methodology: How to analyze
the relation between form of
government and inequality
4.1 Methodological premises
The choice of the methodology employed to analyze a phenomenon
is a fundamental part of any scientific research, especially in social sci-
ences. As pointed out by Schulze (2003), there is not an ideal research
methodology and any choice involves some pros and some cons. Phras-
ing it differently, based on different ontological, epistemological and
methodological assumptions, social scientist’s toolbox contains several
different tools, each of which presents advantages and limitations. The
different tools can be classified into the two broad categories of qualita-
tive and quantitative methodologies.
From an epistemological perspective, the distinction concerns how
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researchers answer to the questions: how do we know what we know?
And what is the relationship between the knower and what is known?
Quantitative scholars, supported by the positivist paradigm, believe that
empirical facts exist apart from personal ideas or thoughts, that they
are measurable, and that they are governed by laws of cause and effect.
Qualitative scholars on the contrary, mainly framed by the interpretivist-
constructivist paradigm, believe the world as constructed, interpreted,
and experienced by people interacting with each other and with the en-
tire social system (Maxwell, 2012; Merriam, 1988). The ontological
perspective, instead, raise the question whether reality exists indepen-
dently from people or it is just a product of social processes. In this
respect, qualitative methodologies employ the second perspective while
quantitative methodologies usually employ the first (Tuli, 2010).
From the balancing of these two perspectives, qualitative and quan-
titative research differ about the methods and the instruments they em-
ploy. Qualitative research includes: case studies, field studies, grounded
theory, document studies, naturalistic inquiry, observational studies, in-
terview studies, and descriptive studies. Often qualitative designs only
employ as unit of analysis one subject, one case, or one unit over an ex-
tended period (Newman & Benz, 1998). Quantitative research, instead,
includes experimental studies, quasi-experimental studies, pretest-postest
designs, and others, where control of variables, randomization, and
valid and reliable measures are required, generalizability from the sam-
ple to the population is the aim, and data are coded according to a priori
operational and standardized definitions (Newman & Benz, 1998).
For long time, the two approaches have been considered as a di-
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chotomy, and scholars employing the qualitative and the quantitative
perspectives engaged themselves in a long and hard debate about which
paradigm should have been considered as the only true expression of the
scientific method. Quantitative partisans, guided by the so-called pos-
itivist approach, claim that social phenomena should be considered as
entities in the same way physicists consider physical phenomena. They
believe that social science research must be objective, that researchers
must work to make generalizations, and that the outcome of social sci-
ence research must be determined reliably and validly. On the other
side, qualitative partisans, often called constructivists or interpretivists,
completely reject positivism, claiming that multiple-constructed reali-
ties do exist, that generalizations (time- and context-free) are not possi-
ble, and that knower and known cannot be completely separated since
the subjective knower is the only authentic source of reality (Johnson &
Onwuegbuzie, 2004).
From an historical perspective, during the last one hundred years,
social science methodology undergone four major phases (Onwueg-
buzie & Leech, 2005). The first, ended in the late nineteenth century,
saw the great emergence of the quantitative paradigm, and the predom-
inance of positivism with its statistical and mathematical instruments.
The second phase begun in the twentieth century when the qualitative
paradigm emerged. During this phase, and until the end of the Second
World War, the purist form of positivism in social science became to
be discredited (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). The third phase, occurred
between the late 1950s and the 1960s of the twentieth century, saw the
emergence of the post-positivist paradigm and the rejection of several
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tenets of logical positivism. With post-positivism emerged a compro-
mise between qualitative and quantitative paradigms. Post-positivists
on the one side maintain that reality is a social construct and that re-
search cannot be totally value free, but on the other side they believed in
the existence of some stable relationships. However, this third phase co-
incided also with the emergence of more radical methodological points
of view, which ultimately ended with the postulation of the so-called in-
compatibility thesis (Howe, 1988), according to which qualitative and
quantitative methodologies could not coexist in a single research. The
forth phase, started in the 1960s of the twentieth century, was marked
by the emergence of the pragmatists (Howe, 1988) that challenging the
incompatibility thesis supported the idea according to which qualitative
and quantitative methodologies were not mutually exclusive. Pragma-
tists consider the two methodologies as a continuum of the scientific
research. They support the idea that reality is both subjective and objec-
tive, and they employ both deductive and inductive logic (Onwuegbuzie,
2002). Even if the partisans of the two methodologies still exist, and the
methodological debate is still present in the academia, from the 1980s
of the twentieth century mixed methods evolved as a distinct research
approach, and mixed model studies emerged, employing a combination
of qualitative and quantitative methods at different stages of the research
process (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005).
One of the major differences between qualitative and quantitative
research is the role occupied by the theory, and the use of inductive,
and deductive reasoning is what mainly differentiate purely qualitative
and purely quantitative researcher. In quantitative research, the theory
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precedes the observation, and it is used by the researcher in order to set
up hypotheses that can be tested empirically, employing statistical tools.
The form of reasoning employed is deductive since the hypotheses are
derived from the theory. On the contrary, in qualitative research, the
theory usually follows the observation and, in some sense, is the very
result of the research. The form of reasoning here is inductive since the
theory is induced in a process developed by observing a phenomenon.
Nevertheless, the presence of such differences among the two research
methodologies are not sufficient to definitively assess the scientific su-
periority of one method over the other, nor they are an evidence that
they cannot be employed jointly. On the contrary, their combination
can provide several significant benefits.
Mouly (1970), yet in the 1960s, described multiple-perspective
research as "the essence of the modern scientific method [. . . ] Although,
in practice, the process involves a back-and-forth motion from induc-
tion to deduction, in its simplest form, it consists of working inductively
from experience to hypotheses, which are elaborated deductively from
implications on the basis of which they can be tested". In other words,
through the inductive and the deductive reasoning, qualitative and quan-
titative research can interact in what (Newman & Benz, 1998) called
an interactive continuum. The notion of interactive continuum (Figure
4.1) is important because it helps to understand how the two method-
ologies can be combined and used within a single research project. The
continuum is interactive because the two methodologies can create sev-
eral feedback loops that move back and forward to one another. In
their volume, Newman and Benz (1998) show that when we confront
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with a certain research question, in social sciences, employing the two
methodologies in different research’s stages can greatly enhance the un-
derstanding of social phenomena. A research, for instance, can begin
as a qualitative research with a field study or a case study and then can
continue with a quantitative analysis of the data collected. At the same
time, the finding of both the qualitative and the quantitative research
can lead to a modification of the initial theory and so to the genera-
tion of further new hypotheses. Therefore, if the research methods are
considered without the incompatibility preconception, it become clear
the fact that using them jointly can offer considerable advantages to the
researcher.
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Figure 4.1: One of the possible interactions within the qualitative-
quantitative interactive continuum framework
Source: Elaboration of the author based on the diagram produced by
Newman and Benz, 1998.
Extreme positions are often counterproductive, and in the case
of research methodologies they can constrain the researchers’ capabil-
ity to study a phenomenon. Practically speaking, the ontological and
epistemological assumptions of qualitative extremists, with their nega-
tion of the possibility to find regularities in social sciences, have the
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consequence of limiting the knowledge one could reach about a certain
question. On the other side, quantitative extremists’ assumptions that
empirical facts exist only apart from personal ideas or thoughts, that
they are always measurable, and they always governed by laws of cause
and effect, pose several problems when one tries to apply them in the
realm of social sciences providing, at the end, the same consequences
of qualitative extremism.
4.2 Mixed method research: a more compre-
hensive approach
The relation between democracy and inequality has been mas-
sively investigated in the last forty years, nevertheless, scholars did not
reach homogeneous conclusions, and a certain dose of disagreement
about either the eventuality of the existence, and the form and the shape
of the relation is still present in the empirical literature. It is impor-
tant to stress that most of the researches carried out on this topic have
been developed by economists, or anyway by purely quantitative schol-
ars. Moreover, with some notable exceptions (such as Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2005), the approach to the study of the phenomenon have
been focused mainly on testing existing theories, and refining the em-
ployment of statistic’s tools and methodologies, rather than on trying to
refine and develop the theories.
Consequently, looking at the theories elaborated to explain the re-
lation between democracy and inequality, it seems to emerge the lack
of a theoretical framework capable to gauge the great complexity of the
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interactions existing between the two variables. The theories elaborated
so far seem to be highly fragmented, each of which considering a rel-
atively small part of the phenomenon and leaving aside important oth-
ers. Phrasing it differently, they seem to oversimplify the phenomenon.
Simplification, of course, is needed to construct a theory capable to fit
with most cases, and it is essential to elaborate generalization, still an
oversimplified theory, when employed to test empirically a certain phe-
nomenon, can lead to a misunderstanding of the subject investigated.
This could explain the fact that most of the theories, when empirically
tested by different scholars, sometimes are confirmed, while other times
they are rejected. The fact that all of them seem to work for some cases,
and not for others, seems to suggest that they need to be incorporated
in a single, and more complex, theoretical framework, or that there are
some mechanisms and variables that have not been yet considered (or
both the options). For all these reasons, in this work, I choose to employ
an analytic strategy merging in some ways qualitative and quantitative
approaches.
The qualitative approach is a powerful tool when one tries to de-
velop a complex theory about social phenomena. Throughout the study
of specific cases, using a mixed inductive/deductive reasoning, in fact,
it allows to find pattern and regularities governing the observed phe-
nomenon, which can be employed to develop a more precise theory,
and then to break it down into more informed hypotheses. In particular,
the case study analysis is an excellent instrument that has a number
of advantages, and it is strong precisely where quantitative and for-
mal methods are weak: case studies can enhance the research’s con-
ceptual validity, with their procedures they can foster the development
of new hypotheses, they allow to examine closely the hypothesized role
of causal mechanisms within individual cases and they are capable to
address causal complexity (George Bennett, 2005).
In a comparative perspective through the analysis of some rele-
vant deviant cases (i.e. cases deviating from the theories emerged in
the literature review), especially useful in generating new hypotheses or
adjusting theoretical propositions (Della Porta & Keating, 2008), I will
try to disentangle the principal mechanisms involved in the relation, to
assess the possible presence of important omitted variable, and to verify
the presence of secondary causal mechanisms interfering with the prin-
cipal ones. The case study method, in fact, has the advantage of allow-
ing scholars to perform inductive analyses of the dynamics occurring in
a given country, and this procedure can be extremely useful in elaborat-
ing a more accurate and complete theoretical framework. In this sense,
in fact, the study of deviant cases employed in this work could be in
some sense included into the qualitative research category not because
it employs a purely qualitative research methodology, rather because
it uses an inductive rather than deductive approach. At the same time,
the quantitative approach is a powerful instrument to test the hypotheses
and theories previously elaborated. All in all, testing a theory is the only
way to confirm or to reject it. Therefore, contrarily to the studies carried
out so far, I will jointly employ the two methodological approaches in
the hope that this will lead to most robust results.
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Figure 4.2: Different interpretation of the qualitative-quantitative inter-
active continuum framework
Source: Elaboration of the author based on the diagram produced by
Newman and Benz, 1998.
Figure 4.2 shows my interpretation of the interactive continuum
framework, and it describe the way in which the research will be de-
veloped. As it can be easily noticed, my interpretation is different, and
in some sense simplified, with respect to the one proposed by Newman
and Benz (1998). For the sake of simplicity, in order to illustrate and
to justify the changes made to the scheme produced by Newman and
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Benz (1998), let’s consider the research’s process as a three-stage pro-
cess composed by: i) preliminary analysis; ii) qualitative analysis; and
iii) quantitative analysis.
Firstly, in what I called preliminary analysis, Newman and Benz
begun with the choice of the topic of interest and the elaboration of a
theory, followed by the literature review, the definition of the terms, and
the definition of the research question. According to the two scholars,
the latter three processes interact among them in a way in which each
step can change and evolve due to the results of the other two steps.
Differently, my diagram starts with the setup of the research question,
followed by the literature review and the definition of the terms (the
second and the third stages however, could also be inverted). The first
can interact with the second, and the second with the third, but the third
cannot influence the first. In other words, on the one side, starting with
the theory can misguide the scholar biasing the following steps. On the
other side, while the interaction between the literature review and the
definition of the research question, and between the literature review
and the definition of the term seem to be quite straightforward, the forth
and back interaction between the definition of the research question and
the definition of the terms appears to be problematic. It is difficult to
imagine how the definition of the terms can modify the research ques-
tion one would answer.
Therefore, the definition of the research question should precede
any other step since if one does not have clearly in mind which is the
question that one would like to answer, it is difficult even to decide
which literature should be revised, or which terms must be defined. At
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the same time, starting with a complete (or even partial) theory about
the object one would investigate can influence, consciously or not, other
aspect of the research such as the selection of the literature. Of course,
most scholars starting a research project have some idea about the pos-
sible answer, still to increase the level of objectivity one should try to
think about the studied phenomenon avoiding being guided by precon-
ceptions. And this means that if one employs a mixed research ap-
proach, the theory should follow at least the review of the literature
rather than precede it.
Concerning the second stage, a consequence of the changes oper-
ated to the preliminary stage is that the qualitative analysis (in my case
the study cases) and the formation of the theory pertain now to the same
stage, however, speculation and theory that in the view of Newman and
Benz (1998) are considered a single step, are now divided in two dis-
tinct steps where speculation precede the theory, and where its interacts
with the qualitative analysis, while the theory formation is the result of
latter and does not interact with the other components. The problem of
considering them a single step is semantic as well as practical. Seman-
tically speaking, according to the Cambridge online dictionary the term
“speculation” is defined as “the activity of guessing possible answers to
a question without having enough information to be certain”, while the
term “theory” is defined as “a formal statement of the rules on which
a subject of study is based or of ideas that are suggested to explain
a fact or event”. The two definitions show how they are two distinct
operations, and the difference is the quantity of information possessed
by the subject performing the operations. Both the processes involve a
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certain degree of uncertainty but to develop a theory it is required the
possession of a bigger quantity of information rather than in the case of
speculation. Therefore, practically speaking, in my view, for the sake
of precision the correct pattern research should follow is that of collect-
ing information through the review of the preliminary research stage,
speculating about the functioning of the phenomenon, using the spec-
ulation in order to setup the case study analysis, and finally using the
results of the case study analysis to develop a more consistent theory.
More consistent because the information on which it is based are now
more, better, and deeper than before. If there is the need, namely if
the qualitative analysis shows that the speculation and consequently the
same analysis need to be revised, one can move back and forward from
the speculation to the qualitative analysis, or even restart the entire pro-
cess by changing the research question. Still the formation of a theory
should be always the arrival point of the qualitative analysis.
The third stage, namely the quantitative analysis, does not diverge
too much from the one proposed by Newman and Benz (1998). Both
representations are guided by the same underlying logic and present
the same pattern. The quantitative analysis must start setting up one
or more testable hypotheses, then the researcher has to collect and to
analyse the data required to test them. Finally, the analysis produces
some results from which the researcher sums up some conclusions. The
conclusions can confirm the testable hypotheses and consequently the
theory, but they can also reject them. Ad similarly to Newman and
Benz’s scheme, depending on the type of results obtained, in the second
case the researcher can reboot its research from several previous steps.
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One could reformulate different testable hypothesis, change the theory
or the speculation, or reformulate the research question. In any case,
when moved back to a previous step one must follow again the other
steps until reaching new and different conclusions.
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5A case study analysis to develop
a complex theoretical
framework
5.1 A brief introduction to the case study anal-
ysis
As I already pointed out, the qualitative analysis, in this work, is
employed in a functional way to try to disentangle the mechanisms un-
derlying the relation investigated. As highlighted by Fearon and Latin
(2008), case studies represent a valuable tool for assessing whether
the speculation proposed to explain the functioning of a certain phe-
nomenon are plausible or not, allowing to develop a theory that, once
translated into testable hypotheses, can be verified empirically. This is
the basis of what is usually called multimethod research. The strategy is
that of building a theory from the scratch (or refining an existing theory)
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by analyzing certain cases and, in a second stage, to test the elaborated
theory through the employment of quantitative analysis.
To move further to accomplish this works’ goal, as previously
discussed in Chapter 4.2, before to begin the case study analysis, it is
necessary to operate some speculation about the functioning of the re-
lation between the two main variables considered. Indeed, at the end
of the exercise the speculation may turn out to be right or wrong, or to
need to be adjusted before being converted in a complete theory, how-
ever, the speculation is essential because it will guide the case studies
by focusing the attention on specific mechanisms and sub-mechanisms.
From the literature review, as well as from my previous works
(Cellini, 2015), it seems plausible to suppose that the relation between
democracy and inequality is shaped by multiple factors and variables,
some of which are direct and clearly identifiable, while others are in-
direct and/or not immediately identifiable. At the same time, it is also
plausible to suppose that the relation in object is not unidirectional. As
we have seen through the literature review, several studies seem to con-
firm that while democracy affects inequality, the latter variable can af-
fect the former. In other words, I assume the presence of a reciprocal
causal relation.
More specifically, I assume that the regime type of a state can af-
fect the level of income inequality through two principal channels: a
direct one, namely the redistributive requests of the population; and an
indirect one, namely the enhancement of the educational system. At the
same time, income inequality could affect the political regime of a state.
High levels of income inequality could result in social disorders, which
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in a democratic state could lead to the implementation of antidemocratic
policies, while in autocratic states could lead to repression, also through
the use of violence, or to a regime change. On the contrary, very high
levels of redistribution, generated through taxation or through the in-
crease of minimum wages, could create discontent between the richer
portion of the population which could result, in the more pessimistic
hypothesis, in a coup d’état operated in order to protect its economic
interests.
Therefore, in principle, since within democratic countries citizens
are usually more educated (Burkart 1997; Cellini, 2015) and they can
influence the creation of redistributive policies, one would expect that
democratic countries should show lower levels of income inequality
than non-democratic countries. At the same time, one would expect that
non-democratic regimes with high levels of income inequality should
show higher levels of unrest and social disorder, and that this would
lead to more frequent regime changes (Muller, 1988).
The empirical analysis, however, show mixed empirical evidence,
reporting several cases in which these expectations are not realized.
Hence, I suppose that there are some secondary mechanisms that some-
times contrast with the principal ones, and which in specific cases can
compromise their functioning. For this reason, in the next sections, I
will analyze three deviant cases, namely three cases in which the ini-
tial speculation seems to fail in explaining the relation between our two
principal variables.
The cases that will be analyzed have been chosen for being par-
ticularly paradigmatic in their deviation from the theory. The first is
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the case of the United States, a country where despite being considered
one of the most democratic countries in the world, has always shown
very high levels of inequality when compared with other consolidated
democracies. The second is the case of Hungary, a country in which,
on the one side, income inequality has been quite modest during its
non-democratic experience and where, on the other side, it increased
steadily following the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic
regime. Finally, the third is the case of China, a country in which de-
spite the level of inequality has dramatically increased since the end of
the 1970s, the stability of the regime has never been seriously in danger.
With the analysis of the three case studies, I hope to find gen-
eralizable hypotheses explaining the reasons why in specific cases the
theory fails to describe the relation between country’s regime and its
levels of inequality.
5.2 The American Case
As we have seen, according to the literature and to our specu-
lations, democratic countries should show relatively low levels of in-
equality. At the same time, democratic countries with high levels of
inequality should show frustration between the poorer section of the
population, which could give rise to extreme forms of protests or in the
worst scenario to the challenge of the democratic method itself. The
American history seems to contradict both these speculations.
The US is one of the most ancient among modern democracies.
Its constitution, drafted in 1778, is the very first modern written con-
stitution in the world, and according to most democratic indices, US
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has the maximum democratic score since very long time. PIV, for in-
stance, awarded US with the maximum democratic score from 1872
to 1963 and again from 1965 to 2016 when it has been downrated by
two points following the polarization of political competition between
“anti-establishment” and “anti-Trump” factions (Figure 5.1). However,
despite being considered one of the oldest and strongest democracies,
its levels of inequality have constantly raised since the 1980s (Figure
5.1 and fig:5.2).
Figure 5.1: United States democracy score by Polity IV for the years
1800-2016, and inequality measured by the Gini index for the years
1962-2016
Source: Author’ elaboration based on Polity IV data for the democratic
score, and on Solt (2016) for the Gini index
Moreover, if compared with other western consolidated democ-
racies, how shown by Figure 5.2, US have been also one of the most
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unequal countries since 1960, and the very most unequal country since
2003. In addition, compared with western countries, US presents also
relatively high level of poverty (Figure 5.3).
Figure 5.2: Income inequality measured by the Gini index 1960-2016
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by Solt (2016).
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Figure 5.3: Poverty rate comparison among western countries for the
year 2014
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by OECD (2017a)
But why US presents so high levels of income inequality even be-
ing considered as one of the most democratic countries in the world?
Several studies have been carried out to understand what the source of
such an apparent contradiction could be. Several reasons have been
pointed out, however, the high level of income inequality seems to de-
pend mainly on the differences in opportunities, which in turn would
depend on gender, race and other socio-demographic variables.
In 2002, the Council of the American Political Science Associ-
ation (APSA) approved the appointment of a Task Force on "Inequal-
ity and American Democracy" with the aim of investigating the causes
of American inequality. A fifteen-member task force was convened in
January 2003, and it collectively worked during the subsequent eigh-
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teen months to prepare an extensive review of researches on inequality
and American democracy. In their report, scholars participating to the
APSA task force concluded that:
"Disparities of income, wealth, and access to opportunity are
growing more sharply in the United States than in many other nations,
and gaps between races and ethnic groups persist. Progress toward re-
alizing American ideals of democracy may have stalled, and in some
arenas reversed" (Schlozman, Page, Verba & Fiorina, 2004).
According to their analysis, the increased concentration of wealth
experimented by the American society starting from the 1970s, and the
increased widening of the gap not only between rich and poor but also
between the rich and the middle class, generated an enormous gap in
the levels of political participation among American citizens, with the
poor not even usually participating in elections, which contributed to a
further worsening of income inequality levels. Using their words:
"The privileged participate more than others and are increasingly
well organized to press their demands on government. Public officials,
in turn, are much more responsive to the privileged than to average
citizens and the least affluent. Citizens with low or moderate incomes
speak with a whisper that is lost on the ears of inattentive government,
while the advantaged roar with a clarity and consistency that policy
makers readily heed" (Schlozman, Page, Verba & Fiorina, 2004).
In other words, the APSA Task Force highlighted a relation be-
tween economic and political inequality. In a situation in which rich
people are politically active and well organized while poor people are
not, the former can better persuade the governments to implement po-
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litical programs favouring their interests at the expenses of those of the
latter.
The picture presented by the ASPA Task Force seems to be con-
firmed also by subsequent researches. One year after the APSA report,
Hacker, Mettler and Pinderhughes (2005), for instance, pointed out that
most of the source of the American inequality should be traced down on
the type and quality of public policies implemented throughout the time
by the American governments. American welfare state, in fact, has al-
ways been relatively very limited, both in terms of public spending and
extension, if compared with that of most western country (Figure 5.4).
Therefore, while other western countries’ governments have employed
public spending effectively to reduce economic inequalities, indepen-
dently from what they were originated, the American government never
used seriously this mean of redistribution.
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Figure 5.4: Public social spending as percentage of GDP in aggregated
terms 1990-2016
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by OECD (2017b)
Indeed, the existence of a strong relation between income inequal-
ity and public social spending, regardless of the country’s regime type,
is not a mystery. Nevertheless, the fact that US, being considered a de
jure as well as a de facto fully democratic country, presents so high lev-
els of income inequality and so low levels of public social spending,
contradicts the well-known classic theory according to which within a
democratic country, where all citizens have the right to vote for their
representatives and where the poor section of the population is bigger
than the rich section, the former will organize themselves in order to
claim the implementation of more redistributive policies, and doing so
they will contribute to lower income inequality levels.
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5.2.1 American citizens’ perceptions on inequality and
redistribution
Therefore, a first question that arise here is whether American cit-
izens, compared to other western countries’ citizens, do or do not con-
sider income inequality as a problem which the state should address.
But also, a second question arises: are American poor citizens more
worried than rich citizens about inequality? And are they more de-
manding for redistribution? If the APSA report’ conclusions were able
to entirely explain the American situation, we should find rich people
to be against redistributive policies, not worrying about the country’s
levels of income inequality and, at the same time, we should observe a
diametrically opposed attitude within poor citizens.
To try to assess this dilemma, we can rely on the data provided by
Inglehart, et al. (2014) within the World Value Survey (WVS)14. The
WVS15 provides nationally representative surveys conducted in almost
100 countries which contain almost 90 percent of the world’s popula-
tion, using a common questionnaire. Doing so, it is the largest non-
commercial, cross-national, time series investigation of human beliefs
and values ever executed, currently including interviews with almost
400,000 respondents. The WVS allows us to verify what is the atti-
tude of American citizens toward inequality and redistribution, as well
as what is their idea about the role of the government in dealing with
14For detailed information about the World Value Survey, see: www.
worldvaluessurvey.org
15World Values Survey Wave 6, 2010-2014, official aggregates, v.20150418. World
Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer:
Asep/JDS, Madrid SPAIN
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them.
To answer our questions, we will analyze the answers intervie-
wees gave to three WVS’s queries: i) "should income be made more
equal or larger income differences are needed as incentives for individ-
ual efforts?"; ii) "is or is not income equality an essential characteristic
of democracy?"; and iii) "is or is not taxing the rich and subsiding the
poor an essential feature of democracy?". All the data are extracted
from the Wave 6 of the WVS, which comprises data collected from
2010 to 2014.
Figure 5.5: Mean answers to the question: Should income be made
more equal or larger income differences are needed as incentives for
individual efforts?
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by World Values
Survey Wave 6, 2010-2014, v.20150418.
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Figure 5.6: Mean answers to the question: is or is not income equality
an essential characteristic of democracy?
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by World Values
Survey Wave 6, 2010-2014, v.20150418.
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Figure 5.7: Mean answers to the question: is or is not taxing the rich
and subsiding the poor an essential feature of democracy?
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by World Values
Survey Wave 6, 2010-2014, v.20150418.
Therefore, for a series of selected countries, we depicted the mean
answer gave by all respondents. As we can see from Figures 5.5, 5.6
and 5.7, when compared with other western countries, American citi-
zens have a peculiar attitude toward income inequality, and to the role
of the government in dealing with it within a democratic regime. Amer-
ican citizens on average seem to believe more consistently than most
of the other western democracies’ citizens that higher levels of income
inequality are needed in order to create incentives for individuals to in-
crease their efforts in trying to advance in the social scale. Accordingly,
they do not seem to consider income equality to be an essential char-
acteristic of democratic regimes and, in the same direction, they seem
131
convinced that a democratic state should not tax the rich in order to
subsidize the poor.
To answer our second question, namely "are American poor cit-
izens more worried about inequality and more demanding for redistri-
bution than rich citizens?", I will analyze the mean answers US citizens
gave to the same queries, disaggregating the data by participants’ level
of income. The WVS divides the interviewee’s level of income accord-
ing to ten categories, from the lower to the higher ladder of the scale. As
we can see from the Figures 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10, data seem to contradict
partially the conclusions of the APSA Task Force according to which
inequality of income would be imputable mainly to political inequality.
Figure 5.8: Mean answers to the question: Should income be made
more equal or larger income differences are needed as incentives for
individual efforts? Disaggregated by the respondents’ level of income
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by World Values
Survey Wave 6, 2010-2014, v.20150418..
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Figure 5.9: Mean answers to the question: is or is not income equality
an essential characteristic of democracy? Disaggregated by the respon-
dent’s level of income
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by World Values
Survey Wave 6, 2010-2014, v.20150418.
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Figure 5.10: Mean answers to the question: is or is not taxing the rich
and subsiding the poor an essential feature of democracy? Disaggre-
gated by the respondents’ level of income
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by World Values
Survey Wave 6, 2010-2014, v.20150418.
According to the data, in fact, with respect to middle class cit-
izens, on average, worst-off citizens have a stronger conviction about
the necessity of making income more equal (Figure 5.8), the impor-
tance of income equality as a characteristic of democracy (Figure 5.9),
and the necessity of taxing the rich in order to subsidize the poor and
redistribute the wealth (Figure 5.10). It is interesting to note, however,
that on a scale ranging from 1 to 10 worst-off citizens’ answers on av-
erage has been around 5, meaning that in absolute terms they were not
considering those characteristics to be so essential. At the same time, it
is also interesting to note that the richest citizens on average responded
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with similar answers than the poorest and, indeed, in the case of the
answer about the necessity to taxing the rich to subsidize the poor, they
responded even with a stronger conviction than the poor.
Therefore, without denying here a relation between income and
political inequality, data seem to suggest the necessity to rethink the
causes of the former by looking also at how citizens perceive it, and
moreover at why citizens perceive it in the way they do. Wording it
differently, WVS’s data suggest that we should not take for granted the
fact that, within a democratic country, worst off citizens will ask for
redistribution, since we cannot take for granted that they will consider
economic inequality as a negative issue that governments should deal
with. And following this logic, on the other hand, we should begin
to try to understand why in some countries income inequality is seen
as a problem to solve while in other countries, such as US, this does
not seem to happen so markedly. For what concerns the US, several
factors could have contributed to the spread of such an attitude among
its citizens. In the next sections we will examine two main factors, the
role of liberalism in shaping American political though, and the role
of social mobility in shaping American preferences on inequality and
redistribution.
5.2.2 The role of liberalism in shaping US citizens be-
lieves on inequality
From a philosophical perspective, it is possible to trace back the
American aptitude toward inequality by looking at the development of
the American political thought, and in particular at the role of liberal-
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ism, in shaping it.
Without the pretension here to present a full assessment of all the
variants of the American philosophical political thought, it is sufficient
for our discourse to stress the importance that the liberal though have
had in American history, and that with different degrees the liberal idea
that the government should not extensively interfere in the life and orga-
nization of its citizens (including the economic sphere) is deeply rooted
in the American view, either economic and philosophical.
Indeed, different forms of liberalism have been developed within
the American context (McGowan, 2007), but all of them with different
degrees emphasized the importance of individual freedom, the neces-
sity of little intervention of the state in individual affairs, and the pos-
itive role of inequality as an incentive for individual in fostering their
efforts. From the more extreme pole of laissez-faire liberalism as pro-
posed by von Hayek, to the more nuanced pole of modern liberalism
as interpreted by Rawls, according to which income differences could
be allowed if they improve the circumstance of the worst-off (Kangas,
2000), liberal thought long supported the idea that some degree of in-
equality is positive and desirable in order to maximize economic pros-
perity, and doing so individual well-being. So, Liberal philosophy in its
different forms could have contributed to shape US citizens’ believes
about inequality, and this could explain why also a consistent part the
worst off share of them do not strongly support redistributive policies.
The triumph of liberalism within American society could also explain
the differences in the levels of American inequality compared with other
western countries, where liberalism never gained the undisputed role it
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gained in US. Within the European context, in fact, liberalism have been
certainly an important line of thought, and it contributed extensively to
shape the European political life within states as well as among states
but, in Europe, liberalism have also competed with other strong philo-
sophical political views such as socialism and communism (in their
different interpretations), which in turn generated their own political
conviction and practices, often mixing and overlapping with liberalism.
This happened in several European countries, which in fact are often
called social-democracies, where the liberal form of states governed by
the classic liberal scheme of check and balances, incorporates norms
and models attributable to the socialist political views.
But even a second feature of liberalism, as interpreted by the
American society, could have contributed to the spread of such an at-
titude toward inequality. As pointed out by Johnston (1996):
"Liberal individualism -the claim that only individuals count- is
the substance and strength of the liberal tradition. But liberal individu-
alism misinterpreted is the Achilles’ heel of the liberal tradition. Liberal
individualism is misinterpreted when it becomes transmuted into the
view that since only individuals count, individuals need to think only
about themselves, about their shares, and about whether their rights
have been respected or violated, whether they have received or failed
to receive their fair share. Liberalism misinterpreted fosters the per-
ception that people can best secure the means to be effective agents
by carving out for themselves the most extensive set of rights, and the
largest bundle of commodities, they can obtain. That perception is false.
It has the truth-value of the perception -a perception that is, tragically,
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widely shared in the United States- that since some criminals have guns,
the best way to protect oneself against violence is to obtain a gun. Un-
fortunately, the result of this action is too often that someone gets shot,
and the victim is rarely a criminal caught in a criminal act."
Liberal individualism of course could explain why the richer part
of US citizenry opposes redistributive policies and considers inequality
as a positive characteristic to maximize economic prosperity, but indeed
it cannot fully explain by itself why also the worst of part of US citizens
shares this conviction.
5.2.3 The American dream and the legend of the self-
made man
As I pointed out in the previous section, the legacies of liberal
thought could partially explain why US citizens oppose redistributive
policies and consider inequality as a positive characteristic to maximize
economic prosperity, moreover it could also partially explain why de-
spite the high levels of inequality, American citizens have never seri-
ously questioned the principles of democracy, nor the democratic method.
It could explain it only partially because in an individualistic perspective
it is difficult to explain why worst-off citizens, as showed by data pre-
sented in Figures 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10, also share this conviction, instead
of increasing their demand for redistributive policies. To understand
this second point, another piece of the puzzle can be found by consid-
ering another characteristic distinguishing American society, what it is
commonly known as the American dream.
American dream identifies the US national ethos, encompassing
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several ideals included under the hat of this term. There is not a single
shared definition of the concept associated with this term, and several
connotations have been attached to it throughout the American history.
The term American dream was coined in the 1930s by James Truslow
Adams, who wanted to use it as a title for a publication that, in light
of the suggestions and criticisms of his editor, ended up as "The Epic
of America" (Cullen, 2004), to denote "[the] dream of a better, richer,
and happier life for all our [US] citizens of every rank, which is the
greatest contribution we have made to the thought and welfare of the
world" (Adams, 1931). However, apart from the first usage of the term,
as pointed out by Cullen (2004), the concept of American dream en-
compasses so many ideals that it would be more correct to speak about
it as American dreams. In his book "The American dream: A history
of an idea that shaped a nation" Cullen retraces all that ideals of the
American dreams from the puritan arrivals in the sixteenth century to
nowadays, showing how the American dreams changed over time, of-
ten overlapping one another.
Indeed, among the American dreams there is a specific one that
has accompanied American citizens throughout their country’s history,
and that has become the principal dream since the nineteenth century,
namely the dream of social and economic success or, in short, the dream
of a better life. Since US foundation, for very long time, every new gen-
eration of American citizens (or for some time at least white American
males) has had the reasonable expectation of ending up in a better socio-
economic position than their parents done. In the new world there was
plenty of opportunities, and with commitment, diligence and abnega-
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tion there was a high probability to achieving better results with respect
to the past generations. Phrasing it differently, upward mobility was
quite common for those people who was ready to work hard to gain it.
In this context, the rhetoric of the self-made man encountered a fertile
ground in which proliferate, and it became another relevant part of the
American national ethos.
The American dream, with the rhetoric of the self-made man could
have strongly contributed to the American attitude toward the role of
inequality within the society, and toward the implementation of redis-
tributive policies, also from the perspective of the worst-off segment of
the population. If someone firmly believe that, by working hard, there
is a concretely high possibility of moving up along the social ladder, it
is plausible to expect that no matter what his actual income level is he
will be more prone on the one hand to accept higher levels of income
inequality and, on the other hand, to not ask for the implementation of
redistributive policies, since in the long run this would mean to found
a situation in which he would pay more taxes in order to subsidize the
poor, which in such a vision of the world are poor basically because
their lack of commitment and hard work.
Nowadays the American dream seems to be much less realistic
than it does until the first half of the nineteenth century, still US citizens’
perception about it does not seem to be changed accordingly. Several
scholars, in the last years, have worried about this change of paradigm
claiming that the American dream is already dead, or at best it is ex-
periencing a major crisis (Hacker, 2008; Putnam, 2016; Chetty, et al.,
2010). And from an empirical perspective, as showed by Figure 5.11,
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this seems to be the case when one considers the levels of income mobil-
ity registered from the second half of the twentieth century. Data shows,
in fact, that while the 90 per cent of the children born in 1940 ended up
richer that their parents, only about the 50 per cent of the children born
in 1985 earned more than their parents during their lives. Of course, on
the one hand these data do not properly address social mobility since
they only show us that a generation earned more than the previous and
not if the social position of individuals have changed from a generation
to another, and on the other hand part of the variance could in theory
be due to the simple presence of favourable and unfavourable economic
cycles. However, considering that the period considered mostly refers
to a period of general economic growth, it is very likely that part of the
variance may be explained by changes in actual social mobility.
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Figure 5.11: Percentage of children earning more than their parents, by
year of birth” disaggregated by the respondent’s level of income.
Source: Author’s elaboration on data from Chetty, et al., 2010
The consequence of this dramatic change in the levels of intergen-
erational mobility has been that of cancelling the dynamic, which ac-
companied US citizens generation after generation, according to which
whatever was its original socio-economic situation each keen American
citizen, with abnegation, dedication and hard work, could have aspired
to live a better life. Nevertheless, looking at the data about US citi-
zens believes on such a dynamic (Figure 5.12), provided by the WVS,
it seems that this conviction has not been substantially scratched.
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Figure 5.12: Answers to the question “In the long run, does hard work
usually brings a better life or doesn’t hard work generally bring success
because it is more a matter of luck and connections"
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by World Values
Survey Wave 6, 2010-2014, v.20150418.
As illustrated by Figure 5.12, answering to the question "In the
long run, does hard work usually brings a better life or doesn’t hard
work generally bring success because it is more a matter of luck and
connections" on average the citizens interviewed showed a quite strong
conviction that hard work is what really matter in order to achieve a
better life. It is interesting to note that such a conviction is across-
the-board over all the ladder of the scale of income considered by the
WVS, except for the richest citizens that show an average answer more
oriented toward the conviction that hard work does not generally bring
success (Figure 5.13).
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Figure 5.13: Mean answers to the question “In the long run, does hard
work usually brings a better life or doesn’t hard work generally bring
success because it is more a matter of luck and connections", disaggre-
gated by the respondent’s level of income.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by World Values
Survey Wave 6, 2010-2014, v.20150418.
5.2.4 the American case’s conclusions
As we have seen, the case of US is a paradigmatic example of
what is usually known as a deviant case, if we compared it against
the theories emerged in the literature review. The fact that despite its
long democratic tradition it shows very high levels of income inequal-
ity, when compared with other consolidated democracies, contradicts
the classic theory on the relation between democracy and inequality.
Moreover, it also contradicts the stability theory on the role of inequal-
ity in influencing the countries’ regime, according to which within a
democratic country high levels of income inequality could endanger the
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very existence of democracy.
The study of the American case raised some interesting points.
Firstly, it highlighted that the relation between democracy and income
inequality is more complex than how it is usually described, and that the
political philosophy in which a country born and matured has a concrete
impact on how the population perceives and reacts on the one hand to
the levels of inequality and, on the other hand to the implementation
of redistributive policies. This could seem a secondary point but, con-
cretely, it implies that the fact that a country appears to be democratic
from a procedural and institutional perspective does not assure that it
will be automatically more able in reducing the levels of income in-
equality. In other words, if it is true that a democratic government vis-
à-vis a non-democratic one is more naturally open to the demands of all
the sectors of the population, it is also true that in order to be willing
(and able) to reduce inequality it needs that the population will ask to
do so. Therefore, as a consequence, if the population do not perceive
inequality as a problem that needs to be solved through redistribution,
independently from the regime type of the state, the government will
not have any incentives in implementing redistributive policies.
In the second place, the American case showed the presence of
another mechanism able to alter the relation, namely the levels of so-
cial mobility (and or economic growth). The presence of high levels
of social mobility, or the belief of its presence, could generate a more
relaxed attitude toward inequality, and aversion toward redistribution.
At the same time, obviously, it could reinforce such attitude where pre-
existing, as in the US, for a political philosophic tradition. The same
145
effect could be attributable to high levels of economic growth. If a
country experiments high levels of economic growth it is possible that
its citizens, finding their income increasing no matter what their social
status changes or not, they will be less likely to be worried by income
inequalities.
These arguments could explain both the incongruities US seems
to have with respect the general theory on the relation between democ-
racy and inequality. On the one hand, in fact, they could explain why US
shows high levels of inequality even been considered one of the most
democratic countries in the world, and on the other hand, they could
explain why despite the high inequality levels the democratic princi-
ples, methods and institutions have never been seriously questioned by
American citizens.
5.3 The Hungarian case
With the American case, I examined the relation between democ-
racy and inequality within a democratic country. I considered such a
relation within a rather static perspective, in fact, I have almost exclu-
sively limited to observing the current level of the variables in question
without giving too much attention to their variation over time. This is
because, according to the democratic index employed, US is consid-
ered a full democracy with the higher democratic rate since the end of
the nineteenth century.
In this section, instead, I will examine the relation between democ-
racy and inequality in a more dynamic perspective, within the context
of a democratic transition. In other word, I will examine how the two
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variables interact in the country’s passage from a non-democratic to a
democratic form of government.
Again, according to the literature review, we should find that the
increase of the level of democracy within a state should be associated
to a decrease in its levels of income inequality. However, Hungary, as
many of Eastern European ex-Soviet countries, seems to contradict such
a theory.
As most of eastern European countries, Hungary experienced many
years of non-democratic rule under the hegemony of the Soviet Union
and, during this period, it adopted the communist economic vision of
a centralized and planned economy. It started its democratic transition
in 1989, after the fall of the Berlin wall, which it contributed to hap-
pen when it decided to open its border with Austria, allowing people
to safely reach west Germany (Taubman & Savranskaya, 2009). And
since then, as we can see from Figure 5.14, it has been classified as a
full democracy.
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Figure 5.14: Hungary democracy measurement by Polity IV for the
years 1868–2016.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Polity IV data.
As a communist country, with the consequent collectivization of
the means of production and its planned economy, similarly to other
countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON),
Hungary succeeded in maintaining income inequality to relatively low
levels since the second half of the twentieth century (Figure 5.15).
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Figure 5.15: Hungarian Income inequality measured by the Gini index
1960-2016.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by Solt (2016)
But, as we can see from Figure 5.16, not only Hungary registered
low levels of inequality in the period considered, it also registered lower
levels than most of the other Eastern countries.
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Figure 5.16: Income inequality measured by the Gini index in Hungary
and in a selected sample of other Eastern countries, for the years 1960-
2015.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by Solt (2016)
In addition, between 1969 and 1980, Hungary registered lower
levels of inequality than most of western consolidated democracies.
And even after 1980, when Hungarian inequality increased consistently,
Hungary continued to register lower levels of inequality than many
western European countries (Figure 5.17).
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Figure 5.17: Income inequality measured by the Gini index in Hungary
and in a selected sample of Western countries, for the years 1960-2015
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by Solt (2016)
However, after touching its lower level in the 1980s, with the be-
ginning of the Democratic transition income inequality started to in-
crease again, reaching back the levels of the 1960s, and only several
years after the end of the democratic transition, inequality decreased
again, though never reaching back the levels registered during the eight-
ies.
Therefore, what happened in the Hungarian context, as it hap-
pened in the American case, seems to contradict the classic hypothe-
sis providing that within a country when democracy increases income
inequality should decrease. Why this happened? Why has inequality
increased despite a successful democratic transition? In the next sec-
tions I will try to answer these questions in the hope to shed light on the
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mechanisms driving such a pattern.
5.3.1 What happens when democratic transition coin-
cides with economic liberalization starting from
a communist regime?
The Hungarian case is a peculiar case of democratization since,
as happened in several Eastern European countries, the phase of polit-
ical liberalization has been preceded and accompanied by a phase of
economic liberalization. Phrasing it differently, political liberalism has
been embraced jointly with economic liberalism, which ended with the
abandonment of the centralized and planned economy in favour of a
decentralized and liberal one.
As we already pointed out, after the end of the Second World
War, Hungary felt under the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union
and, under the rule of the local communist party, it adapted to the soviet
economic vision, at least until the implementation of the well-known
New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in 1968. More precisely, Hungary
adopted a less draconian version of the Stalinist vision, which prac-
tically implied the development and the implementation of five-years
economic plans, the collectivization of the lands, and the overemphasis
of heavy industry at the expenses of consumer goods. After the revolu-
tion of 1956, ended with the Hungarian occupation by the Red Army,
the installation of the Kádár regime brought a gradual economic lib-
eralization, and the abrogation of several measures undertook by the
former government of Rákosi, which even without detaching too much
from the Soviet model succeeded in improving the standard of living
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of Hungarian citizens (Fenyo, 2000). During this period, the levels of
inequality decreased consistently. From the end of the 1950s to the end
of the 1960s, the Gini index decreased from about 0.29 to about 0.26
(on a scale ranging from 0 to 1, where 0 represent a completely equal
distribution while 1 a completely unequal one).
The decreasing trend of inequality continued, and become even
more marked, with the implementation of the NEM, introduced in 1968.
The NEM, implemented several changes in the Hungarian economic
system, among which a partial decentralization, and major liberty for
the private sector in deciding what and how to produce and which tech-
nology to employ (Granick, 1973), a more active role of prices (Hare,
1976), and the possibility to consumers to choose to buy imported rather
than domestic goods (Balassa, 1970). In other words, the NEM resulted
in a totally new typology of economy, which could be placed in the mid-
dle between a centralized and a free market types of economy (Bauer,
1990). During the 1970s Hungarian inequality continue to decrease,
touching its lower levels since the second half of the twentieth century.
The situation in terms of inequality changed again in the mid-
1980s, when further economic reforms had been implemented to move
toward a completely free market economy, and even more markedly
after the fall of the Berlin wall and the fall of the Soviet Union, when
Hungary start to complete its economic transition. During this period,
in fact, income inequality grew sharply, and since then it never reached
back the low levels of the late seventies.
Indeed, as suggested by several scholars, the simple passage from
a socialist to a capitalist economy is likely to generate an increase in
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income inequality (Murrell, 1993; Bandelj & Mahutga, 2010). There
are several reasons to explain the phenomenon but, as demonstrated by
Bandelj and Mahutga, two scholars of the University of California, the
increase of inequality can be ascribed to four principal variables: the
expansion of the private sector; the retrenchment of the redistributive
state; the social exclusion of ethno-national minorities; and the penetra-
tion of foreign capital. But the Hungarian case shown also that through
a gradual rather than an abrupt economic transition, some of the nega-
tive effects in terms of inequality could be reduced. The gradualness of
the economic transition, represented by the temporary introduction of a
mixed economy through the implementation of the NEM, in fact, could
have contributed to the good performance in terms of inequality showed
by Hungary when compared with the other ex-Soviet countries.
5.3.2 The perception of inequality and redistribution
in Hungary, and the role of corruption in shaping
them
The study of the American case highlighted the importance of
how inequality and redistribution are perceived among the citizens. In a
democratic context, in fact, the government will implement redistribu-
tive policies able to decrease inequality if, and only if, citizens will de-
mand the government to do so. The simple fact that the poor section of
the population is usually bigger than the richer one, alone, does not au-
tomatically assure that the former would ask for the implementation of
redistributive policies. To have such a result, in fact, one needs that the
population perceives inequality as a social problem and consequently
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that it considers redistributive policies as a solution to that problem.
Since Hungary, as I shown in Figure 5.16 and 5.17, experimented
relatively low levels of inequality when compared with other Eastern
as well as Western countries, if the previous reasoning is correct one
should find that Hungarian citizens consider inequality as a social prob-
lem and, at the same time, that they support the implementation of re-
distributive policies. And data actually confirms the presence of such
an attitude. Employing the data collected by the WVS, as I have done
for US, we can observe that Hungarian citizens, on average consider
inequality as a problem that should be solved, rather than an incentive
to foster individual efforts (Figure 5.18). And at the same time, they
consider redistribution to be an essential characteristic of democratic
regimes (Figure 5.19). In a comparative perspective, it is interesting to
notice that on average, except for Hungary and Poland, Eastern Euro-
pean citizens support the idea according to which income differences
are needed in order to foster individual efforts (Figure 5.18). At the
same time, except for Bulgarian, on average citizens within all Eastern
European countries considered show a high level of conviction about
the importance of redistribution (Figure 5.19)
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Figure 5.18: Mean answers to the question “Should income be made
more equal or larger income differences are needed as incentives for
individual efforts?” - Survey Wave 5: 2005-2009.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by World Values
Survey Wave 6, 2010-2014, v.20150418.
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Figure 5.19: Mean answers to the question “is or is not taxing the rich
and subsiding the poor an essential feature of democracy?” - Survey
Wave 5: 2005-2009.
Source: World Values Survey Wave 6, 2010-2014, v.20150418.
However, despite most of the citizens of the Eastern European
countries considered seem to agree about the importance of implement-
ing redistributive policies, and despite most of them agree about the
necessity to made income more equal, the levels of income inequality
diverge significantly from a country to another, as shown in Figure 5.16.
Moreover, if it is true that, following the democratic transition, inequal-
ity increased in almost all Eastern European countries, it is also true
that even the extent to which inequality increased, and the capability
to decrease it again after the conclusion of the democratic transition,
significantly varied from a case to another.
Which could be the sources of such a difference? A first answer,
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as pointed out in the previous sections, can be the way in which the
economic liberalization has been accomplished alongside the demo-
cratic transition. The Hungarian case, in fact, seem to suggest that
when the economic liberalization is carried out incrementally rather
than abruptly, it returns greater results in term of inequality levels. At
the same time, as already suggested by the American case, the Hun-
garian case seems to confirm that how citizens perceive inequality and
redistribution is another important variable in shaping the national lev-
els of inequality.
However, there could be at least an additional variable able to
explain the different outcomes in terms of inequality reached by the
ex-Soviet countries, namely corruption. As I already pointed out, the
logic underlying the theory according to which democracy should neg-
atively influence the levels of inequality relies on the assumption that
within a democratic regime, vis-à-vis within a non-democratic regime,
the worst-off section of the population is more able to influence the im-
plementation of redistributive policies at the expenses of the richest sec-
tion. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. The richest citizens, in
fact, could be able to convert their economic power into political power
and, by corrupting the political and bureaucratic apparatus, they could
prevent the implementation of redistributive policies.
Corruption, for instance, could help to explain the different out-
come in terms of inequality reached by Hungary and Latvia follow-
ing their democratic transitions. The choice to compare the two coun-
tries depended on the fact that, as shown by Figure 5.20, at the end
of the 1980s both were registering about the same level of inequality.
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But when the democratic transitions took place, between the end of the
eighties and the beginning of the nineties, Latvian inequality started to
increase far more sharply than the Hungarian one.
Figure 5.20: Income inequality measured by the Gini index in Hungary
and Latvia, for the years 1980-2015.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by Solt, (2016).
Employing data on corruption provided by Kaufmann, Kraay and
Mastruzzi (2010), which measure the level of corruption perceived by
citizens, Figure 5.21 shows the pattern of corruption in both countries.
According to the scale employed by the Control of Corruption Index,
higher values correspond to lower levels of corruption while lower val-
ues, at the contrary, correspond to higher levels of corruption. Data
show how at the end of the nineties Latvia was perceived as much more
corrupted that Hungary, but during the following years its score, ex-
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cept from a minor break between 2008 and 2011, has continuously aug-
mented. Therefore, it is possible that the great difference in corruption
levels within the two ex-communist countries contributed to the differ-
ent outcome in terms of inequality following their democratic transi-
tions. Looking at the correlation between the corruption index and the
Gini index within the two countries, in fact, we can see that they are
negatively correlated, so as that an increase in the value of the corrup-
tion index (namely a decrease of corruption) is associated to a decrease
of the levels of income inequality (Figure 5.22).
Figure 5.21: Corruption levels in Hungary and Latvia, measured by the
Corruption Perception Index, for the years 1998-2015.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by Kaufmann,
Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010
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Figure 5.22: Correlation between Hungarian and Latvian Corruption
Perception Index and the Gini Index, for the years 1998-2015.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by Solt (2016), for
the measurement of income inequality; and on data provided by Kauf-
mann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010), for the measurement of Corruption.
5.3.3 The Hungarian case conclusion
The Hungarian case showed us a pattern in which, even main-
taining low levels of inequality compared with other Eastern European
countries, as well as compared with Western consolidated democracies,
the increase of democracy coincided with an increase of income in-
equality. A similar pattern has been followed by almost all the ex-soviet
countries, but with different outcome in terms of rising inequality.
From the analysis of the Hungarian case, we can reach some pre-
liminary conclusions that will help us later to develop a more complex
theory for explain the relation between the political regime of a country
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and its levels of income inequality.
Firstly, the study of the Hungarian case seems to suggest that non-
democracies are not all the same, and that the economic organization of
a country is an important variable, as much as the political organization,
in shaping income inequality within a country. The fact that Hungary, as
well as almost all ex-Soviet countries, experimented an increase in the
level of inequality that coincided with its democratic transition could
be better explained by considering their passage from a communist to a
capitalistic type of economy rather than by the abandonment of a non-
democratic regime in favour of a democratic one. Phrasing it differently,
the Hungarian case seems to suggest that a capitalistic liberal and ne-
oliberal economy generates higher levels of income inequality regard-
less of whether it is placed in a democratic or non-democratic context.
This also raises another consideration: beyond the countries’ form of
government, even the very positioning of the governments within the
political spectrum do matter with respect to the outcome in terms of
inequality. In fact, the Hungarian case, as well as most of the other ex-
Soviet countries, demonstrates that a leftist government (in this case a
communist one) tends to be associated with low levels of income in-
equality.
At the same time, the Hungarian case confirms what has been al-
ready suggested by the study of the American case, namely that the way
in which a government, democratic or not, decides to deal with inequal-
ity and redistribution is strongly dependent on how these two variables
are considered by the citizens. In other word, the Hungarian case seems
to confirm that in order to reach and maintain low inequality levels, it
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is not sufficient for a country to become democratic, or to increase its
democratic level, it is rather important that its citizens perceive inequal-
ity as a social problem that needs to be solved, and redistribution the
correct way to solve it.
Finally, the Hungarian case allowed us to identify an additional
variable that can influence the relation between a country’s form of gov-
ernment and its levels of income inequality, namely corruption. In the
cases considered, as we have seen, the level of perceived corruption
within a country, in fact, seem to be correlated with the levels of in-
equality, so as that increasing the former variable also the latter would
tend to increase. A first possible explanation for such a relation could
be, quite straightforwardly, that through corruption the richest sections
of the population could be able to prevent the implementation of re-
distributive policies asked by the poorer section. Indeed, in this case
the mechanisms behind the theory, according to which more democ-
racy should bring lower levels of inequality, would be broken by this
intervening variable and the theory itself would prove to be ineffective.
5.4 The Chinese case
Until now, with our case studies, we considered the effect that the
form of government could have on income inequality within democratic
as well as non-democratic states, and the effect that high levels of in-
equality could have on democratic countries. But since we are interested
in the possible reciprocal causal relation between the two variables, in
the following section we will address the effect of high levels of in-
equality on a non-democratic country. To do so, we will examine the
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case of China.
As I reported in Chapter 1, according to the literature, the effect
that inequality has on the state form of government should be twofold,
the effect on the genesis, and the effect on the stability. The former
could obviously affect only non-democratic regimes, while the latter
could affect non-democratic as well as democratic regimes. About the
genesis effect, since in order to develop itself democracy needs a strong
middle class, non-democratic countries with high levels of income in-
equality should not be able to successfully carry out a democratic tran-
sition. Within a non-democratic country, if the political and economic
power is too concentrated in the hand of a small section of the popula-
tion, this small section could easily prevent the beginning of a demo-
cratic transition. About the stability effect, within a democratic country,
extreme forms of inequality could generate resentment and frustration
in the worst-off section of the population, and these sentiments could
give rise to violent forms of protest or anti-system parties support, ul-
timately endangering the stability of the regime, or in the pessimistic
scenario giving birth to a non-democratic backlash. As the study of the
American case highlighted, however, this mechanism could be unable
to work properly under some specific circumstances.
At the same time the stability effect could play a role also within
non-democratic regimes. As it could happen within democracies, high
levels of inequality could generate frustration among the citizens, exac-
erbating their sentiment toward the incumbent government. This frus-
tration, in turn, could give place to different forms of protest, non-
violent or violent, which could end up with the dismissal of the incum-
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bent regime and its replacement with another non-democratic regime
or, in the more optimistic outcome, with the beginning of a democratic
transition.
However, as it often happens, theory and practise do not always
match. I already shown how US and Hungary contradict the classic
hypothesis of the effect of democracy on inequality, as well as US con-
tradicts the stability effect of inequality on democratic regimes. In the
following sections I will examine the case of China, which results to
be a deviant case with respect to the stability effect theory applied to a
non-democratic regime.
Politically speaking China represents a rather peculiar case. De-
spite its millennial history, the country has never experienced any form
of democratic government, at least considering the concept of democ-
racy encapsulated in the modern usage of the term. Between 1916
and 1928, China experimented the creation of a constitutional republic
(Nathan, 1983) which however has not been considered a democratic
transition since it had never even achieved the characteristics of a mini-
mal democracy (Figure 5.23).
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Figure 5.23: China democratic score measured by Polity IV for the
years 1800–2016.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by Polity IV
However, the establishment of the Republic of China, following
the revolution of 1911, represents a very important turning point in the
modern history of the country, since it marked the end of the impe-
rial power of the Qing dynasty that ruled for about two thousand years
(Young, 1983). Without the pretension of addressing here the complete
review of the Chinese modern history, it is worthy to highlight that with
the end of the Qing dynasty and the creation of the Republic of China,
the country entered a phase of turbulence, instability and political frag-
mentation (Elleman, 2005; Hutchings, 2003) known as the warlords’
era. When the nationalist Chinese party (the Kuomintang) took the
power in the late 1920s, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, it
was able to reunify the country, ending fifteen years of civil war. Ended
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the warlords’ era and reunified the country, the Kuomintang begun to
direct its attention toward another internal problem, namely the com-
munists that were threatening again the stability of the country. With a
succession of different phases of combat, and of alliance to face interna-
tional threats such as the Japanese occupation, the Kuomintang’s con-
frontation with the Chinese communist rebels lasted about two decades
erupting, in 1941, in a civil war ended in 1949 with the communists’
victory and the creation of the People Republic of China (PRC) (Elle-
man, 2005).
The end of the war, and the change of paradigm due to the Com-
munist Party took over the power, marked a turning point in the Chinese
approach to the problem of inequality. Central in the debate about the
nature of socialism, in the central control and local autonomy, and in
the resource allocation among the regions, inequality, especially its re-
gional manifestation, became an important issue since the establishment
of the PCR (Fan, 1995; Wei, 1997). When the PCR was established,
its leader Mao Zedong, as well as the rest of the Chinese Communist
Party, started to address the problem by implementing a series of poli-
cies aimed to foster the development of the worst-off Chinese regions
and to reduce inequality (Wei, 1999), and thanks to its efforts, under
Mao’s leadership, China succeed in reducing inequality significantly.
The first year in which data on Gini are available for China is 1953,
year in which, according to the data provided by the World Income In-
equality Database, compiled by the United Nations University World
Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER, 2017),
the value of the Chinese Gini coefficient was 0.56. At Mao’s death in
167
1976, however, income inequality was reduced by more than half, with
a value of the Gini coefficient of 0.27 (on a scale ranging from 0 to 1,
where 0 represent a completely equal distribution while 1 a completely
unequal one).
But when, few years after Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping took the
power, the picture of Chinese inequality changed again. Deng Xiaoping
represented a shift from Mao’s political and economic visions. Dur-
ing its leadership, Xiaoping implemented many social and economic
reforms aimed to modernize and partially open the country to the rest
of the world. Its reforms resulted in significant social and economic
transformations, the country started to grow steadily, and the general
living conditions of Chinese citizens increase. This growth, however,
came up with an increase of inequality which continued incessantly un-
til nowadays. As show in Figure 5.24, in fact, from 1978 to 2014 in-
come inequality moved from 0.32 to 0.53, reaching again the levels of
inequality of the pre-Mao era.
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Figure 5.24: Chinese income inequality measured by the Gini index
1978-2016.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by Solt, 2016
According to the theory, this constant rise in inequality and the
high level reached should have had damaged the stability of the Chinese
regime, however, this had not occurred. Why does the theory failed to
explain the Chinese case? Are there some mechanisms that impede
that theory to work? In the next sections we will try to address these
questions in the hope to better understand why the theory do work in
some cases while it does not in other cases.
5.4.1 Chinese citizens’ perception on inequality
As I put forward with the study of the American case (Chapter
5.1), one of the possible explanation about the presence of high lev-
els of inequality within a country may be the fact that its citizens on
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the one side do not consider inequality as a problem the government
should solve and, consequently, on the other side, they do not believe
the government should redistribute the wealth among its citizens. As
we have seen earlier, this is what it seems to happen in the American
context. Of course, in a non-democratic regime, governments are not
accountable to the citizenry nor are responding to citizens’ requests as
happens in democratic regimes. Still, it is important to address whether
citizens consider inequality as a problem or not, since it could explain
their reaction to increases, or to high levels, of inequality.
To do so, consistently with the American and Hungarian cases, I
will rely on the WVS data, looking at the answers Chinese citizens gave
to the question: should income be made more equal or larger income
differences are needed as incentives for individual efforts? Figure 5.25
reports the percentages of the answers divided by the different WVS
waves.
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Figure 5.25: Mean answers to the question “Should income be made
more equal or larger income differences are needed as incentives for
individual efforts?” - Survey Waves 4-5-6
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data provided by World Values
Survey Waves 4, 5, and 6.
According to WVS data, following the increases in income in-
equality (as shown in Figure 5.24), since the years 1999-2004 citizens
mean answer to the question “Should income be made more equal or
larger income differences are needed as incentives for individual ef-
forts?” has significantly decreased meaning an increase of citizens be-
lieving that income should be made more equal. In the years 1999-2014
the mean answer was higher than 6, while in 2010-2014 was slightly
higher than 4.
Therefore, since Chinese citizens seem to be aware of the increas-
ing inequality, and at the same time they believe in the need to made
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income more equal, we can exclude that the failing of the stability the-
ory in explaining the Chinese case is due to an agreement of Chinese
citizens on the importance to have high levels of inequality. Excluded
the possibility that citizens’ perception on inequality could be the only
reason why the theory failed, we need to look at other possible explana-
tions.
5.4.2 Stability through repression and mass control
The stability theory on the role of inequality on the regime of a
state provide that with high levels of inequality, within non-democratic
countries, citizens should show frustration that could end up with the
spread of protests that should endanger the stability of the incumbent
regime, and in the more favourable case with a set-up of a democratic
transition. The logic underlying this theory is that income inequality
generating frustration toward the operate of the incumbent government
could fuel protests and riots aimed to dismantling it. Until now, we
pointed out how China succeeded in remaining a stable non-democratic
regime despite the rise in inequality started in the seventies, and how
this makes it a deviant case with respect to the stability theory. How-
ever, this not implies China have not been subjected to demonstrations
and protests throughout its history, it rather implies that Chinese gov-
ernments through the decades have been able to minimize the effects of
the protest on the regime’s stability.
Looking at the data on Domestic Conflict Events, provided by the
Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS)16, we can see how
16see Banks and Wilson, 2017.
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with different degrees dissent and protests have been always present in
Chinese History (Figure 5.26). But we can see also how the form of
protests have changed in the last decades. From the seventies of the
twentieth century, acts of guerrilla and general strikes have been absent
from the scene, riots have remained quite stable, while anti-government
demonstration increased steadily. It is important to highlight that anti-
government demonstrations are define by the CNTS as “Any peaceful
public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of dis-
playing or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority”,
while riots are defined as "Any violent demonstration or clash of more
than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force".
Figure 5.26: Number of protests and social unrest in China from 1920
to 2010, divided by category and decade.
Source: Author’s elaboration on data provided by Banks and Wilson
(2017).
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Therefore, peaceful as well as violent forms of protest have been
present in the modern history of China, however, the stability of the
regime has never been seriously at risk. How Chinese governments
succeed in achieving this result? To answer this question, it is useful to
retrace briefly the way in which Chinese governments have handled the
dissent and how it changed in the last decades.
After the protests of Tiananmen Square, ended with the death of
an unknown number of demonstrators, in the 1990s, the message com-
ing from the state’s leadership was that it was not allowed to challenge
the authority in any form (Steinhardt, 2017). This attitude is well ex-
plicated in Xiaoping’s ultra-conservative dictum: "stability overrides
everything" (Li, 1995). This was a partial shift from Mao’s perspective
on dissent, according to which "contradictions among the people, in-
cluding protests against official misconduct without regime-challenging
demands, were to be treated with clemency, while contradictions with
the enemy warranted ruthless repression" (Steinhardt, 2017).
The state’s attitude toward protests and dissent changed again in
the 2000s, when Hu Jintao came into power. Jintao, in fact, turned again
to the Maoist theory of contradiction, leaving more space to the dissent
that was not directed to challenge the regime. This attitude contributed
also to the increasing of peaceful form of protests directed toward spe-
cific policies or specific social problems as for instance unemployment
and inequality (Steinhardt, 2017). This does not mean that government
begun to be more prone to accept the dissent tout court, but it implied
that it started to demonstrate a quite more relaxed attitude toward those
protests which were not intended to question the kernel of the regime.
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It either does not mean that Chinese government ceased to use
violent forms of repression to shut down those protests considered more
troublesome. On the contrary, beside the employment of institutional
means of coercion such as police and military, China begun to employ
third-party extra-legal violence to evict homeowners and to deal with
petitioners and protesters. This kind of violent intervention take the
form of what Ong (2015) called "thugs for hire", namely the hiring of
"thugs and gangsters to repress citizens and coerce them into complying
with its policies".
At the same time, China developed and implemented more subtle
strategies to control protests and protesters, such as psychological and
relational repression. Beyond more conventional actions carried out by
the police, in order to deal with protesters, Chinese governments have
been employing economical means to corrupt demonstrators, had em-
powered state’s housing officials to give rural evictees the right to move
to cities, and retrievers have been paid to monitor and intercept petition-
ers to avoid they travel to Beijing (O’Brien & Deng, 2017).
As we can see by this brief assessing of the Chinese repressive
practices, the Chinese government can count on a wide range of means
to suppress dissent, and it does not fail to use them whenever it feels that
protests could threaten the political stability of the country. In addition,
the employment of means such as psychological and relational repres-
sion denotes a great capacity of the state to strictly control its citizens at
a collective as well as at an individual level. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that regardless the high level of inequality currently showed by
the country, and its increasing occurred in the last decades, and despite
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Chinese citizens perceive it such as a problem the state should address
and solve, the stability theory on the effect of inequality over the regime
failed to apply to the Chinese case.
5.4.3 The Chinese case study conclusions
I embarked on the analysis of the Chinese case to address why the
stability theory on the effect of inequality on a non-democratic regime
fails to explain it. As we have seen, in fact, despite Chinese inequality
gown incessantly since the end of the seventies, reaching rather high
levels in 2014, and despite Chinese citizens considers inequality as a
problem that the government should address, after the foundation of the
PRC the Chinese regime has never faced serious threatens to its core
characteristics.
Chinese citizens, indeed, have not always been passive in front
of policies and decision undertook by the governments. Many citizens’
acts of dissent, in different forms and manifestations, have accompanied
the establishment and consolidation, as well as the more recent history
of the PRC, still, especially in the last decades, they have been mostly
directed to specific policies and decision rather than toward the core
elements of the regime.
This does not mean that there were not, or there are not nowadays,
citizens and movements that question not only the Chinese governance
but also the very nature of the Chinese regime. Still, as we pointed out in
the previous section, the degree of control the state reached over its cit-
izens, the hard and sometimes violent way the governments responded
to these threatens, and the variety of means of repression developed
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and implemented by the state to prevent and suppress them, make it
difficult also for frustrated citizens to organize themselves and to effec-
tively carry out revolutions able to seriously damage, or to overthrow,
the regime.
From this analysis we can draw some general conclusions about
the stability theory that complete the picture developed with the Amer-
ican and the Hungarian case. If on the one side, to work, the stability
theory needs that citizens consider inequality as a problem that should
be solved by the government, on the other side, it needs also that citi-
zens have some room for manoeuvre allowing to organize themselves
in the attempt to affect the regime stability.
In this sense, as shown by the Chinese case, when the control ex-
ercised by the state’s apparatus over the citizens is very high, and the
protests directed toward the core characteristics of the regime are vio-
lently repressed, in many cases also pre-emptively repressed, citizens
frustration does not have the space to be transformed in acts able to
threaten the regime’s stability.
Since in the literature there is a great amount of agreement about
the role of the elite in shaping the political conformation of a coun-
try, we have not considered this important variable in the Chinese case
study, assuming that the great stability of the Chinese regime and its
longstanding duration was also due to the fact that there is a certain
amount of agreement among the elites in maintaining the status quo.
However, to conclude, it is important to stress that to work the stability
theory probably needs that the frustration of the citizens is in some way
supported at least by a part of the elites, moreover if they face high level
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of control and repression as in the Chinese case.
5.5 Case studies conclusion
Analyzing the theoretical and the empirical literature about the
relation between the regime of a state and its levels of inequality, It
emerged the exigence of elaborating a more complex theoretical frame-
work to address the relation. This occurred because all the different
theories proposed and tested appeared to be significantly valid in some
studies, while have claimed to be invalid in other studies. This of course
could have been due to the methodological differences among the em-
pirical studies, as the size and selection of the sample, the econometric
approach employed, or the data on which the studies relied. However,
these differences could be also imputed to the fact that all the theories
elaborated and tested have considered only a limited part of the relation
investigated, and doing so they could have lacked to consider important
variables and mechanisms influencing the relation.
The choice of performing the case studies analysis have been
therefore motivated by this second possibility. Given our speculation
about the functioning of the relation between the regime of a state and
its levels of inequality, the study of some specific cases that seem to
deviate from the theory have been extremely useful in identifying the
sub-mechanisms which may interfere with the principal mechanisms
theorized for explaining the relation investigated.
The American case highlighted the wrongness of given for granted
that worst-off citizens will always support and ask for the implementa-
tion of redistributive policies. The American case, in fact, showed that
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the political philosophy in which a country born and matured has a con-
crete impact on how the population perceives and reacts on the one hand
to the levels of inequality, and on the other hand to the implementation
of redistributive policies. This is an important point since it imply that
being part of a consolidated democracy does not automatically assure
that a government will also be more able and more willing to reduce in-
equality within its polity. Wording it differently, a democratic govern-
ment vis-à-vis a non democratic one is certainly more naturally open
to the demands of all the sectors of the population, but in order to be
willing (and able) to reduce inequality it needs that the population will
ask to do so. As a consequence, if inequality is not perceived as a social
problem needing to be solved, independently from the regime type of
the state, the government will not have any incentives in implementing
redistributive policies.
But the American case showed also the presence of another im-
portant mechanism able to invalidate the assumption that worst-off cit-
izens will always support and ask for the implementation of redistribu-
tive policies: high levels of social mobility. And what is more, it seems
that to invalidate that assumption, it is sufficient that the high levels of
social mobility are only perceived by the citizens. High levels of so-
cial mobility, or the perception of high levels of social mobility, could
generate a more relaxed attitude toward inequality and aversion toward
redistribution.
Moving to the study of the Hungarian case, it suggested the need
to take into the equation the economic organization of a country. The
increases in the level of inequality showed by Hungary, as well as many
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other ex-Soviet countries, and its coincidence with their democratic
transition could be better understood by considering their passage from
a communist to a capitalistic type of economy rather than by the aban-
donment of a non-democratic regime in favour of a democratic one. In
other words, the Hungarian case seems to suggest that a capitalistic lib-
eral economy generates higher levels of income inequality regardless of
whether it is placed in a democratic or non-democratic context.
The Hungarian also allowed to identify an additional variable that
seem to influence the relation between a country’s form of government
and its levels of income inequality, namely the country’s level of corrup-
tion. The level of perceived corruption within a country, in fact, seem
to be correlated with the levels of inequality, so as that increasing the
former variable also the latter tends to increase. Through corruption the
richest sections of the population could be able to prevent the implemen-
tation of redistributive policies even if they are deemed to be essential,
and strongly requested, by the worst-off section of the population.
Finally, with the analysis of the Chinese case we drawn some gen-
eral conclusions about the stability theory that complete the picture de-
veloped with the American and the Hungarian cases. If it is true that
to work, on the one hand, the stability theory needs that citizens con-
sider inequality as a problem that should be solved by the government,
on the other hand, it needs also that citizens have some room for ma-
noeuvre that allow them to organize themselves in the attempt to affect
the regime stability. In fact, the Chinese case raised an important con-
sideration, when the control exercised by the state is very high, and
the protests directed toward the core characteristics of the regime are
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violently repressed, citizens frustration does not have the space to be
transformed in acts able to threaten the regime’s stability. Therefore,
if citizens have not space to effectively employ the dissent in order to
overturn the regime, and if they are not supported in some way at least
by a part of the elite, the stability mechanism is unable to deploy its
effect.
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6Exploring the relation between
form of government and
inequality: elaborating a
theoretical framework
In Chapter 3, I analyzed the theoretical and empirical literature on
the relation between democracy and inequality. The theoretical litera-
ture presented different explanation for the relation in object, pointing
out several mechanisms that would be at the basis of the functioning
of the relation itself. Also, I showed how it is possible to identify four
main theoretical strands that pinpoint to different causal relations be-
tween a state form of government and its level of inequality: i) a Linear
relation in which the form of government influence inequality in one
way or the other; ii) a Linear relation in which Inequality influences the
form of government in one way or the other; iii) a Non-linear relation
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in which the increasing of the quality of government firstly increases
inequality while further increases in the quality of government reduces
it, the so called inverted "U"; and iv) No relation between the two vari-
ables. Lastly, from the empirical literature review it emerged how there
are empirical studies supporting any of the four main theoretical strands,
and sometimes denying the correctness of the others. For these reasons,
I hypothesized that the casual relation could be reciprocal rather than
unidirectional and, at the same time, that there is the concrete possibil-
ity that several important variables have not been considered within the
theoretical and the empirical analyses. Therefore, I claimed the need
to elaborate a more complex theoretical framework to explain all the
mechanisms and sub-mechanisms driving it. Indeed, both the theoret-
ical and the empirical literature review have been extremely useful to
identify some of the key variables and mechanisms influencing the re-
lation.
From what concerns the influence of the form of government on
the levels of inequality, it is assumed to follow two main paths, a direct
and an indirect one. The direct mechanism is represented by the re-
distributive requests of the population. Intuitively, democratic regimes
should be structurally more open than non-democratic regimes to the
requests made by their citizens. Since democracy is driven by account-
ability mechanisms, and citizens are able through election to choose
those political forces willing to implement their favourite policies, and
because the poor segment of the population, which should be the one
more prone to ask for redistribution, is usually bigger than the rich seg-
ment in terms of votes, one should find democracies to be more equal
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than non-democracies. However, even if in a more modest way, also
non-democratic governments could be influenced by citizens’ redis-
tributive requests. If nothing else, in those cases in which for whatever
reason they find convenient to meet citizens’ requests.
The indirect mechanism, instead, is represented by the national
level of education. As highlighted by Burkart (Burkhart, 1997) among
others, public education is one of the features, and a product, of demo-
cratic systems, which to develop themselves need to create educated
citizens who meet the requirements of a State governed by the people.
Therefore, to arise, and moreover to survive, democratic regimes need a
well-developed bureaucracy, which in turn can be realized only through
the growth of educated citizens capable to meet the requirement of the
system itself. On the contrary, non-democratic regimes do not have this
kind of needs. And the empirical literature on the subject confirms the
existence of such a relation showing how, on average, democratic coun-
tries on the one side spend more in financing the public educational
system and, on the other side, they record higher values of participatory
rates at all the levels of education.
At the same time, the literature review pointed out how income
inequality could influence the regime state of a country in two different
ways. On the one side there is the issue of the genesis, according to
which high levels of income inequality, within a non-democratic coun-
try, could prevent to pave the way for a democratic transition. On the
other side, there is the issue of the stability, according to which indepen-
dently from the actual state’s structure, democratic or not, high levels
of income inequality could endanger the stability of the regime. For
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a non-democratic polity this could lead to the implementation of more
repressive policies also with the recourse to violence, or the fall of the
current regime and the establishment of other non-democratic regimes
or, in the more optimistic scenario, could lead to the start of a demo-
cratic transition.
The analysis of the theoretical and the empirical literature helped
to elaborate some speculations about the relation between the state’s
form of government and its levels of inequality. Firstly, I supposed
that, taking for granted the correctness of the classic hypotheses, in a
static perspective, democratic countries should show, on average, lower
levels of inequality than non-democratic countries, while in a dynamic
perspective increasing the level (or the quality) of democracy should
imply a reduction in the inequality levels.
Secondly, for what concerns the effect of inequality on the form of
government, relying on the theory elaborated by Muller (1988), I sup-
posed that the first variable influences the second in two different ways.
On the one side, within democratic countries, high levels of inequality
can endanger the democratic system. In the more optimistic hypothe-
sis, high levels of inequality could lower the democratic quality within
a country since it could reduce the levels of political participation or
redirect electoral consensus toward anti-system or antidemocratic par-
ties. While, in the more pessimistic scenario, high level of inequality
could give birth to demonstration, protests and riots, pushing the gov-
ernments to implement restrictive anti-democratic policies to fight them,
slipping the country towards non-democratic forms of government. On
the other side, within non-democratic countries, high levels of inequal-
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ity can prevent the possibility to set in motion a democratic transition,
since it usually implies the lack of an organized middle class neces-
sary to run it, but it can also give rise to demonstrations, protests and
riots pushing governments and elites to implement more repressive ac-
tions or, if citizens succeed in organize themselves, it can lead also to a
regime change, possibly ending up with the establishment of a different
non-democratic regime, or with the start of a democratic transition.
I called "principal mechanisms" all the causal links mentioned
above, since they are the main ways in which the two variables, form of
government and inequality, influence each other. However, as emerged
with the case study analysis, there are other variables that concur in
influencing our main variables, as well as secondary mechanisms that
concur in contrasting and influencing the principal ones, therefore, it is
necessary to assess them and to include them into the model in order to
correctly identify not only how the form of government and the level of
inequality interacts, but also the degree of influence each variable have
on the other. To elaborate a theoretical model that can be empirically
verified, in the next sections, I will discuss in detail each of the variables
and mechanisms influencing the relation.
However, a preliminary look at the data can help to understand
the relation between the two variables. Table graphically show the rela-
tion between democracy and income inequality. The line represents the
prediction of the relation.
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Figure 6.1: Relation between democracy and inequality
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Polity IV data for democracy
and on Solt (2016) for the Gini index.
6.1 How the form of government can influ-
ence inequality
As I already pointed out in the past section, the form of govern-
ment of a country can influence the country level of inequality by means
of two distinct channels, a direct and an indirect one.
For what concerns the indirect channel, namely education, schol-
ars mostly agree about the fact that increasing its coverage and its qual-
ity within a country helps to reduce inequalities. Education would pro-
vide citizens with the set of skills required by the labour market, which
have persistently risen in the last decades (Autor, 2014), and this would
facilitate the absorption of the worst-off citizens in the job market. Not
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all scholars agree about the short-term effect of education on inequality
(Glomm & Ravikumar, 2003), but most of them agree about its long-
term effect. In the long-run, in fact, investments on education would
reduce inequalities (Gregorio & Lee, 2002; Martins & Pereira, 2004;
Autor, 2014). At the same time, as already pointed out, the theory pro-
vides that democratic countries have generally better educational sys-
tem than non-democratic states (Mill, 1862; Burkart, 1997).
The empirical literature seems to confirm both points, and a pre-
liminary look at the data can help to assess these relations. Figures
6.2 and 6.3 show the data on the Gini index plotted, respectively, with
the total government expenditure on education as percentage of GDP,
and with the net enrolment on secondary education (both provided by
the World Bank Database). Both figures seem to confirm the existence
of a negative relation between both variables and the Gini index, so as
that when the expenditure increases, or when the net enrolment on sec-
ondary education increases, income inequality would tend to decrease.
Furthermore, also the relation between education and the political sys-
tem of a state seems to be confirmed. Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show the
relation between the level of democracy measured by the PIV index
and, respectively, the total government expenditure on education as per-
centage of GDP, and the net enrolment on secondary education. In both
cases, one may see the presence of a positive relation between the demo-
cratic index and both the variables considered, therefore, at higher level
of democracy seem to correspond higher levels of both government ex-
penditure and net enrolment on secondary education.
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Figure 6.2: Relation between the Gini index and the government expen-
diture on education as percentage of GDP
Source: Author’s elaboration on data provided by Solt (2016) for the
Gini index, and on World Bank data for the government expenditure on
education.
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Figure 6.3: Relation between the Gini index and the net enrolment in
secondary education
Source: Author’s elaboration on data provided by Solt (2016) for the
Gini index, and on World Bank data for the net enrolment in secondary
education.
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Figure 6.4: Relation between the Polity IV index of democracy and
government expenditure on education as percentage of GDP
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Polity IV data for the PIV
democracy index, and on World Bank data for the government expendi-
ture on education as percentage of GDP.
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Figure 6.5: Relation between the Polity IV index of democracy and the
net enrolment in secondary education
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Polity IV data for the PIV
democracy index, and on World Bank data for the net enrolment in sec-
ondary education.
For what concerns the direct channel, namely the redistributive re-
quest of the population, the situation is more controversial. The classic
theory provides that within a democratic country, where all the citizens
have the right to participate to the political life and consequently to in-
fluence the implementation of specific policies through their votes, and
where the poor section of the population is usually bigger than the rich
section, most voters should prefer political forces committed to the im-
plementation of redistributive policies. The reasoning at the basis of the
theory is quite straightforward, poor citizens must be interested in the
implementation of redistributive policies since they would improve their
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individual well-being. At the same time, rich citizens should oppose re-
distributive policies since they will endanger their economic interests.
But, as already pointed out in Chapter 1, this reasoning has two
strong implications. Firstly, it takes for granted that poor citizens al-
ways perceive inequality as a social problem that the government must
address, and the implementation of redistributive policies as the answer
to the problem. Secondly, it takes for granted that rich citizens must
always oppose redistribution. This struggle among two distinct societal
groups, interpreted in different ways, is also the basis of the three ma-
jor theories of democratization: the transition from above, the transition
from below, and the more recent redistributive model of democracy.
Even if not always explicitly, the theories strongly rely on the eco-
nomic assumption which consider the human being to be a rational ac-
tor, and its choices to be mainly driven by rationality. In economics, the
concept of rationality, in its broader sense, can be defined as the action
of identifying and implementing some means to achieve an agent’s par-
ticular ends (Kolodny & Brunero, 2016). According to the neoclassic
theory, agents are consistently logical in their decisions with regards to
their preferences, they are assumed to have complete knowledge about
their preferences, and their decisions are driven mainly by material in-
centives (Sanders, 2016). The neoclassic understanding of rationality
has been long criticized, especially about the assumptions of the agent’s
perfect knowledge of his preferences, and that of logical consistency.
Behavioural economists for instance have proposed a revised version of
rationality in which, without context or reference, an agent often does
not know what he wants, and often he does not neither know what he is
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doing. Khaneman (2011) goes even beyond and, in its influential book
"Thinking fast and slow", relying on psychological theoretical advance-
ments and experimental findings, claims that human beings employ two
distinct typologies of thinking when they face choices. The first is au-
tomatic, fast and it is not under direct subject’s control. Phrasing it dif-
ferently it is mainly irrational and driven by what is commonly called
instinct. The second, instead, is slower, deliberate, and is mainly under
the subject’s control. In other words, the second type of thinking is a ra-
tional thinking driven by more complex and mentally demanding forms
of reasoning.
It is not the scope of this work to enter the discussion on ratio-
nality, however, it is important to stress that as applied to the relation
between the form of government and inequality, it can misguide re-
searchers in the interpretation of the phenomenon. Taking for granted
that the poor section of the population must prefer the implementation
of redistributive policies, while the rich section must oppose it, means to
deny the possibility that citizens’ behaviour may be guided by consid-
erations different from the maximization of their short-term economic
profit. Human beings on the contrary, independently from their social
class or their economic status, may be guided by other kinds of con-
siderations, such as for instance moral or ethical ones, when deciding
how to behave. At the same time, citizen’s choices can also be biased
by limited knowledge about the options among which to choose, or by
wrong perceptions about the object of their choice. In other words, cit-
izens’ preferences about a certain policy can be based and guided by
different kind of short- or long-term considerations and, furthermore,
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they can change based on the information as well as the perception that
they have about a certain issue. This does not mean that their behaviour
about the choice of a policy over another is necessarily irrational, but it
means that one cannot takes for granted that choices are guided exclu-
sively by merely economic considerations, and that a certain category
of citizens will choose a certain policy only because it is part of that
category.
6.1.1 How beliefs and perceptions shape worst-off citi-
zens’ requests for redistribution
To understand if and how a state’s form of government could in-
fluence its levels of inequality, and to assess whether democracy is or
is not abler than non-democracy to reduce it, it is necessary to compre-
hend how citizens choose or not choose to ask to their government for
the implementation of redistributive policies. The study of the Ameri-
can case, in fact, shown that the only fact of being a democracy does not
assure that a country will reach low levels of income inequality, nor that
it will show necessarily lower level of inequality than non-democratic
countries. In other words, the American case highlighted how even if
a country is democratic and poor citizens can influence the implemen-
tation of policies through free, fair, and recurrent elections, this does
not mean that they will mechanically ask the government to implement
redistributive policies. To function correctly, the redistributive mecha-
nism through which the form of government of a state can influences its
levels of inequality requires that, at least, the poor segment of the popu-
lation within that country believe inequality to be a social problem. This
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could seem an obvious statement, but most of theories and researchers
addressing this subject, treated this aspect as an axiom. However, as
emerged by the data on American society, there is not any evidence to
think that poor citizens must necessarily perceive inequality as a social
problem who needs to be solved. According to the findings of the case
study analysis, this could depend on two main factors: citizens’ political
beliefs, and citizens’ perceptions on socio-economic mobility.
To better illustrate this point let’s consider two imaginary coun-
tries: A and B. The first is a non-democratic country, while the second
is governed democratically. For the sake of simplicity, let’s imagine that
within both countries poor and rich citizens are homogeneous entities
which share among their classes the same attitude toward inequality and
redistribution, so as that the attitude may vary between rich and poor,
but not among citizens within the same class. In a similar situation, ac-
cording to the most accredited theories,B should have a more equal dis-
tribution of incomes than A. In fact, poor people in principle could not
influence the implementation of policies in the non-democratic country
A, while they could do it in the democratic country B. However, let’s
imagine that for historical reasons, A′s citizens have a socialist orien-
tation and consider inequality as the most serious problem a country
should deal with and solve. On the contrary, B′s citizens, for several
historical circumstances, have a neoliberal orientation and, believing
in the assumption that governments should not interfere in their eco-
nomic life since markets have the ability to regulate themselves, they
are convinced that income inequality is not an issue, that poor people
are poor only because their laziness, and that as a matter of fact income
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inequality is a good thing because it would spur people to do their best
to overcome their poverty.
Continuing to follow the classic theoretical framework in which
the relation between the states’ form of government and its levels of
income inequality is just a matter of conflict between the poor and the
rich sections of the population, and in which it is taken for granted that
the former will demand for the implementation of redistributive poli-
cies, while the latter will oppose it, one would still expect that country
A would present a more unequal income distribution than country B.
But in our case, it would be likely that A′s citizens would require for
the implementation of redistributive policies while B′s citizens would
not. Of course, since A is a non-democratic country, where government
is not accountable to its citizens, it is not certain that their demands
will be heard and met. At the same time, since B′s citizens would not
ask for redistribution there is no reason to expect that government will
implement it. Therefore, the difference in the levels of inequality be-
tween the two countries would mainly depend on the choices of the A′s
government about the opportunity to meet poor citizens’ requests. If A
government would find convenient to meet their demands, for instance
to avoid the spread of protest and the destabilization of the regime, it
would be plausible to find A to be less unequal than B. On the contrary,
ifA′s government would not find convenient to meet citizens’ demands,
its inequality could be higher than that of B, or they could also show
similar levels.
The functioning of the classic theory on the relation between the
form of government of a country and its levels of inequality requires
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that within that country there is a majority of citizens that not only are
able to influence the government in the implementation of policies, but
also that consider inequality a serious social threat that the government
should face and solve. If both these requirements are not satisfied si-
multaneously, the mechanisms at the basis of the classic theory cannot
deploy their effects. However, political thought is not the only variable
that could shape citizens’ attitude toward inequality and redistribution.
As mentioned earlier, there is at least another variable that deserve to be
considered, namely the country’s level of socio-economic mobility, or
citizens’ perceptions about it.
Let’s now imagine three fully consolidated democratic countries
(A, B and C). All the three countries have always had a relatively low
level of inequality comparable with the average inequality usually reg-
istered within democratic countries, and they are very similar also with
respect to other macroeconomic fundamentals, as well as with respect
to their level of social mobility. Moreover, citizens’ political believes
are analogous, and they share in principle the same concerns toward
inequality. However, since inequality is low and social mobility (de-
fined as the individual’s probability to improve one’s socio-economic
situation during one’s life) is high, citizens in all the three countries are
not interested in the implementation of redistributive policies. If there
are high chances that no matter the individual socio-economic start-
ing level, each person could easily advance its social ladder through
hard work and personal commitment, social mobility could replace the
need for redistribution. At a certain point in time, however, for sev-
eral reasons, income inequality begins to increase drastically in all the
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three countries. Therefore, in principle continuing to follow the classic
theory one would expect that poor citizens within the three countries
would increase their demands for the implementation of redistributive
policies. But with the increase of inequality, another variable begins
to change its usual path. Countries A, B and C start to diverge about
their level of socio-economic mobility. Country A experiences an in-
crease in socio-economic mobility, while countries B and C experience
a dramatic decrease. In addition, while in countries A and B citizens
become immediately aware of these changes, the citizens of country
C continue to perceive the same level of social mobility, as if this had
never diminished.
What consequences in terms of redistributive requests can be ex-
pected from these changes? Firstly, it is plausible to expect that country
B′s poor citizens would start to increase their redistributive requests.
Since inequality increased and the probability to escape from poverty
taking advantage of socio-economic mobility mechanisms decreased,
citizens will be more prone to ask for redistribution. On the contrary,
even if for different reasons, citizens within countries A and C would
probably not increase their redistributive requests. On the one side, be-
ing aware about both the increase of inequality and socio-economic mo-
bility, country A′s citizens would find that their situation has not sub-
stantially changed. In other words, they will find mobility compensating
inequality so as that they would probably not change their demands for
redistribution. On the other side, also country C ′s citizens would prob-
ably adopt a similar attitude. Being aware of the increase in the levels
of inequality but misperceiving higher levels of mobility than the actual
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ones, it is plausible to expect that they would increase their demands for
redistribution, but way less than citizens in country B.
What emerges from these examples is the importance to consider
citizens belief and perceptions in the analysis of the relation between
a country regime type and its levels of inequality. Both citizens’ polit-
ical believes and their perception about inequality and social mobility
levels, in fact, are susceptible to influence the mechanism according
to which democratic countries should present structurally lower lev-
els of inequality than non-democratic countries. Being able to change
citizens’ preferences and attitudes toward inequality and redistribution
these variables can contrast the mechanisms laying out the classic the-
ory, which in some cases, therefore, can fail in explaining the influence
that the form of government can have on the country’s levels of income
inequality.
6.1.2 How economic power can be converted in politi-
cal power to contrast redistribution: corruption
and lobbying activities
One of the reasons according to which the regime type of a state
would influence the state’s level of income inequality is the relation be-
tween political and economic inequality. The classic theory according
to which democratic countries should show lower levels of inequality
than non-democratic countries, in fact, is based on the idea that within
democratic polities citizens can express their preferences, and poor cit-
izens will be heard when asking the government for redistribution. On
the contrary, within non-democratic polities citizens have no concrete
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means to claim the implementation of their preferred policies and there-
fore they will be at the mercy of the close to the government elites’ pref-
erences. Moreover, since non-democratic systems do not provide any
accountability mechanism, economic elites may use whatever means at
their disposal to make their particular interests prevail over the will of
the majority, without the government having to worry about negative
repercussions in terms of legitimacy. These arguments seem to suggest
that non-democratic regimes would produce inevitably greater level of
inequality, because political inequality would translate into economic
inequality.
But the causal link between the two types of inequality seems not
to be limited to the former influencing the latter, and this has impli-
cations also for democratic systems. As already discussed in Chapter
5.1, analyzing the relation between inequality and democracy in the
American context, in 2014 the APSA task force highlighted how the
increased concentration of income occurred from the 1970s generated
a huge gap in the levels of political participation among rich and poor
citizens, which in turn contributed to a further worsening of income in-
equality, generating a sort of vicious circle (Schlozman, Page, Verba
& Fiorina, 2004). According to the APSA task force, in a situation in
which rich people are politically active and well organized while poor
people are not, the former can better persuade the governments to im-
plement political programs favouring their interests at the expenses of
those of the latter. APSA task force’s insights are important because
highlight how the link between political and economic inequality is not
limited to non-democratic countries. Of course, this is not a total nov-
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elty. Scholars and practitioners engaged in the study of lobbying activ-
ity, for instance, know very well how economic power can be employed
even in democratic contexts, at different level, to make pressure on po-
litical agents to favour particular interests.
And this is particularly important for the present analysis since
the employment of economic power to favour particular interests can
contrast the main mechanism at the basis of the classic theory on the
effect of the regime’s type on inequality, namely the implementation
of redistributive policies claimed by worst-off citizens. In the previous
section (6.1.1), I highlighted the wrongness of taking for granted that
poor citizens would ask for redistribution only because they are as such
but, at the same time, since economic power can be converted in polit-
ical power, it is also wrong to take for granted that governments would
always follow up majoritarian worst-off citizens’ demands, even in a
democratic context.
Indeed, as also emerged by the analysis of the Hungarian case,
there are at least two different methods through which economic power
can be converted into political power to avoid governments implement-
ing redistributive policies: lobbying activities and corruption. In general
terms, as reported by the International Encyclopaedia of Social Science,
lobbying is defined as the action through which organized interests com-
municate their preferences to governmental policy makers to influence
policy decisions (Darity, 1968). Corruption, instead, is a phenomenon
involving different aspects, so as that it is quite difficult to provide a
single and comprehensive definition. However, in general terms, cor-
ruption is frequently defined as the misuse of public power for personal
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gains, in other words it refers to decisions that politicians or public offi-
cials make based on personal rather than public interests (Darity, 1968).
This definition of corruption is focused on the role of public agents
but, on the other side, the definition could be also focused on the cor-
rupter so as that corruption could be also understood as a mean through
which bearers of particular interests seek to favour their private interests
through the use of economic incentives toward those who are called to
make decisions over public affairs. Adopting the corrupter-based def-
inition, corruption appears to be not so much different from lobbying.
In both cases, in fact, a private agent employs economic means in or-
der to favour its private interests. Ortiz-Ospina and Roser (2017), in
this respect, define lobbying as a more subtle and sometimes even legal
example of corruption.
Through lobbying and corruption economic power can be con-
verted in political power preventing the implementation of redistribu-
tive policies demanded by poor citizens. Redistribution in fact implies
the need to tax the rich to subsidize the poor, therefore if the cost of
lobbying or corruption is lower than the cost generated by the raise of
taxes, rich citizens could find convenient recurring to them to preserve
their economic interests. Empirical research seems to confirm this asso-
ciation between corruption and inequality. In particular, Jong-Sung and
Khagram (2005) show how inequality can increases the level of cor-
ruption through material and normative mechanisms, and at the same
time corruption can increase the level of inequality generating a sort of
vicious circle. The logic underlying this process is that increasing in-
equality the rich (as a class or as interest groups) have more resources
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that can be converted in buying political influence, both legally and il-
legally (Glaeser, Scheinkman & Shleifer, 2003). At the same time in-
creasing inequality will increase redistributive demands by poor citizens
and this will generate greater motivation for the rich to use lobbying and
corruption to lower the fiscal pressure.
All these considerations highlight the need to include forms of
economic to political power conversion in the analysis of the relation
between a state’s form of government and its levels of inequality. Even
taking for granted that poor citizens always demand for redistribution,
if rich citizens can influence the public apparatus to preserve their inter-
ests, also in democratic contexts, there is no guaranty that democratic
governments will actually be more open to worst off citizens’ requests
than non-democratic governments. Phrasing it differently, lobbying and
corruption can contrast the key mechanism underlying the classic the-
ory on the effect of the state’s regime on inequality, and therefore they
need to be included in the analysis.
6.2 How inequality can influence the state’s
form of government
From the literature review it emerged how income inequality can
affect the state form of government through two distinct channels (Muller,
1988). On the one side, within non-democratic countries, high lev-
els of inequality may prevent the formation of a strong and organized
middle class, which in turn may prevent the set in motion of a demo-
cratic transition. On the other side, within non-democratic as well as
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within democratic countries, high levels of inequality may destabilize
the incumbent regime, since it could generate frustration and resent-
ment among the poorer sections of the population that can lead them to
undertake pacific as well as violent forms of protest, which under cer-
tain conditions, can lead to a regime change. Within democratic country
the outcome could be a shift toward less democratic or non-democratic
forms of government, but also a simple change of government. Within
non-democratic countries, instead, the outcome could be either a shift
to a different form of non-democratic regime, a partial liberalization, or
a shift to a democratic regime. The stability effect in this sense can be
also understood as an effect that inequality can have on the quality of
the regime, defining quality as the set of characteristics distinguishing
an ideal democracy (as discussed in Chapter 2.1.3). This definition of
quality can be applied to both democratic and non-democratic countries
so as that the quality will be greater the more the regime will approach
the ideal definition of democracy, while it will be smaller the more it
will deviate from that definition.
Since the aim of the present analysis is to address the effect of in-
equality on both non-democratic and democratic countries, rather than
the effect of inequality on the processes of democratization, I will ex-
clude the genesis effect from the empirical analysis, focusing only on
the stability effect of inequality on the state’s regime.
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6.2.1 The role of control and repression in contrasting
the stability effect of inequality on the form of
government
The stability effect, similarly to the classic theory on the effect of
the state’s regime on inequality, takes for granted that at least poor citi-
zens would consider inequality as problem that needs to be solved. But
to drive citizens to protest as to destabilize the regime, it is necessary
that they would be frustrated by inequality, up to the point to persuade
them to perform demonstrations and protests despite the risks that this
could represent for their personal safety. The American case (Chapter
5.2.1) has highlighted this point by showing how high levels of inequal-
ity does not necessarily represent a threat for a democratic regime if
citizens do not perceive inequality as an issue the government should
deal with. The US, in fact, is one of the most economically unequal
democracies since decades without this represented a threat in terms of
stability for the democratic norms and institutions.
It is also important to distinguish the role that protests can play
in democratic vis-à-vis in non-democratic regimes. Protests, at least pa-
cific ones, are usually allowed within democratic countries. Democracy,
in fact, in its minimalist conception is defined by the two dimensions
of competition and contestation, and the possibility to dissent with the
government’s decisions, and to protest against them, is encapsulated in
the latter dimension. On the contrary, within non-democratic countries,
protests are not always tolerated. Non-democratic countries, in fact, of-
ten recur to several repressive means to end up, or even to prevent, the
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spread of protests.
Moreover, it is often assumed that all non-democratic govern-
ments employ repression in a similar fashion, however, they differ even
substantially with respect to the degree of control and repression they
practice over their citizens, as well as with respect to the means em-
ployed to carry out these tasks (Davenport, 2007). These differences
can play an important role, in some specific cases, in impeding the sta-
bility effect to work as expected. The study of the Chinese case has
shown that even when inequality is high, and even if citizens perceive it
as a problem the government should solve, it cannot be taken for granted
that they will be able to organize themselves in such a way as to put in
place protests capable of influencing the stability of the regime. If the
degree of control and repression exercised by the state is very high, and
protests directed toward the kernel of the regime are violently repressed,
in many cases also pre-emptively, citizens frustration does not have the
space to be transformed in acts able to threaten the regime’s stability.
To better understand this point, let’s imagine two non-democratic
countries A and B, both of which presenting very high level of income
inequality. Within both countries A and B citizens consider inequality
a social problem the government should address and solve. Moreover,
both countries’ citizens are strongly frustrated by so unequal incomes
and by the fact that governments seem to be unwilling to deal with the
issue. But the two countries diverge with respect to the level of con-
trol and repression toward their citizens. Country A′s regime, on the
one side, has a massive and efficient control apparatus able to accu-
rately track the activity of dissident citizens so as to act preventively to
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avoid the spread of protests and, on the other side, it has a long his-
torical record of violent repression of protests when they occur to take
place. Country B′s regime, instead, have a less efficient control appa-
ratus which is not able to enact preventive strategies to avoid the spread
of protests. In addition, country B’s regime is usually reluctant to im-
mediately face protests with violent forms of repression. This could
be due to several reasons for instance because it fears the implementa-
tion of international sanctions, or a more or less direct intervention of
international actors (such as foreign states, Non-Governmental Organi-
zations (NGOs), international organizations) in its internal politics. In a
similar situation, countryA′s citizens would probably find very difficult
even to organize themselves in a protest front. On the one hand since
the preventive control apparatus would be able to track their activities,
government could implement measures such as curfews, preventive im-
prisonment, forced displacement, and so on. On the other hand, citizens
could find that the cost-benefit calculus of protesting is not favourable.
If the likelihood of succeeding in overthrow the incumbent regime is too
low, while the probability that government will respond to protests with
violent means is too high, it is plausible to expect that citizens will not
engage themselves in protests at all, or if they will do so it is plausible to
foresee that the government will be able to preserve its power through
repression. On the contrary, within country B, due to the inefficiency
of the control apparatus and the government’s reluctance of employing
violent means of repression, citizens would find less difficult to orga-
nize themselves and to set protests in motion. The cost-benefit calculus
would be more favourable and therefore it is plausible to expect that cit-
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izens would exploit the opportunity to try to destabilize the regime. In
other words, country B′s citizens would enjoy a greater manoeuvring
space to destabilize the incumbent government through protest activi-
ties.
Control and protests’ repression, however, are not the only factors
able to impede the stability effect to work. There is at least another
variable that, even way more difficult to empirically measure, can play
an important role in fostering or blocking the stability effect. This is the
role of the elites. Within both democratic and non-democratic regimes,
elites, defined as a small group of actors situated at the atop of key social
structures (Darity, 1968), can support citizens’ claims contributing to
the destabilization of the incumbent regimes, or at the contrary they can
oppose those claims contributing to the regime’s stability preservation.
Elites are not a homogeneous and monolithic entity and there are in fact
different types of elites, such as political, economic and military, each
of which can have and pursue different objectives.
As explained by the transition from above theory, sometimes elites
can be the very engine of the democratization processes. Example of
regime transition driven by the elites, or however in which the elite
have had a decisive role, are the Portuguese and the Spanish transi-
tions to democracy. The Portuguese transition arose as a military coup
that almost bloodlessly ended up a fascist regime lasted for almost fifty
years. After the coup, most of the population get out on the streets
joining the military in pacific demonstrations, however, the Portuguese
transition is a perfect example of a transition led by the elite, in this case
the military. The Spanish transition diverge from the Portuguese one.
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In the Spanish context, despite the presence of popular pacific as well
as violent forms of protest, the real engine of the Spanish democratic
transition must be traced in the collaboration among competing polit-
ical elites. Thanks to the collaboration between moderated Francoists
and moderated democratic elites, Spain has been able to partially sub-
due the spread of violence among both side of the political spectrum,
as well as to prevent major interference from the army, and ultimately
to start and to accomplish a relatively pacific democratic transition af-
ter the death of the General Franco. But elites can also overthrow a
democratic government to install an undemocratic one, as happened for
instance in Argentina when in 1976 the army seized the power and in-
stalled the government of Jorge Rafael Videla.
Therefore, the destabilizing effect that protests can or cannot have
on the stability (or on the quality) of a regime, democratic or not, would
depend also on elites’ decision of supporting or contrasting those protests.
Unfortunately, at the moment there is not any successful cross-national
attempt of empirically measure the support that different elites grant to
the incumbent regime within a country, or the support that they grant
to demonstrations and protests. For this reason, even highlighting the
importance that such a variable may play in the outcome of a protest in
terms of regime stability, I will not include it as a variable in the quan-
titative analysis. In other words, I will limit to consider it as a matter of
fact.
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6.3 Neoliberalism and inequality
Until now I have examined the principal relations and mecha-
nisms through which the state’s form of government and its levels of
inequality influence one another, and the sub-mechanisms able to alter
the functioning of the principal ones. However, there is at least another
variable, which even if in some way external to the model, can influ-
ence a state’s level of inequality. The variable in question is the degree
of national economy’s adherence to the neoliberal credo. To understand
how and to what extent the form of government of a state can influence
its levels of inequality and vice versa it is important to consider this
variable, so as to be able to better isolate and to weight the variance
imputable to the former.
The term neoliberalism describes a political and economic doc-
trine as well as a set of economic policies, which have become widespread
in the last quarter of the twentieth century. As most of political and
economic doctrines, neoliberalism is defined by different positions the
most prominent of which are those elaborated by the Austrian school
of economics, associated with the economists Hayek and von Mises,
the Chicago school inspired by Milton Friedman’s monetarism doc-
trine, and the German Ordoliberals school, whose vision contributed
to the creation of the German post-war market economy. However, de-
spite the different traditions in which neoliberalism is declined, there
are some basic assumptions that are common among most neoliberals:
a strong individualism, a skepticism toward centralized state planning,
and a belief in the complete efficiency of the markets (Darity, 1968).
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According to Vincente Navarro (2007), neoliberalism is the dominant
ideology permeating public policies in many developed and developing
capitalist countries, as well as international organizations such as the
Word Bank, The International Monetary Fund, the Word Trade Organi-
zation and several United Nations’ agencies.
Emerged in the wake of the Second World War as a response to
the barbarities committed by the authoritarian states, and fostered by
the conviction that the intervention of governments oppresses personal
freedoms (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2015), neoliberalism generally follows
three general propositions: i) the individual is the most qualified to com-
municate his desires and the society should aim to remove the obstacles
to this goal; ii) free market is viewed as the most efficient mean for pro-
moting personal autonomy and freedom; iii) the state should intervene
as less as possible in the economic sphere, limiting itself to maintain
and promote free market and to guarantee individual rights, the most
important of which is the right to own property (Springer, 2016).
Applied within national economies, such propositions lead to a re-
duction in the state’s regulation of economic activities, a de-regularization
of labour and financial markets, and a boost of commerce and invest-
ments by the elimination of borders and barriers, allowing a great mo-
bility of labour, capital, and goods and services. According to neolib-
eral authors, the implementation of these practices, which fostered and
strengthened the processes of globalization, has generated economic
growth worldwide as well as a boost of social progress (Navarro, 2007).
Indeed, globalization contributed to a world-level economic growth and
perhaps also to an increase in social progress, however, it also con-
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tributed to a massive increase in national levels of inequality. The pro-
cesses of economic globalization guided by the neoliberal credo, in fact,
in the absence of an analogous process of political globalization able to
globally guide them, have generated unbearable consequences for what
are usually called the losers of globalization. Trade and financial lib-
eralization, in fact, have both contributed to the increase of inequality
within nations as well as among nations (Rodrik, 2018).
Economic models have shown how the liberalization of trade tends
to be generally beneficial for all the economies that take part in it, but
they also show how within a given country there always are groups that
are advantaged and groups that are disadvantaged by free trade. The
Stopler-Samuelson theorem (1941), for instance, provides that within a
model with two gods and two production factors, and with inter-sectoral
mobility of factors, the owner of the factor used intensively in the im-
portable good’s production will experience a decline in its earnings. Of
course, the theorem is derived under necessary conditions that simplify
the reality. Other more realistic models elaborated afterwards have to
some extent reappraised that conclusions, however, as pointed out by
Rodrik (2018), there is an effect in the Stopler-Samuelson theorem that
can be considered to be quite general, namely that under competitive
conditions if complete specialization is not reached and the imported
good continue to be produced domestically there will always be a pro-
duction factor that will lose following trade liberalization. And this will
impact on the distribution of wealth, generating inequality.
Similarly, neoliberals believe that financial globalization guaran-
tee economic benefit for all countries. According to neoliberals, finan-
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cial globalization should direct savings to those countries where returns
are higher, allowing inter-temporal consumption for the countries, as
well as a global diversification of investments. The attitude toward
financial liberalization has changed cyclically after the Second World
War, but today capital could be moved from a country to another much
more easily than it has been possible before along the course of the hu-
man history. And if on the one side, it produced the benefit claimed
by neoliberals, on the other side it seems to have produced also distri-
butional distortion among, as well as within, countries. Several studies
documented such a negative impact of financial liberalization on in-
equality (Furceri & Loungani, 2018; Jaumotte, Lall & Papageorgiou,
2013).
There are several reasons behind such a negative effect. An im-
mediate reason is that with the expansion of financial markets and in-
struments and their liberalization, the capitalist dynamic of wealth ac-
cumulation and investment are modified, and capital is used increas-
ingly to make profits without pass through material investments (Pianta
& Franzini, 2016). A second reason is that financial liberalization, al-
lowing capital to freely move from a country to another, contributes to
lower workers’ wages (Rodrik, 1998). If wages are determined by the
bargaining between employees and employers, the possibility for the
latter to move the production in another country represent a credible
threat with which they may force the former to accept lower salaries.
A third reason is that becoming internationally mobile, it has become
more difficult to tax capital. If capital can be easily displaced from a
country to another, governments may lose the ability to tax it. At the
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same time taxing salaries remains far easier, and in fact tax on salaries
remained quite constant and, in some cases, they have even increased.
Indeed, the negative effects on inequality generated by the appli-
cation of neoliberal policies could be reduced by the intervention of
national governments. Income inequality created by trade and financial
liberalization could be compensated by a redistribution of wealth from
the winners to the losers of globalization. However, since neoliberalism
postulates the limitation of states’ intervention in the economic sphere,
more the neoliberal credo is applied within a country more it is likely
that governments will not implement redistributive policies aimed to
compensate the distortions generated by trade and financial liberaliza-
tion.
Neoliberalism therefore, through the policies it encompasses at
national and global levels, could contribute to shape the national levels
of inequality. For this reason, the inclusion of such a variable in the
model may help to better estimate, and therefore to better understand,
the role of the form of government in affecting inequality within coun-
tries.
6.4 Theoretical model conclusion
Following the insights drawn by the analysis of the theoretical
literature, and the conclusions derived by the empirical works on the
subject, in this chapter I tried to elaborate a theory able to explain the
relation between the regime type of a country and its levels of income
inequality.
Starting from the assumption that the mixed results shown by the
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empirical literature would depend on the one hand on the fact that the
two variables could be linked by a reciprocal causal relation, and on
the other hand from the lack of inclusion of important independent and
intervening variables in the models developed, I directed my attention
to the development of a theory able to explain both the effects of the
form of government on inequality and the effect of inequality on the
form of government.
To do so, I firstly confronted the question “how do the form of
government of a state can influence inequality?”. Answering to this
question I highlighted that, in accordance with the theoretical litera-
ture the form of government of a state influences its levels of inequality
through two main channels. The level of education that has been empir-
ically proved to be higher, by an impressive amount of studies, within
democratic rather than non-democratic systems, and the redistributive
requests made by the population. However, while the empirical find-
ings seem to agree about the relation between the level of education
(measured in several different ways) and the form of government, there
is much less agreement about the relation between the latter and the re-
distributive requests. And in fact, several empirical studies rejected the
existence of a relation between the form of government of a state and
its levels of income inequality.
With respect to this apparent contradiction, I claimed that the prin-
cipal issue is that the classic theory usually employed to analyze the
relation long relied on the assumption according to which poor people
within democratic countries would request the implementation of redis-
tributive policies to their government just because they are poor, while
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rich citizens would certainly oppose it to safeguard their economic in-
terests. In other words, it has been often taken for granted that the rea-
son why democratic countries should be more equal, rather than non-
democratic countries, is that the former systems through elections give
voice to the poor, which are bigger in number rather than the rich, and
that the poor should obviously choose redistributive policies because
their poverty while the rich should oppose it because their wealth.
Even if not always explicitly, the theories strongly rely on the neo-
classic economic assumption which consider the human being to be a
rational actor, and its choices to be mainly driven by rationality. How-
ever, taking for granted that the poorest section of the population must
prefer the implementation of redistributive policies, while the richest
section must oppose it, means to deny the possibility that citizens’ be-
haviour may be guided by considerations different from the maximiza-
tion of their short-term utility, or that citizens’ decision may be biased
by a limited or distorted knowledge, or by wrong perceptions about the
object of their choice.
At the same time, classic theories also seemed to take for granted
that within democratic countries governments will surely implement
the policies preferred by the majority of the population. However, as
shown in the past sections, there are means of action through which the
minority of rich citizens may be able to convince the government of
democratic countries to implement policies that favour their particular
minoritarian interests at the expense of the interests of the majority.
For all these reasons, the model elaborated here to explain the
effect of the form of government on inequality refuses the logic of as-
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cribing preconceived decisions about inequality and redistribution to
citizens’ class, expecting that their behaviour would be guided by the
only belonging to the one of the two categories. And at the same time,
it refuses the logic according to which democratic governments always
implement the policies demanded by the majority of citizens.
On the contrary, the model elaborated points out how, on the one
side citizens’ beliefs and perceptions may shape worst-off citizens’ re-
quests for redistribution within democratic as well as non-democratic
countries, and on the other side how economic power may be converted
in political power in order to contrast the implementation of redistribu-
tive policies also in democratic contexts.
Secondly, I tried to answer the question: how do inequality can
influence the form of government of a state? In answering this ques-
tion, I highlight how the theoretical literature points out two principal
channels, one affecting the origin of democracy and the other affecting
the regime stability (independently from the form it assumes). On the
one side, within non-democratic countries, high levels of inequality may
prevent the formation of a strong and organized middle class, which in
turn may prevent the set in motion of a democratic transition. On the
other side, within non-democratic as well as within democratic coun-
tries, high levels of inequality may destabilize the incumbent regime
since it could generate frustration and resentment among the poorer
sections of the population that can lead them to act pacific as well as
violent forms of protest that in turn can lead to a regime change. Within
democratic country the outcome could be a shift toward less democratic
or non-democratic forms of government. Within non-democratic coun-
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tries, instead, the outcome could be both a shift to a different form
of non-democratic government, a partial liberalization, or a shift to a
democratic one. Moreover, the stability effect in this sense can be also
understood as an effect that inequality can have on the quality of the
regime, defining quality as the set of characteristics distinguishing an
ideal democracy. Since the aim of the present analysis is to address the
effect of inequality on both non-democratic and democratic countries,
rather than the effect of inequality on the processes of democratization,
I excluded the genesis effect from the empirical analysis.
Since the empirical literature also in this case shown mixed re-
sults, which may depend on the lack of inclusion of important inter-
vening variables in the models developed, I tried to develop a model
explaining how the stability effect may be contrasted by other sub-
mechanisms. To do so, I firstly pointed out how the stability effect
theory takes for granted that poor citizens always consider inequality as
problem that needs to be solved however, as discussed earlier, beliefs
and perceptions may play an important role in shaping citizens attitude
toward inequality. Secondly, I pointed out how it is important to dis-
tinguish the role that protests can play in democratic vis-à-vis in non-
democratic regimes. Protests, at least pacific ones, are usually allowed
within democratic countries. On the contrary, within non-democratic
countries, protests are not always tolerated, and often they recur to
several repressive means to end up, or even to prevent, the spread of
protests. Moreover, contrarily to what it is often assumed, not all non-
democratic governments employ repression in a similar fashion, they
differ even substantially with respect to the degree of control and re-
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pression they practice over their citizens, as well as with respect to the
means employed to carry out these tasks.
For these reasons, I supposed that even when citizens perceive
inequality as a problem it is not obvious that they will be able to or-
ganize themselves in such a way as to put in place protests capable
of influencing the stability of the regime. If the degree of control and
repression exercised by the state is very high, and protests directed to-
ward the kernel of the regime are violently repressed, in many cases also
pre-emptively, citizens frustration does not have the space to be trans-
formed in acts able to threaten the regime’s stability. In other words,
in the model elaborated here, the stability effect may be contrasted by
the level of government protests’ repression, and the means employed
to avoid and to face them.
Finally, to understand how and to what extent the form of gov-
ernment of a state can influence its levels of inequality and vice versa, I
added another important variable to the model, namely the degree of na-
tional economy adherence to the neoliberal credo, so as that to be able
to better isolate and to weight the variance imputable to the formers.
Neoliberalism generally follows three general propositions: i) the indi-
vidual is the most qualified to communicate his desires and the society
should aim to remove the obstacles to this goal; ii) free market is view as
the most efficient mean for promoting personal autonomy and freedom;
iii) the state should intervene as less as possible in the economic sphere
limiting itself to maintain and promote free market, and to guarantee in-
dividual rights, the most important of which is the right to own property
(Springer, 2016). And applied within national economies, such proposi-
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tions lead to a reduction in the state’s regulation of economic activities,
a deregulation of labour and financial markets, and a boost of commerce
and investments by the elimination of borders and barriers, allowing a
great mobility of labour, capital, and goods and services. According to
several economic models, trade and financial liberalization, for differ-
ent reasons, may contribute to the increase of inequality within nations
as well as among nations. Of course, the negative effects on inequal-
ity generated by the application of neoliberal policies could be reduced
by state’s actions, but since neoliberalism postulates the limitation of
states’ intervention in the economic sphere, more the neoliberal credo
would be applied within a country more would be likely that govern-
ments will not implement redistributive policies aimed to compensate
the distortions generated by neoliberal economic policies.
Neoliberalism therefore, through the policies it encompasses at
national and global levels, could contribute to shape the national levels
of inequality. For this reason, the inclusion of such a variable in the
model may help to better estimate, and so to better understand, the role
of the form of government in affecting inequality within countries. Fig-
ure 6.6 show a summary diagram of the theoretical model developed
within the chapter.
221
Figure 6.6: Summary diagram of the theoretical model
Source: Author’s elaboration.
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7Empirical test of the theoretical
model
7.1 Introducing the quantitative analysis
Following the methodological path described in Chapter 4, after
the elaboration of the theoretical model aimed to explain the relation
between a state’s form of government and its levels of inequality, in this
chapter through several steps I will test the model empirically.
In the following sections:
• I will break down the elaborated theory into testable hypotheses,
which will be the focus of, and at the same time will guide the,
empirical analysis;
• I will present the variables and the data employed in the econo-
metric analysis, describing and discussing the data and their prin-
cipal characteristics;
• I will discuss the quantitative analysis implemented to test the
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different hypotheses. In particular, I will present and discuss the
methodologies and the econometric models employed;
• I will present and discuss the results obtained through the econo-
metric analysis.
7.2 Breaking down the theoretical model into
testable hypotheses
In the last section of Chapter 6, I presented the theoretical model
explaining the relation between the two principal variables: form of
government and inequality. In the present section, I will decompose
the theoretical model into hypotheses that may be tested through the
employment of econometric analysis.
The first two hypotheses to be tested concern whether and to what
extent the form of government of a state influences its levels of in-
equality, and whether and to what extent the levels of inequality within
a state influence its form of government. My hypotheses are: (H1)
that levels of inequality influence the form of government, and (H2)
vice versa the latter influence the former. In addition to the dichotomy
democracy/non-democracy, I will also test whether and to what extent
the quality (interpreted as the degree of democracy and non-democracy)
of a state’s form of government influences its levels of inequality, and
how the levels of inequality influence the quality of a state’s form of
government. In this respect my hypotheses provide that (H3) inequality
negatively influences the quality of the form of government, and vice
versa (H4) the quality of the form of government negatively influences
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inequality.
The fifth and sixth hypotheses I aim to test concern the presence
of a reciprocal causal relation between the form of government and the
levels of income inequality (H5), and the presence of a reciprocal causal
relation between the quality of the government and the levels of inequal-
ity (H6). Assessing the presence of a reciprocal causal relation between
the two variables will allow me to answer to the principal research ques-
tion from which this work originated.
But beyond the six principal hypotheses and the principal rela-
tions mentioned above, I will also test additional relations which are
able to influence the principal ones. Firstly, (H7) I suppose that citi-
zens attitudes toward inequality and redistribution influence inequality
so as that if inequality is not perceived as an issue its levels will be
higher. Similarly, (H8) I suppose that citizens’ perceptions about socio-
economic mobility influence inequality and that when mobility is per-
ceived to be high inequality tend to increase. Secondly, I suppose (H9)
that protests help to improve the quality of government, while (H10)
repression conversely reduces it. Secondly, I suppose (H11) that the
national level of education influences inequality so as that increasing
the number of people enrolled in education reduces the levels of in-
come inequality. Thirdly, I suppose (H12) that corruption positively
influences the level of inequality, namely that higher is the level of cor-
ruption higher will be the level of inequality. Fourthly, I suppose (H13)
that the degree of adherence of a country in terms of economic poli-
cies to the principles of economic neoliberalism positively influences
the levels of inequality, in other words more a country would tend to
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apply the principles of neoliberalism within its economy more its levels
of inequality would tend to increase. Lastly, I suppose (H14) that the
there is a relation between the position of the country’s’ executive along
the political spectrum and the level of inequality, so as that the presence
of leftist executives is associated to lower levels of inequality.
7.3 Variables and data
Before presenting the econometric strategy used to analyze the
investigated relations, and to test my hypotheses, it is appropriate to
present and discuss the data I will employ in the analysis. Let’s start
with the variables "form of government" and "income inequality" that
are the two principal variables in the current work.
Measure of the regime type
For what concern the measurement of countries’ form of gov-
ernment, for different purposes I will use three different datasets: the
UDS, the PIV and the GSoD. As principal reference I will employ the
UDS data17 which, as already pointed out in Chapter 3, is a measure
of democracy produced by Pemstein, Meserve and Melton (2010) that
aggregates and harmonizes ten of the most used available democratic in-
dices. The index classifies political regimes based on a continuous scale
ranging from -2.2 to 2.2, where -2.2 represents the states that completely
lack democracy and 2.2 represents the full achievement of democracy.
Comparatively, the UDS index has two main advantages for the pur-
pose of the current analysis, on the one hand it covers a broad sample
17Unified Democracy Scores data are available at: http://www.
unified-democracy-scores.org/uds.html.
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of 199 for the years 1946-2012 and, on the other hand, the employment
of a continuous scale allows for a better diversification of the quality of
democracy within states as well as between states.
As discussed in Chapter 2.1.3, the PIV index18 is a democratic
index produced by (Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr, 2017). It classifies coun-
tries’ regime along a discrete scale which varies from -10 (total lack of
democracy) to +10 (total achievement of democracy), for a very large
sample of 194 countries for the years 1800-2017. The vast coverage
both in terms of time and space is the very comparative advantage of
this index, which will be employed as a control for the robustness of
the results obtained with the UDS. In this way it is possible to assess
whether the employment of a maximalist oriented versus a minimalist
oriented index of democracy, as seen in Chapter 2.1, returns different
results.
The last index employed is the GSoD. The GSoD data19, elabo-
rated by International IDEA, have the aim “to provide systematic and
nuanced data that captures trends at the global, regional and national
levels related to International IDEA’s comprehensive understanding of
democracy” (Skaaning, Jimenez, Noonan & Tufis, 2017). Therefore,
rather than creating a single score overarching democracy index per
country, the GSoD indices provide measurements of distinct aspects
of democracy, which are emphasized by one or more major traditions
within democratic thought. The GSoD includes indices and sub-indices
18Polity IV Index of democracy data are available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/
inscrdata.html.
19The Global State of Democracy Indices’ data are available at: https://www.idea.int/
gsod-indices/#/indices/world-map-table.
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for five attributes of democracy: i) representative government; ii) funda-
mental rights; iii) checks on government; iv) impartial administration;
and v) participatory engagement. Each index classifies each aspect of
democracy along a discrete scale which varies from 0 (total lack of the
certain characteristic) to 1 (total achievement of the certain character-
istic), for a sample of 155 countries for the years 1975-2015. The em-
ployment of the GSoD in the present work will allow to assess if and
to what extent different democratic characteristics influence the levels
of inequality, and if and to what extent inequality differently influences
different democratic components.
Measure of the inequality
For what concerns the measurement of countries’ levels of in-
equality I will use the SWIID data20 on Gini, produce by Solt (2016).
The SWIID aim to provide scholars with a dataset of income inequality
that maximize comparability for the amplest possible sample in terms
of both time and space (Solt, 2009), and in fact it provides observations
on Gini for 192 countries covering the years 1960-2017. The SWIID
accomplish this task, by using the data collected by the Luxembourg
Income Study as the standard, while incorporating data on Gini from
the IDD, the SEDLAC, the WIID, the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Latin America and the Caribbean, national statistical offices
around the world, and academic studies. The process of data aggrega-
tion is carried out minimizing reliance on problematic assumptions by
20The Standardized World Income Inequality Database’s data are available at: https:
//fsolt.org/swiid/.
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using as much information as possible from proximate years within the
same country (Solt, 2016). The standardization is done by employing
various imputation techniques to estimate the ratios of different coeffi-
cients and to create comparable data, in particular, using multiple impu-
tation (MI) estimates for filling the missing values in the LIS database
(Dorn, 2016). Through these procedures, Solt produced one hundred
estimates for any single observation, so as to take into account the un-
certainty of the estimations. To generate a single value for any single
observation, as suggested by Solt, I calculated the bounds of the 95%
uncertainty intervals, the result of which is the Gini data I employ in the
quantitative analysis.
Beyond the two principal variables form of government’s qual-
ity and income inequality, other important variables in the model are:
protest, repression, education, corruption, the degree of adherence of a
country to the principles of economic neoliberalism, the government’s
positioning along the political spectrum, citizens’ redistributive requests,
and the level of socioeconomic mobility.
Measure of protests and repression
For what concerns the data on protest and repression, they are pro-
duced by Clark and Regan (2016) in the context of The Mass Mobiliza-
tion Project (MM)21. According to the project website "the MM data are
an effort to understand citizen movements against governments, what
citizens want when they demonstrate against governments, and how
21The Mass Mobilization Project Data are available at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/
dataverse/MMdata
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governments respond to citizens". The MM data cover 162 countries
between 1990 and 2014. The unit of observation is the protest-country-
year, where protests are recorded individually within each country and
year. The Variable “protest” takes the value of 1 if a protest has occurred
in a given country in a given year. Protest is considered to have been
occurred if at least 50 people gathering to make demands to the govern-
ment. MM does not code protests that take place in a country when are
directed against policies carried out in a third country, so as that it cap-
tures only protests targeted at state policies. The MM provide disaggre-
gated data at single protest events, offering information about the num-
ber of participants, the protest group identity, the protester demands, and
the state response. Due to the purpose of the present analysis however,
since I am interested in having a single observation for a given country
and a given year, I carried out a process of data aggregation. In partic-
ular, since I would like to test whether protests against inequality may
influence the regime of a country, I firstly kept only those observations
concerning protester demands on labour wage dispute, price increases
or tax policy, land tenure or farm issues, and political processes (that is a
general category of demanding “reform” would be captured by political
behaviour or processes, as would demands for democratic transitions).
Secondly, I have aggregated the data for country/year observation re-
coding the variable as a dummy that takes the value of 1 if at least a
protest occurred in a given country in a given year, and a value of 0 if
in the time-frame considered by the MM data no protests occurred in
a given country in a given year. With respect to the variable “repres-
sion”, which consider the response of the government to protests, the
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MM data provide six categories: accommodation of demands, arrests,
beatings, crowd dispersal, ignore the protest, killings, and shootings.
Also, in this case, I re-coded the variable creating a scale from 0 to 7
considering the government response from the less to the most violent:
Accommodation, ignore the protest, crowd dispersal, beatings, arrests,
shootings, and killings. If in a given country and a given year more than
one protest occurred, I coded the country/year observation considering
the most violent response the government gave in that year.
Measure of education
Data on education hail from the database World Development In-
dicators, elaborated by the World Bank. As a proxy of the quality of
the education system I employ the net enrolment rate on secondary
education, defined as the ratio of children of official school age who
are enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official
school age. Completing the provision of basic education provided by
the primary level, secondary education aims at laying the foundations
for lifelong learning and human development by offering more subject-
or skill-oriented instructions employing more specialized teachers. The
net enrolment rate excludes overage as well as underage students and
captures the system’s coverage and internal efficiency. The data22 on
net secondary education cover a sample of 186 countries for the years
1970-2017.
22Data on net enrolment rate on secondary education are available at: http://databank.
worldbank.org/
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Measure of corruption
For the measurement of corruption, I will employ the "control
of corruption" indicator created by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi
(2010) in the context of The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
project. The Phenomenon of corruption involves many particular cases,
and for this reason it is difficult to give a single precise and comprehen-
sive definition. However, in general terms, corruption implies the abuse
of entrusted power for private gain. Some non-exhaustive examples in-
clude bribery, clientelism, and embezzlement. Other subtler and some-
times even legal examples of corruption include lobbying and patronage
(Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2017). The control of corruption indicator cov-
ers 171 countries over the period 1996–2016. It “captures perceptions
of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, includ-
ing both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the
state by elites and private interests". Therefore, this indicator in some
sense is able to grasp both the level of perceived corruption as well as
the perceived level of illegal or improper use of lobbying activities. The
index adopts a scale ranging from -2.5 to +2.5, where -2.5 is the max-
imum level of corruption while +2.5 is the minimum level of corruption.
Measure of the adherence to neoliberal economic principles
To measure the degree of adherence of a country to the principles
of economic neoliberalism, namely to what extent a country adheres to
the logics of free market economy and not inference in citizens’ eco-
nomic life, I will rely on the data provided by the Index of Economic
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Freedom23, produced by Miller, Kim, and Holmes (2018).The Index of
Economic Freedom defines economic freedom as:
"the fundamental right of every human to control his or her own
labour and property. In an economic free society, individuals are free
to work, produce, consume, and invest in any way they please. In eco-
nomically free societies, governments allow labour, capital, and goods
to move freely, and refrain from coercion or constraint of liberty beyond
the extent necessary to protect and maintain liberty itself."
Economic freedom is measured based on 12 quantitative and qual-
itative factors, grouped into four broad categories of economic freedom:
i) Rule of Law (property rights, government integrity, judicial effective-
ness); ii) Government Size (government spending, tax burden, fiscal
health); iii) Regulatory Efficiency (business freedom, labour freedom,
monetary freedom); and iv) Open Markets (trade freedom, investment
freedom, financial freedom). Each of the twelve economic freedoms
within these categories is graded on a scale of 0 to 100, and the coun-
try’s overall score is derived by averaging all the economic freedoms,
with equal weight being given to each. The overall score ranges from 0
to 100, where 0 represents a total lack while 100 a total achievement of
economic freedom. The index of Economic Freedom covers a sample
of 180 countries for the years 1995-2018.
Measure of the government positioning along the political spectrum
Data on the government’s (or regime’s) positioning along the po-
23The Index of Economic Freedom’s data are available at: https://www.heritage.org/
index/download.
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litical spectrum are retrieved from the Database of Political Institution
(Scartascini, Cruz & Keefer, 2018) and integrated with the employment
of several different sources. The pertaining of the government party (or
the non-democratic regime) to the political spectrum is accounted by
a dummy variable taking the value of 0 in case of right-wing parties
and the value of 1 in case of left-wing parties. The database24 covers
180 countries for the years 1975-2017. Since inequality is a structural
variable and the effect of government’s policies have not an immediate
effect on it, in the analysis the positioning along the political spectrum
will employed as a five-year lagged variable.
Measure of citizens’ attitudes and perceptions
The last data employed in the present work concern citizens’ at-
titudes toward redistribution and perceived social mobility, for both of
which some considerations are needed. As discussed in Chapter 6, both
variables would influence redistributive requests made by the popula-
tion which in turn would influence the levels of inequality. The opti-
mum strategy would have been that of directly measure the citizens’
attitude toward redistribution, the actual level of redistributive requests,
and the actual level of mobility. However, there is a serious lack of
cross-national longitudinal objective data on both redistributive requests
and mobility, while data on the citizens’ attitude toward redistribution
and data on the perceived level of mobility are available through several
cross-national surveys. Due to this data limitation, I will analyze the
24The Database of Political Institution’s data are available at: https://publications.iadb.
org/handle/11319/8806.
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direct effect of citizens’ attitude toward redistribution and the perceived
level of mobility on inequality, still supposing that if some significant
effect is found it would be mediated by their effects on redistributive
requests. In order to measure citizens’ attitude toward inequality and
their perception of social mobility, I will employ data25 produced by
the WVS. For what concerns citizens’ attitude toward inequality, I will
employ the country-level average answers to the question: "Should In-
comes be made more equal? Or, are larger income differences needed
as incentives for individual effort?". While for what concerns citizen’s
social mobility perception, I will employ the country-level average an-
swers to the question: "In the long run, does hard work usually brings
a better life? Or doesn’t hard work generally bring success, it’s more a
matter of luck and connections?". WVS data cover almost 100 coun-
tries, from 1981 to 2014 in 6 waves26. Each wave reports the data
collected within several years, however, since the variables employed
may be considered as structural variables that change slowly over the
years, I will re-code the time of each data as if it would have been col-
lected in the conclusive year of the survey. Both variables are measured
along a scale ranging from 1 to 10. With respect to citizens’ attitude
toward inequality, 1 represents "income should be made more equal"
while 10 represents “larger income differences are needed as incentives
for individual effort”. With respect to social mobility perception, in-
stead, 1 represents “in the long run, hard work usually brings a better
25World Value Survey’s longitudinal data are available at: http://www.
worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp.
26Wave 1 (1981-1984); Wave 2 (1990-1994); Wave 3 (1995-1998); Wave 4 (1999-
2004); Wave 5 (2005-2009); Wave 6 (2010-2014).
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life”, while 10 represents "hard work generally doesn’t bring success,
it’s more a matter of luck and connections".
Measures of countries’ GDP and economy’s specialization
Beyond the variables and data described above, which are part of
the elaborated model, in the econometric analysis I will also employ
two other variables as control variables, the GDP per capita as an inde-
pendent variable for the quality of government, and the share of work-
ers employed in the industrial sector as an independent variable for the
level of inequality. High levels of GDP per capita, on the one hand, are
thought to be a requisite for obtaining high quality governments, and in
particular they are associated with high levels of democracy27, even if
there are also authors such as Acemoglu et al., (2005) which deny such
a relation. However control for the GDP per capita will help obtaining
more precise estimations. Data28 on GDP per capita at current US dol-
lars are provided by the World Bank national accounts data, and OECD
National Accounts data files.
The share of workers employed in the industrial sector is added
as a control for the degree of specialization of a national’s economy.
An economy highly specialized in one sector, in fact, seems to present
higher inequality levels than less specialized economies (Chase-Dunn,
1975). Data29 on the the employment in industry as percentage of to-
27See, among others, Lipset (1959), Londregan and Poole (1996), Przeworski and
Limongi (1997), Barro (1997), Barro (1999), Przeworski et al. (2000), and Pa-
paioannou and Siourounis (2008).
28Data on GDP per capita are available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.
GDP.PCAP.CD.
29Data on the share of workers employed in the industrial sector are avail-
able at: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/source/world-development-indicators/
preview/on#advancedDownloadOptions.
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tal employment is provided by the International Labour Organization
Statistics, ILOSTAT Database.
Table 7.1 reports the relevant summary statistics of the variables
employed in the empirical analysis.
Table 7.1: Summary statistics of the variable employed in the empirical
analysis
VARIABLES N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Min Max Source
PIV 4,547 3.753 6.603 -10 10 Marshal et al. (2017)
Representative govt. 4,047 0.576 0.240 0 1 Skaaning et al. (2017)
Fundamental rights 4,030 0.606 0.192 0.051 1 Skaaning et al. (2017)
Checks on govt. 4,030 0.558 0.197 0.002 1 Skaaning et al. (2017)
Impartial administration 3976 0.530 0.210 0 1 Skaaning et al. (2017)
Civil society participation 4,046 0.630 0.178 0.058 1 Skaaning et al. (2017)
Electoral participation 3,819 0.598 0.233 0 1 Skaaning et al. (2017)
Direct democracy 4,049 0.136 0.167 0 1 Skaaning et al. (2017)
Subnational elections 3,502 0.425 0.303 0 1 Skaaning et al. (2017)
Education 1,706 70.25 24.65 2.720 99.91 UNESCO (2018)
Corruption 2279 0.019 1.042 -1.722 2.470 Kaufmann et al. (2010)
Neoliberal index 2,725 60.75 10.45 21.40 90.50 Miller et al. (2018)
Industry specialization 4,085 29.33 9.977 3.480 83.21 World Bank (2017)
Log GDP per capita 4,838 7.866 1.618 4.043 11.69 World Bank (2017)
L.5 Leftist govt. 1720 0.514 0.500 0 1 Scartascini et al. (2018)
Gini index 5,072 0.381 0.086 0.198 0.611 Solt (2016)
Repression 3,169 2.117 2.065 0 7 Clark and Regan (2016)
Protests 3,169 0.621 0.485 0 1 Clark and Regan (2016)
Protests violence 3,169 0.334 0.472 0 1 Clark and Regan (2016)
Redistributive attitudes 215 5.769 1.064 2.92 8.23 Inglehart et al. (2014)
Perceived mobility 174 4.175 0.804 1.94 6.5 Inglehart et al. (2014)
UDS 4,392 0.395 0.890 -1.482 2.263 Pemstein et al. (2010)
Author’s elaboration. “N” represents the number of country/year obser-
vations
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7.4 Econometric analysis
In order to test the hypotheses discussed in Chapter 7.2, I will pro-
ceed throughout several steps. In this section I will discuss the econo-
metric approaches employed to accomplish the task.
Firstly, as a preliminary analysis, I will estimate four baseline
equations using OLS estimators. The first two represent linear regres-
sions aimed to test the effect of inequality on the form of government
and on the quality of government. The second two represent a linear
and a curvilinear regression aimed to test the effect of the form of gov-
ernment on inequality, and the effect of the quality of government on in-
equality. To test the second relationship, I choose to employ a quadratic
instead of a linear model to assess whether there is the presence of a
Kuznets’ curve as hypothesized by part of the literature. The baseline
equations for the two type of regression are:
y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + . . . + βkXk + µ (7.1)
y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X
2
2
+ . . . + βkXk + µ (7.2)
where y represents the dependent variable, β0 the constant term,
X represents the independent variables and µ represents the error term.
Substituting the terms with the variables employed in the analysis, the
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four equations become:
UDSdummyit = β0 + β1Giniit + β2Protestit + β3Protestviolenceit
+ β4Repressionit + β5GDPpercapitait + µ
(7.3)
UDSit = β0 + β1Giniit + β2Protestit + β3Protestviolenceit
+ β4Repressionit + β5GDPpercapitait + µ
(7.4)
Giniit = β0 + β1UDSdummyit + β2Educationit + β3Corruptionit
+ β4Neoliberalismit + β5Industryshareit + µ
(7.5)
Giniit = β0 + β1UDSit + β2UDS
2
it
+ β3Educationit + β4Corruptionit
+ β5Neoliberalismit + β6IndustryShareit + µ
(7.6)
For two main reasons, this kind of analysis based on cross-country
relationships, does not allow to study causation. Firstly, as hypothe-
sized, one might be in the presence of reverse causality, so as that while
the quality of government may influence inequality, at the same time in-
equality may influence the quality of government. In this case, if some
of the explanatory variables in one equation are dependent variables of
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the other equation therefore the error terms maybe correlated and esti-
mating separate equations would provide biased results. Secondly, there
is the potential for omitted variable bias since we could have factors that
may determine both the nature of the political regime and the level of
inequality in a country. In presence of omitted variable in fact, the error
terms are correlated with endogenous variables and, therefore, the OLS
estimations would be biased.
To address the second problem, we control for country-specific
factors affecting both inequality and democracy by estimating panel re-
gressions including country fixed effects. Country fixed effects are not
the solution for all the problems of omitted variables one may have in
the model, however, since I suppose that the major sources of potential
bias are country-specific as historical factors influencing both political
and economic environment the inclusion of time-invariant fixed effects
will remove them and this source of bias. In this case also, I will es-
timate four different equations. Similarly to what done for the OLS
estimations, the first two equations represent linear regressions testing
the effect of inequality on the form of government and on the quality of
government, while the third and the fourth equations represent a linear
and a curvilinear regression aimed to test the effect of the form of gov-
ernment on inequality, and the effect of the quality of government on
inequality. Again, the choice to employ a quadratic instead of a linear
model to assess the effect of the quality of government on inequality is
due to test the presence of a Kuznets’ curve as hypothesized by part of
the literature.
As discussed above the fixed effects estimation is useful to re-
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move the time-invariant influence of determinants of both democracy
and inequality but it does not estimate the possible reciprocal causal ef-
fects between inequality and the form of government. An instrumental-
variables strategy (IV) with a valid instrument would have been a better
approach, however, due to the difficulties in finding valid and proper
instruments, I chose to follow a different strategy.
Since our main interest is the potential reciprocal casual relation
between democracy and income inequality and in order to find a proper
instrument, I choose to specify a simultaneous equations model that
includes enough variables to meet the conditions for identification.
The most used estimation technique to address simultaneity is two
stages least square (2SLS). However, we should note that most of the
properties of 2SLS are based on large-sample results which, in our case,
could not be applied. Therefore, we choose to estimate jointly our equa-
tions using three stages least square (3SLS) which has been proved to
be more efficient when the sample size is not large. This is an IV-GLS
estimator obtained in three steps:
1. it obtains the 2SLS estimates of the system of equations by re-
gressing all endogenous variables separately on all the exogenous
variables;
2. the errors from the 2SLS regression are used as instruments to
estimate the errors of the system of equation and the contempora-
neous correlation among the error terms;
3. finally, it uses an IV-GLS model to estimate the structural model
by using the contemporaneous variance-covariance matrix of er-
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ror terms (Zellner & Theil, 1962).
In this study, two different variables are used to measure democ-
racy: UDS and PIV. As a robustness check, in fact, we repeat the estima-
tion of the simultaneous equations twice once with UDS4 and secondly
with PIV. In addition, to assess the degree to which each form of gov-
ernment’s component affects inequality and vice versa, I will employ
the GSoD indices.
Finally, data on the attitude toward inequality and on citizens’
perception about social mobility, retrieved from the WVS dataset, when
aggregated at country level result in a very limited number of observa-
tions. So as that their inclusion in the estimations would lead to regress
a too small number of observations, and since the 3SLS automatically
drop all the observation containing missing values this would lead to
severely bias results. To test their effects on the overall model, there-
fore, I choose to use a different statistical strategy, the Structural Equa-
tion Model (SEM), which allows to overcome the problems raised by
the extremely high number of missing values.
To handle with missing data two main techniques have been de-
veloped: Multiple Imputation (MI) and Full Information Maximum
Likelihood (FIML). MI is a simulation-based approach in which the
missing values are replaced with a set of simulated value, while FIML
is a maximum-likelihood function which adjusts the likelihood func-
tion so that each case contributes information on the variables that are
observed. In dealing with missing values SEMs with FILM have two
main advantages over MI. The first is that FILM is easier to be repro-
duced and moreover performing repeated runs of the same model pro-
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duces the same results (Little & Rubin, 2014; Allison, 2001), and the
second is that the MI approach involves a high degree of subjectivity
since to perform the simulation one needs to choose the type of impu-
tation model, what variables to include and the number of imputations
to create. In addition, SEM also allows to test for the simultaneity of
the relation between the state’s quality of government and its levels of
inequality.
7.5 Results of the econometric analysis
The first step to test my hypotheses, as discussed in the past sec-
tions, is that of performing four simple OLS regressions to preliminarily
assess the presence of a significant relation between the variables state’s
form of government and level of inequality, and that of a significant re-
lation between the quality of government and the level of inequality.
Table 7.2 reports the result of the estimates of the relation be-
tween the level of inequality and the form government’s type (H1) and
between the level of inequality and the quality of government (H3).
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Table 7.2: OLS estimates (dependent variable: dummy democratic in-
dex and UDS democratic index)
UDS dummy UDS
(Model 1)
OLS
(Model 2)
OLS
Gini 2.585*** -1.258***
(0.598) (0.145)
Protest 1.370*** 0.308***
(0.159) (0.039)
Protest violence 0.353*** 0.099***
(0.135) (0.033)
Repression -0.224*** -0.060***
(0.0402) (0.0103)
Log GDP per capita 0.710*** 0.325***
(0.0346) (0.00758)
Constant -6.161*** -1.787***
(0.395) (0.096)
Observations 2,746 2,747
R-squared 0.214 0.492
Author’s elaboration. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
All the variable included in the OLS models show a high level of
significance and, except for the effect of the Gini on the dummy demo-
cratic index, all of them do show the expected sign. In fact, while higher
inequality seems to be associated with lower levels of democratic qual-
ity, when considering the form of government in a binary way it shows
exactly the opposite sign so as that higher levels of inequality seems to
be associated with democratic rather than non-democratic systems.
On the other side of the relation, Table 7.3 reports the results of
the OLS estimates of the effect of the type of government (H2) and of
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the quality of government (H4), on the level of inequality.
Table 7.3: Table 18: OLS estimates (dependent variable: Gini index)
Gini
(Model 1)
OLS
(Model 2)
OLS
UDS dummy 0.042***
(0.013)
UDS -0.006
(0.013)
UDS2 -0.026***
(0.005)
Net secondary enrolment -0.001*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Corruption -0.066*** -0.034***
(0.005) (0.006)
Neoliberal index 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000)
Workers’ industry share 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000)
L5. Leftist government 0.009 0.008
(0.006) (0.005)
Constant 0.099*** 0.134***
(0.035) (0.032)
Observations 453 453
R-squared 0.641 0.679
Author’s elaboration. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
The estimates reported in Table 7.3 do show the expected signs
for almost all the variables considered, with the exception of the form
of government in the first specification, and the presence of a leftist
government in both specifications, which also show no significant re-
sults. Concerning the principal relations, while the results of the first
specification shows that democratic regimes are associated with higher
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levels of inequality than non-democratic ones, a higher government’s
quality seems to be associated with lower levels of inequality. How-
ever, with respect to the second specification, the estimate of the effect
of the quality of government on inequality resulted to be negative but
not significant, contrarily to the effect of its square value which in turn
resulted to be negative and strongly significant.
Indeed, we could not entirely rely on the presented results since,
as pointed out in the previous sections, the OLS estimates’ results could
be severely biased. Notwithstanding, they show how the employment
of a dichotomous classification of the states’ regime or of a more nu-
anced classification of the states’ quality of government, and the use of
an improper functional specification, may drive the research to rather
opposite conclusions.
Secondly, to take advantage of the longitudinal nature of the data,
and to control for country-specific factors that may affect both the form
of government and inequality, I proceed the analysis by estimating panel
regressions including fixed effects. In presence of omitted variables, the
error terms are correlated with endogenous variables and, therefore, the
OLS estimations would be biased. Country fixed effects do not solve
all the endogeneity problems, however, since I suppose that the major
sources of potential bias are country-specific, as historical factors in-
fluencing both political and economic environments, the inclusion of
time-invariant fixed effects will address this source of possible bias.
Table 7.4 reports the estimates of the two panel regressions testing
the effects of inequality on the type as well as on the quality of govern-
ment (H1 and H3). The results are mixed and moreover not significant.
246
The sign of the Gini coefficient is negative and non-significant for what
concerns its effect on the type of government, while it results to be pos-
itive and non-significant for what concerns its effect on the quality of
government. The other variables included, instead, show the expected
sign in both specifications, however, almost all of them also result to be
non-significant.
Table 7.4: Panel estimates (dependent variables: dummy democratic
index and UDS democratic index)
UDS dummy UDS
(Model 1)
Logit Panel
(Model 2)
Panel
Gini -6.180 0.027
(4.130) (0.246)
Protest 0.208 0.009
(0.342) (0.017)
Protest violence 0.082 0.014
(0.262) (0.013)
Repression -0.035 -0.004
(0.075) (0.004)
Log GDP per capita 0.901*** 0.140***
(0.189) (0.009)
Constant 0.876 -0.797***
(2.410) (0.131)
Observations 2,746 2,747
Number of countries 141 141
Author’s elaboration. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7.5 reports, instead, the estimates of the panel regressions
testing the effect of the type and the quality of government on inequality
(H2 and H4). In this case, all the coefficients show the expected sign,
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except for the share of workers employed in the industrial sector, and
except for the industrial sector and for the dummy democratic index all
result to be significant. Moreover, the curvilinear regression testing the
effect of the quality of democracy on inequality show the presence of
an inverted “U” shaped curve, in other words the regression seems to
confirm the presence of the so-called Kuznets’ curve.
Table 7.5: Panel estimates (dependent variable: Gini index)
Gini
(Model 1)
Panel
(Model 2)
Panel
UDS dummy -0.001
(0.008)
UDS 0.023***
(0.008)
UDS2 -0.005*
(0.003)
Net secondary enrolment -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.001)
Corruption -0.018*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.004)
Neoliberal index 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.001)
industry -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
L.5 Leftist government -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.001)
Constant 0.355*** 0.339***
(0.020) (0.018)
Observations 453 453
R-squared 0.344
Number of countries 64 64
Author’s elaboration. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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If one would conclude the analysis with the panel regressions, one
would conclude that inequality have not any significant effect on the
type of government nor on the quality of government, and that while
the type of government have not any significant effect on inequality, the
quality of government influences inequality generating a Kuznets’ curve
according to which when a country become democratic there would
be an initial phase in which inequality would tend to increase, but in
a second phase further increases in the quality of government would
produce a decrease in the levels of inequality. If concluding here the
analysis, therefore, H4 should be accepted while H1, H2 and H3 should
be refused.
As discussed in the previous section, however, on the one hand
the fixed effects estimation accomplishes the task of removing the time-
invariant influences but, on the other hand, it does not estimate the pos-
sible presence of a reciprocal causal effects between inequality and the
form of government. However, if this hypothesis raised in this work is
true, the simultaneous causal relation between two dependent variables
and many independent ones would generate a contemporaneous corre-
lation between the error terms and the independent variables which in
turn would makes OLS inconsistent and doing so would make the re-
sults obtained by the cross-section and the panel regressions biased and
unreliable. To overcome this issue and to assess the presence of a si-
multaneous causal relation between the two principal variables, I chose
to employ the 3SLS estimation, as presented in the previous section.
Since the 3SLS estimates for the relation between the type of
regime and inequality did not show any significance for all the vari-
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ables considered, I decided to not report the corresponding table of the
results. Therefore, H1, H2, and H5 must be definitely refused. Table 7.6
reports the estimates of the 3SLS regression for the relation between the
quality of regime and inequality. The results clearly show the presence
of a simultaneous relation between the two variables, in fact, they are
simultaneously significant in both equations, allowing to accept H6. For
what concerns the first equation, where the quality of regime is the de-
pendent variable, all the coefficients show the expected sign and, except
for the variables measuring repression and protests violence, all of them
result to be significant. For what concerns the second equation, where
inequality is the dependent variable, all the coefficients show the ex-
pected sign and, with the only exception of the variable measuring the
share of workers employed in the industrial sector, all of them result to
be significant.
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Table 7.6: Three Stage Least Square estimates
(Model 1)
3SLS
(Model 2)
3SLS
UDS 0.214***
(0.065)
UDS2 -0.064***
(0.021)
Net secondary enrolment -0.002***
(0.001)
Corruption -0.030***
(0.008)
Neoliberal index 0.002***
(0.001)
industry -0.001
(0.001)
L5. Leftist government -0.005**
(0.002)
Gini -1.868***
(0.209)
Protest 0.121**
(0.049)
Protest violence -0.034
(0.040)
Repression -0.003
(0.015)
Log GDP per capita 0.298***
(0.012)
Country dummies No Yes
Constant -0.918*** 0.427***
(0.165) (0.051)
Observations 426 426
R-squared 0.815 0.977
Author’s elaboration. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
In detail, for what concerns the principal relation investigated, the
Gini exhibits a negative effect on the quality of government confirming
251
H3, according to which higher levels of inequality correspond to lower
level of democratic quality. On the other side of the relation, the qual-
ity of government shows a significant effect on the levels of inequality.
In particular, it seems to follow the pattern of the so-called Kuznets’
curve. In fact, while the coefficient of the UDS index shows a posi-
tive sign, the coefficient of the square value of the UDS is negative and
both are highly significant. And this allow to accept H4. For what con-
cerns the secondary relations, instead, Protests seem to be a useful tool
to increase the quality of government, showing a positive effect on the
UDS index. Violent protests and repression do show a negative but non-
significant effect on the quality of government. Education, the presence
of a leftist government, and the share of workers in the industrial sector
show a negative effect on inequality, even if the latter variable show non-
significant effect. Lastly, corruption and the degree to which a country’s
economic system adhere to the axioms of neoliberal economics show a
positive and significant effect on inequality. Therefore, H9, H11, H12,
H13, and H14 can be accepted, while H10 must be refused. It worthy
to highlight that the differences of the results obtained employing the
two different indices, in addition to the results derived from the OLS
and the Panel estimates, do confirm that the employment of a dichoto-
mous democratic index, classifying countries among democracies or
non-democracies instead of a more nuanced index capable to gauge the
quality of democracy, returns completely different results. Not only
employing one or the other influences the significance of the results, in
some cases it also overturns the signs of the coefficients in counterintu-
itive and unexpected ways. This could have two different meanings, on
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the one side It could simply mean that the mere classification between
democracy and non-democracy fails to categorize those countries that
are at the edge of the two positions, but on the other side instead it could
mean that the form of government does not affect (and is not affected
by) inequality, while the quality of government does. Future research
focused on this very subject should be carried out to clarify this ambi-
guity.
Through several step and econometric techniques, until now, I
have individually and simultaneously estimated the effect of the type
and the quality of government on inequality and the effect of inequality
on the type and the quality of government, as well as how other vari-
ables may influence the two principal ones. In all the cases, however, I
have not tested H7 and H8 leaving out from the analysis two important
variables that are part of my theoretical model, namely the variable ac-
counting for citizens’ attitude toward inequality, and the one describing
citizens’ perception about social mobility. As explained in the previ-
ous section, the reason for choosing to not include them in the previous
analysis is that unfortunately when aggregated at country level, the data
from the WVS result in a very limited number of country/year observa-
tions.
To test their effects on the overall model, as discussed in Chapter
7.4, I choose to use the SEM model, which in conjunction with the
FILM estimate allows to handle the presence of missing values. Table
7.7 reports the results of the SEM analysis.
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Table 7.7: SEM with FIML estimates
Structural SEM
Gini <–
UDS 0.097***
(0.021)
UDS2 -0.061***
(0.008)
Net secondary enrolment -0.002***
(0.001)
Corruption -0.021***
(0.006)
Neoliberal index 0.001
(0.000)
industry 0.003***
(0.001)
L5. Leftist government -0.018**
(0.008)
Redistributive requests 0.037**
(0.017)
Perceived Mobility -0.022*
(0.153)
Constant 0.433***
(0.353***)
UDS <–
Gini -10.253***
(0.556)
Protest 0.505***
(0.576)
Protest violence 0.150***
(0.471)
Repression -0.054***
(0.015)
Log GDP per capita 0.193***
(0.014)
Constant 2.576***
(0.294)
Observations 5072
Log likelihood -55021.043
Author’s elaboration. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The SEM analysis confirms the principal results of the 3SLS es-
timation (Table 7.6). The quality of government shows a curvilinear
relation with inequality in which the value of the quality of government
positively affects while its squared value negatively affects inequality,
confirming the presence of the so-called Kuznets curve. And this means
that, after a certain level, the quality of government is able to reduce the
country’s levels of income inequality. At the same time, increasing in-
equality decreases the quality of government.
For what concerns the secondary relations, except for the variable
measuring the level of adherence to the neo-liberal credo, all the vari-
ables are significant and show the expected sign. In particular, either
the variable measuring citizens’ attitude toward redistribution and the
variable measuring their perception of socio-economic mobility signif-
icantly affect income inequality. Citizens belief that larger differences
of income are needed in order to foster individual efforts is associated
with higher levels of income inequality. At the same time, a percep-
tion of a low socio-economic mobility is associated with lower levels of
inequality. Therefore, H7 and H8 can be accepted.
Lastly, without any specific hypotheses on this respect, in order to
test if different attributes defining the quality of government differently
influence inequality and vice versa, I performed eight different 3SLSs
regressions employing the GSoD indices30. Table 7.8, 7.9, 7.10, and
7.11 report the results of the eight regressions.
30The GSoD indices employed are: representative government; fundamental rights;
checks on government; impartial administration; civil society participation; electoral
participation; direct democracy; subnational elections
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Table 7.8: Three Stage Least Square estimates
Variable
(Model 1)
Rep Gov
(Model 2)
Fund Rights
Rep Gov 2.001**
(0.846)
Rep Gov2 -1.857**
(0.818)
Fund Rights 0.093
(0.517)
Fund Rights2 -0.088
(0.356)
Net Secondary Education -0.002*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.000)
Corruption 0.004 -0.011***
(0.013) (0.003)
Neoliberal Index 0.001** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Industry Workers’ Share -0.003** -0.001**
(0.002) (0.000)
L5. Leftist Government -0.009* -0.006***
(0.005) (0.001)
Gini 0.083 -0.539***
(0.056) (0.052)
Protest 0.026** -0.007
(0.013) (0.012)
Protest Violence 0.025** 0.022**
(0.010) (0.010)
Repression -0.007* -0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
Log GDP per Capita 0.066*** 0.069***
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.110 0.013 0.318 0.277
(0.045) (0.126) (0.042) (0.156)
Observations 523 523 523 523
R-squared 0.579 0.776 0.775 0.985
Author’s elaboration. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7.9: Three Stage Least Square estimates
Variables
(Model 3)
Checks Gov
(Model 4)
Imp Admin
Checks Gov 0.526
(0.447)
Checks Gov2 -0.426
(0.346)
Imp Admin -0.624
(0.497)
Imp Admin2 0.402
(0.344)
Net Secondary Education -0.001*** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000)
Corruption -0.011*** -0.007
(0.004) (0.004)
Neoliberal Index 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Industry Workers’ Share -0.001 -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000)
L5. Leftist Government -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
Gini -0.320*** -0.441***
(0.057) (0.063)
Protest -0.020 -0.041***
(0.013) (0.014)
Protest Violence 0.015 0.012
(0.011) (0.012)
Repression 0.001 0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Log GDP per Capita 0.070*** 0.089***
(0.003) (0.004)
Constant 0.186 0.277 0.023 0.463
(0.045) (0.156) (0.050) (0.131)
Observations 523 523 523 523
R-squared 0.775 0.985 0.764 0.985
Author’s elaboration. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7.10: Three Stage Least Square estimates
Variables
(Model 5)
Civ Soc Part
(Model 6)
Elect Part
Civ Soc Part -3.424***
(0.677)
Civ Soc Part2 2.495***
(0.494)
Elect Part 1.266**
(0.588)
Elect Part2 -1.084**
(0.494)
Net Secondary Education -0.001 -0.002***
(0.000) (0.001)
Corruption 0.001 0.014
(0.007) (0.014)
Neoliberal Index 0.001*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
Industry Workers’ Share -0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
L5. Leftist Government -0.009*** -0.005
(0.003) (0.004)
Gini -0.099 -0.160
(0.065) (0.101)
Protest -0.026* 0.007
(0.015) (0.023)
Protest Violence 0.045*** 0.030
(0.012) (0.019)
Repression -0.001 -0.012*
(0.005) (0.007)
Log GDP per Capita 0.053*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.006)
Constant 0.281 1.454 0.536 0.032
(0.051) (0.232) (0.081) (0.126)
Observations 523 523 523 523
R-squared 0.467 0.956 0.089 0.894
Author’s elaboration. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7.11: Three Stage Least Square estimates
Variables
(Model 7)
Direct Dem
(Model 8)
Subn Elect
Direct Dem -0.090
(0.173)
Direct Dem2 0.044
(0.158)
Subn Elect -2.505***
(0.788)
Subn Elect2 1.829***
(0.582)
Net Secondary Education -0.001*** 2.12e-05
(0.000) (0.001)
Corruption -0.011*** -0.006
(0.004) (0.011)
Neoliberal Index 0.002*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Industry Workers’ Share -0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
L5. Leftist Government -0.004 -0.007*
(0.003) (0.004)
Gini -0.374*** -0.023
(0.135) (0.163)
Protest 0.0251 0.093***
(0.031) (0.035)
Protest Violence -0.037 0.023
(0.025) (0.028)
Repression -0.004 0.003
(0.009) (0.011)
Log GDP per Capita 0.001 0.087***
(0.008) (0.010)
Constant 0.309 0.295 -0.237 0.690
(0.107) (0.022) (0.133) (0.137)
Observations 523 523 463 463
R-squared 0.039 0.985 0.285 0.881
Author’s elaboration. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The analysis of the attributes of democracy’s effects on inequal-
ity and vice versa highlights some interesting results. The attributes
of democracy considered in the regressions are: representative govern-
ment; fundamental rights; checks on government; impartial administra-
tion; civil society participation; electoral participation; direct democ-
racy; subnational elections. Firstly, it shows that while there is a re-
ciprocal causal relation between the composite index of the quality of
democracy (UDS) and inequality, there is no any reciprocal causal re-
lation between the different attribute of democratic quality and inequal-
ity. This is not surprising, however, but it shows the second interesting
result, namely that only some attributes of democratic quality signif-
icantly influence inequality and only some attributes are significantly
influenced by inequality.
For what concerns the effects of inequality on the attributes of
democracy, the results show it negatively and significantly influences
fundamental rights, checks on government, impartial administration,
and direct democracy. At the same time, inequality has a negative but
non-significant effect on representative government, and a positive but
non-significant effect on civil society participation, electoral participa-
tion, and subnational elections.
On the other side, concerning the effect that the different attributes
of democracy have on inequality, the results show that representative
government and electoral participation have a positive and significant
effect while their squared values a negative one. Fundamental rights and
checks on government have a positive but non-significant effect while
their squared values a negative one. Impartial administration, direct
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democracy and subnational elections have a negative but non-significant
effect while their squared values a positive one. Lastly, civil society
participation has a negative and significant effect while its squared value
has a positive and significant one.
Summing up these last findings, inequality seem to contribute to
worsen the quality of fundamental rights, checks on government, im-
partial administration, and direct democracy, while it seems to have no
significant effects on the other attributes. On the other side, the quality
of representative government and of electoral participation seem to sig-
nificantly reduce inequality, but only after a certain level of inequality
showing the presence of a Kuznets curve. At the same time, the quality
of civil society participation in a first time seem to contribute to signif-
icantly reduce inequality but also in this case in a "U" shaped fashion.
All the other attributes of democracy on the contrary do not show any
significant effect.
7.5.1 Robustness checks
In this section I investigate the robustness of the previous re-
sults by repeating the analysis employing a different democratic index,
namely the PIV index. Table 7.12, 7.13, and 7.14, respectively report
the results of the panel estimates of the effect of inequality on the form
and on the quality of government; the panel estimates of the effect of
the form and the quality of government on inequality, and the 3SLS
estimates. Since as pointed out in the past sections the OLS estimates
results to be severely biased, for the sake of concision they are not re-
peated in this section.
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The results reported in Table 7.12 obtained by employing the PIV
index as dependent variable confirm those obtained by using the UDS
index, showing the absence of any significant effect of the Gini index
on both the PIV dummy and the PIV index. Moreover, even in this
case, except for the positive effect of the Log GDP per capita on both
variables none of the other variables result to be significant.
Table 7.12: Panel estimates (dependent variables: PIV dummy and
UDS democratic index)
PIV dummy PIV
Variables
(Model 1)
Panel
(Model 2)
Panel
Gini 1.723 -2.200
(0.486) (2.271)
Protest -0.237 0.0344
(0.304) (0.164)
Protest violence -0.158 0.020
(0.221) (0.130)
Repression 0.031 0.007
(0.067) (0.043)
Log GDP per capita 1.400*** 0.979***
(0.159) (0.083)
Constant -12.37 -2.948
(2.180) (1.208)
Observations 3,047 3,047
Number of countries 143 143
Author’s elaboration. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Even the results reported in table 7.13, obtained by employing
PIV dummy and PIV index as independent variables, confirm those ob-
tained by using the UDS dummy and the UDS index. The principal
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variables show the expected sign in both specifications, however, the
effect of the form of government is non-significant while the effect of
the quality of government is significant. Moreover, the employment of
the PIV index confirms the presence of a Kuznets curve since the coef-
ficient of the PIV is positive while the coefficient of its squared value is
negative.
Table 7.13: Panel estimates (dependent variable: Gini index)
Gini
(Model 1)
Panel
(Model 2)
Panel
PIV dummy -0.005
(0.004)
PIV 0.008***
(0.003)
PIV squared -0.001***
(0.000)
Net Secondary Education -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Corruption -0.017*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003)
Neoliberal Index 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Industry Workers’ Share -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
L5. Leftist Government -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.361 0.361
(0.019) (0.019)
Observations 561 561
R-squared 0.392
Number of countries 66 66
Author’s elaboration. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Lastly, Table 7.14 reports the estimates of the 3SLS regression
performed by employing the PIV index, which further confirms the pre-
vious results obtained by using the UDS index. The regression shows,
in fact, the presence of a reciprocal causal relation between the quality
of government and inequality, the coefficient of the two variables show
the expected sign and are significant.
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Table 7.14: Three Stage Least Square estimates
Variables
(Model 1)
3SLS
(Model 2)
3SLS
PIV 0.082***
(0.030)
PIV squared -0.006***
(0.002)
Net Secondary Education -0.001***
(0.000)
Corruption -0.011*
(0.006)
Neoliberal Index 0.002***
(0.000)
Industry Workers’ Share 0.002***
(0.001)
L5. Leftist Government -0.008***
(0.003)
(0.197)
Gini -0.656*
(1.170)
Protest 0.410
(0.267)
Protest violence 0.131
(0.216)
Repression -0.070
(0.082)
Log GDP per capita 1.075***
(0.066)
Constant -1.247 0.675
(0.929) (0.148)
Observations 528 528
R-squared 0.487 0.950
Author’s elaboration. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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8Conclusions
The relation between the state’s form of government and its lev-
els of income inequality is puzzling scholars at least since the 1970s,
becoming part of the research strand on the determinants of democratic
processes. These processes have been long studied in both political sci-
ence and economic literature, and several theories have been proposed
to disentangle, and to explain, the role played by the different actors
and variables, as well as under which conditions they are more likely to
occur.
When this research strand begun, non-democratic countries out-
numbered democratic countries to a consistent extent, and the aim of at
least a part of the scholars involved in this kind of research was also to
show the advantages of democratic vis-à-vis non-democratic regimes, in
the hope that this would have helped spreading and fostering democratic
practices and institutions all over the world, and from the beginning it
was assumed that one of the advantages of democracy was the reduc-
tion of income inequality. But when the third wave of democratization
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occurred, and ex-Soviet countries transitioned from non-democratic to
democratic systems they shown a completely different pattern in which
their levels of inequality sharply increased. This obliged scholars to re-
consider the relation and to develop other theories to try to understand
it.
Since the 1970s, several theories have been proposed to describe
and explain the relation between the two variables. As discussed in
Chapter 3.1, some authors claimed that the form of government influ-
ences inequality one way or the other, others that it is inequality influ-
encing in some way the form of government, and other authors claimed
that there is not any significant relation. And as shown in Chapter 3.2,
many scholars engaged themselves in empirical studies aimed to test
these theoretical frameworks, however, as the theories diverged about
the functioning of the relation, the empirical researches have shown
mixed and sometimes contrasting results, and after almost forty years
of studies on this topic, there is still no agreement on how the relation
between the state’s form of government and inequality would shape nor
how the causal mechanisms would work.
The present work, started discussing some of the possible sources
of these contradictions showing how the discordance of results may
have depended on several conceptual and methodological factors. From
the methodological perspective, The process of operationalization and
the choice of the indicators needed to proceed from the theoretical to
the empirical realm, the choice of employing a set of data instead of
another, or an equation model over another, even if usually guided by
the literature, require abundant doses of subjectivity that can lead to
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divergent results when the empirical analyses are carried out.
But even before the methodological aspects, at least two theoret-
ical problems emerged from the study of the theories on the relation
between the state’s form of government and inequality.
The first theoretical issue concerns on the one side the nature of
democracy and its relationship with liberalism and, on the other side,
the distinction between economic and political liberalism. With respect
to democracy and liberalism, the two concepts have often been con-
flated and confused, and this confusion is particularly evident looking
at the attempts to quantitatively measure democracy that, in fact, em-
ploy a definition of democracy based on a liberal understanding, as if
liberal democracy would be the only possible form of democracy, and at
the same time as if liberalism would be a monolithic philosophical doc-
trine. Liberals however, as has been discussed in Chapter 1, developed
several distinct and sometimes competing understandings of the con-
cept of liberty, a concept at the very basis of the liberal doctrine, which
have different consequences that can affect inequality when translated
into political and economic practices. Particularly, economic liberal-
ism, often employing a negative understanding of liberty taught as the
mere absence of external obstacles that prevent an individual action,
supports the idea according to which "The Market" is able by itself to
allocate the resources of a country in the best possible way. And when
translated into practice, this means that governments should not impose
taxes beyond what it is needed to regularly run the governmental appa-
ratus.
With respect to the second theoretical issue, namely the influence
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of the concept of rationality on the study of the relation between democ-
racy and inequality, the theories seem to take for granted that citizens
perform their choices in an economically rational way. On the one side,
it is taken for granted that poor citizens always perceive inequality as
a social problem that the government must address, and the implemen-
tation of redistributive policies as the answer to that problem. On the
other side, it is taken for granted that rich citizens must always oppose
to redistribution. Even if not explicitly, indeed, the theories evidently
rely on the economic assumption which consider the human being to
be a rational actor, and its choices to be mainly driven by economic ra-
tionality. However, such attitudes can depend on other factors such as
citizens’ philosophical, ethical, and political belief, and the maximiza-
tion of economic utility based on his own class may not be the only way
a person decide to favour or oppose redistribution.
The literature review also highlighted that most of the theories
trying to explain the relation between the state’s form of government
and inequality was integrated into the research stream of democratiza-
tion theory, and at the same time it highlighted the lack of a theoretical
framework capable to explain the intricacy of the interactions between
the two variables. The theories elaborated so far, in fact, resulted to
be fragmented each of which considering relatively small parts of the
phenomenon and leaving aside important others.
For all these reasons, I proceeded the investigation by examining
some specific countries in which the theories on the relation between
the form of government and inequality seemed to not work. The aim of
this case study analysis, focusing on cases deviating from the theories,
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was to try to assess the possible presence of important omitted variable,
and to verify the presence of secondary mechanisms interfering with the
principal ones. Specifically, I presented three deviant cases: the case of
US, which even being considered one of the most democratic countries
in the world, on the one hand, it showed relatively high levels of inequal-
ity compared to other democratic as well as some non-democratic coun-
tries and, on the other hand, where in spite of the high levels of inequal-
ity the stability of the democratic regime has been never threatened; the
Hungarian case, where despite the presence of a non-democratic regime
the country registered relatively low levels of inequality compared to
other non-democratic as well as democratic regimes; and the Chinese
case, a non-democratic country in which despite the level of inequality
has dramatically increased since the end of the 1970s, the stability of
the regime has never been seriously in danger. The analysis of the three
cases has shown how the relation between the state form of government
and its levels of inequality is far more complex than how it is usually
described.
The American case (Chapter 5.2) shown how citizens’ attitudes
toward inequality and redistribution are important to explain both the
level of inequality and how they react to high levels of inequality, and
on the other side, contradicting the dogma of economic rationality, that
these attitudes are not influenced by the merely belonging to a specific
social class. In particular the analysis pointed out how the relatively
high levels of inequality, in spite of being a fully democratic country,
can be explained by the fact that many American citizens consider in-
equality a characteristic able to foster individual efforts, and therefore
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a positive characteristic, and on the other hand that they don’t believe
that taxing the rich to subsidize the poor is a fundamental aspect of
democracy. This set of belief can also explain why despite being rela-
tively highly unequal American democratic system has been never ques-
tioned or threaten. The analysis of the American case also pointed out
two variables that can explain the origin of that kind of attitude: i) the
politico-economic liberal ideology; and ii) the perceived levels of social
mobility. Liberalism, even if in different manners, postulates that some
degree and some forms of inequality are necessary and morally accept-
able. This idea permeates the American society since its foundation
so as that nowadays even many poor citizens believe that government
should not redistribute wealth. At the same time, American citizens,
raised with the national ethos of the "American dream", still perceived
the presence of high levels of social mobility even if they dramatically
decreased in the last decades. The perception of high level of social mo-
bility, however, can generate a more relaxed attitude toward inequality,
and aversion toward redistribution. At the same time, obviously, it can
reinforce such attitude where pre-existing, as in US, for a philosophical
tradition.
The Hungarian case (Chapter 5.3) suggested the need to take into
the equation the economic organization of a country. The increases in
the level of inequality showed by Hungary, as well as many other ex-
Soviet countries, and its coincidence with their democratic transition
could be better understood by considering their passage from a commu-
nist to a capitalistic type of economy rather than by the abandonment of
a non-democratic regime in favour of a democratic one. In addition, the
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analysis of the Hungarian case allowed to identify an additional variable
that can influence the relation between a country’s form of government
and its levels of income inequality: the country’s level of corruption.
Through corruption the richest sections of the population could be able
to prevent the implementation of redistributive policies even if they are
deemed to be essential, and strongly requested, by the worst-off section
of the population.
The Chinese case (Chapter 5.4), finally, raised some further in-
sights about the stability theory. To work, on the one hand, the stability
theory needs that citizens consider inequality as a problem that should
be solved by the government, but on the other hand it needs also that cit-
izens have some room for manoeuvre that allow them to organize them-
selves in the attempt to affect the regime stability. In fact, the Chinese
case shown that when the control exercised by the state is very high,
and the protests directed toward the core characteristics of the regime
are violently repressed, citizens frustration does not have the space to
be transformed in acts able to threaten the regime’s stability. Therefore,
if citizens have not space to effectively employ the dissent in order to
overturn the regime, and if they are not supported in some way at least
by a part of the elite, the stability mechanism is unable to deploy its
effect.
The analysis of the theoretical and empirical literature, and the
study of the three deviant cases, allowed to develop a more comprehen-
sive theoretical model aimed to explain the relation between the state’s
form of government and inequality. According to this model, first and
foremost, inequality and the form of government reciprocally influence
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each other.
Following the classic theories, the form and the quality of govern-
ment influences inequality through three channels: the levels of redis-
tribution, the levels of education, and the ideology on which it is based.
Democracies are expected to be more egalitarian than non-democracy
since in principle, on the one side, they give political voice to the poor
section of the citizenry, and on the other side because democratic coun-
tries provide better education systems. Beyond that, however, also the
ideology guiding governments should be considered into the equation.
Governments inspired by leftist ideologies are expected to increase taxes
on the rich and redistribution to the poor, on the contrary governments
inspired by rightist ideologies are expected to do the opposite. There-
fore, leftist government are expected to be associated with lower levels
of inequality than rightist ones.
At the same time, income inequality influences the form and the
quality of a country in two different ways. On the one side high levels
of income inequality, within a non-democratic country, could prevent to
pave the way for a democratic transition. On the other side, there is the
issue of the stability, according to which independently from the actual
state’s structure, democratic or not, high levels of income inequality
could endanger the stability of the regime.
Beyond these relations, which I called principal mechanisms, there
are secondary mechanisms able to interfere with the principal ones.
Firstly, even if a country is democratic, and poor citizens can influ-
ence the implementation of policies through free, fair, and recurrent
elections, this does not mean that they will mechanically ask the gov-
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ernment to implement redistributive policies. To function correctly, the
redistributive mechanism through which the form of government of a
state can influences its levels of inequality requires that, at least, the
poor segment of the population within that country believe inequality to
be a social problem. Moreover, citizens’ believes about inequality do
not necessarily depend on their social class, but they can depend also at
least on two other factors: citizens’ political beliefs, and citizens’ per-
ceptions on socio-economic mobility. Consequently, if income inequal-
ity is not perceived as an issue and (or) social mobility is perceived to
be high, redistributive requests may be absent, and in this case, there
is no reason to think that democracy will be more egalitarian than non-
democracies. At the same time, attitudes toward inequality and redis-
tribution can also interfere with the effect of inequality on the system’s
stability. If citizens do not consider inequality as an issue there is no
reason to believe that high levels of inequality would trigger protests
and riots and therefore would harm the regime’s stability.
Secondly there are at least two other factors that can influence
inequality and that are not depended on the form (or the quality) of gov-
ernment: the level of corruption and the national adherence to economic
neoliberalism. Corruption can influence inequality by contrasting citi-
zens’ redistributive requests. The rich citizens may decide to convert
their economic power into political power to avoid the implementation
of redistributive policies that would threaten their wealth. The same
result, however, can be reached with lobbying activities which are le-
gal and regulated in some democratic countries. Economic liberalism,
instead, through the economic policies it encompasses at national and
274
global levels creates imbalances in the distribution of income, and with
the political principles it advocates concerning the limitation of states’
intervention in the economic sphere could contribute to shape the na-
tional levels of inequality independently from its form of government.
Lastly, even if citizens perceive inequality as a social problem it
is not obvious that they will be able to organize themselves in such a
way as to put in place protests capable of influencing the stability of
the regime, especially within non-democratic countries with a powerful
authoritarian infrastructure. If the degree of control and repression ex-
ercised by the state is very high, and protests directed toward the kernel
of the regime are violently repressed, in many cases also pre-emptively,
citizens frustration does not have the space to be transformed in acts
able to threaten the regime’s stability.
In order to empirically test the theoretical model, I break down
it into testable hypotheses: (H1) the form of government of a state in-
fluences its levels of inequality; (H2) the levels of inequality within a
state influence its form of government; (H3) the levels of inequality
negatively influence the quality of government; (H4) the quality of gov-
ernment negatively influences its levels of inequality; (H5) there is a
reciprocal causal relation between the form of government and the lev-
els of income inequality; (H6) there is a reciprocal causal relation be-
tween the quality of the form of government and the levels of inequality;
(H7) citizens’ attitudes toward inequality and redistribution influence
inequality itself, so as that if inequality is not perceived as a problem it
tends to increase; (H8) citizens’ perception about socio-economic mo-
bility influence inequality, so as that if mobility is perceived to be high
275
inequality tends to increase; (H9) protests help to improve the quality
of government; (H10) repression conversely reduces it; (H11) the na-
tional level of education influences inequality so as that increasing the
number of people enrolled in education reduces the levels of income in-
equality; (H12) corruption positively influences the level of inequality,
namely that higher is the level of corruption higher will be the level of
inequality; (H13) the degree of adherence of a country to the principles
of economic neoliberalism positively influences the levels of inequality;
and (H14) the there is a relation between the position of the country’s’
executive along the political spectrum and the level of inequality, so as
that the presence of leftist executives is associated to lower levels of
inequality. To test these hypotheses, several econometric models with
different specifications have been employed.
The estimates performed revealed some interesting results. First
and foremost, they confirmed that the employment of a dichotomous
democratic index, classifying countries among democracies or non-democracies,
or of a more nuanced index capable to gauge the quality of democracy,
completely changes the results. Not only employing one or the other
influenced the significance of the results, in some cases it also over-
turned the signs of the coefficients in counterintuitive and unexpected
ways. This could have two different meanings, on the one side It could
simply mean that the mere classification between democracy and non-
democracy fails to categorize those countries that are at the edge of the
two positions, but on the other side instead it could mean that the form
of government does not affect (and is not affected by) inequality, while
the quality of government does. Future research focused on this very
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subject should be carried out to clarify this ambiguity.
Secondly, as expected and not surprisingly, the results showed
how employing different econometric models drove to different con-
clusions about most of the aforementioned hypotheses. The OLS, the
Panel, and 3SLS estimations, in fact, diverged either in terms of coef-
ficients’ sign and levels of significance for both the principal and the
secondary hypotheses. In particular, the panel estimates, which consid-
ering the longitudinal nature of the data employed, and controlling for
country-specific factors are more efficient than OLS and therefore more
reliable, shown no significant relationship between the form of govern-
ment and inequality, while it shown a significant result for the effect
of the quality of government over inequality but not for the effect of
inequality over the quality of government. However, since one of the
principal hypotheses driving this work was that there could be a recip-
rocal causal relation between the two principal variables, as discussed
in Chapter 7.4, both the OLS and the Panel estimates was expected to be
biased. Their results, therefore, cannot be employed to derive definitive
conclusions.
The 3SLS estimates, on the contrary, allowing to consider the pos-
sibility of a reciprocal causal relation, delivered more robust results.
Firstly, they shown that there is no significant relation between the form
of government and inequality, forcing me to refuse H1, H2 and H5. Sec-
ondly, the estimates confirm H3, namely that the quality of government
significantly reduces inequality, but following the pattern of a political
Kuznets curve; and H4, namely that at the same time inequality reduces
significantly the quality of government. The fact that both effects re-
277
sulted to be simultaneously significant also confirmed the presence of
a reciprocal causal relation between the two variables (H6). In addi-
tion, the 3SLS estimate confirmed that education and the presence of a
leftist government have a negative effect on inequality, corruption and
the adherence to the neoliberal credo do increase countries’ levels of
inequality, protests increase the quality of government, and that repres-
sion, on the contrary, resulted to have no significant effect on the quality
of government. Following these results H9, H11 H12, H13 and H14 can
be accepted while H10 must be refused.
The 3SLS estimates therefore allowed to accept all the hypothe-
ses except for H6 and H7 for which a different strategy has been needed.
Data on citizens’ attitude toward redistribution and those on socio-economic
mobility perception, in fact, covered only a relatively few numbers of
country/year observations, generating a high number of missing values,
and the 3SLS method is not the best technique to handle missing value.
To overcome the issue, I employed the SEM with the FIML estimate
that is one of the best options to face the missing values’ issue.
The SEM with the FIML estimate on the one hand further con-
firmed most of the results of the 3SLS, except for the effect of the adher-
ence to the neoliberal credo resulting to be positive but non-significant
and, the effect of repression resulting to be negative and significant. On
the other hand, the SEM also confirmed H7 and H8 about the effect
of citizens’ attitude toward inequality and their perceptions of socio-
economic mobility. For this reasons, further studies are needed to shed
light on the effect of economic liberalism (and neoliberalism) and re-
pression respectively on inequality and on the quality of government.
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Lastly, the analysis of the effects of the different attributes of
democracy on inequality and vice versa through the employment of
the GSoD indices31 highlights some additional interesting results. It
showed that while there is a reciprocal causal relation between the com-
posite index of the quality of democracy (UDS) and inequality, there
is no any reciprocal causal relation between the different attribute of
democratic quality and inequality, and that only some attributes of demo-
cratic quality significantly influence inequality while only some attributes
are significantly influenced by inequality.
In particular, on the one side inequality contributes to worsen the
quality of fundamental rights, checks on government, impartial admin-
istration, and direct democracy, while it seems to have no significant
effects on the other attributes. On the other side, the quality of repre-
sentative government and of electoral participation significantly reduce
inequality showing the presence of a Kuznets curve. At the same time,
the quality of civil society participation in a first time seem to contribute
to significantly reduce inequality, while its marginal effect become pos-
itive after a certain level showing a "U" shaped curve. All the other
attributes of democracy on the contrary do not show any significant ef-
fect.
Overall, originated with the aim to shed light on the relation be-
tween the states’ form and quality of government and its levels of in-
equality, this work succeeded in demonstrating that the two variables
influence each other through a reciprocal causal relation mechanism in
31The GSoD indices employed are: representative government; fundamental rights;
checks on government; impartial administration; civil society participation; electoral
participation; direct democracy; subnational elections.
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which the former have a negative effect on the latter and vice versa,
but only when the quality of government is considered, while it has not
any significant effect when one considers the mere type of government.
Moreover, it demonstrates that, simultaneously, the quality of govern-
ment can reduce inequality while inequality can reduce the quality of
government. In addition, it helped to identify some additional variables
and mechanisms significantly interfering with the two principal ones.
And it highlights the necessity to overcome some of the assumptions of
the economic theory often employed in political science research.
Due to data limitations the analysis has been carried out for the
years 1960-2012, moreover with an unbalanced dataset, and therefore
it did not cover most of the years following the economic crisis of
2007. The economic crisis, however, has had economic as well as
political consequences within many countries, especially within demo-
cratic ones. In the last years, on the economic side, in many countries
inequality and poverty registered sharp increases, and unemployment
followed the same pattern; wages have shown a dramatic stagnation,
where and when they have not even diminished, and labour in general
suffered from an unprecedented precariousness. At the same time, at
the political side, established political parties (especially Western left
and centre left parties) massively lost electoral consensus in favour of
"anti-establishment" and sometimes new political formations labelled
as populist, but basically often being simply rightists or far-rightists.
The victory of Donald Trump in the American presidential elections,
the exploit of Nigel Farage who gained his referendum on the Brexit,
the victory of the coalition between Lega Nord and Movimento5Stelle
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in Italy, or the more recent electoral exploit of Jair Bolsonaro in the
Brazilian presidential elections, are all examples of this worrying trend.
This trend, of course, have been triggered and driven by several factors
but a minimum common denominator can be identified in the inabil-
ity of established institutions, political forces, and national and interna-
tional elites, to respond to citizens’ angry and frustration deriving from
an evident worsening of their living conditions. Many scholars have re-
cently warned about the possibility that this populist raise could end up
in non-democratic reversal, or in a less dramatic scenario to a general
worsening of the quality of democracy.
All this discourse, jointly with the finding presented above about
the reciprocity of the causal link between the quality of government and
inequality and their relation, gives raise to some concluding consider-
ation about possible future streams of research, some of which go far
beyond the scope of the present work.
First and foremost, the fact that income inequality influences the
quality of government (defined as the degree to which it approaches or
moves away from the concept of maximum democracy) suggests the
urgency for all the political parties, the national and international elites,
and in general for all the democratic partisans to put pressure on govern-
ments for the immediate implementation of policies able to reduce in-
equality, be they fiscal or wage and labour policies. otherwise it cannot
be excluded a general backlash to non-democratic forms of government,
with which all the consequences that this would have on the overall in-
ternational community. In this sense, it is very important to better un-
derstand, theoretically and empirically, which are the dynamics driving
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the populist escalation and how it has repercussions on the countries’
quality of government. The support for “anti-establishment” and pop-
ulist forces, for instance, could be integrated into the theory concerning
the relation between inequality and the stability of the regimes.
On the other side, the reciprocal causal relation between the qual-
ity of government and inequality means also that fostering the latter or
reducing the former could generate a positive circle that could bring
benefit for countries’ economic and political life. In this sense, it is
important to elaborate and implement new forms of democracy able to
better include citizens in the decision-making process and at the same
time more able to respond to their needs and concerns. In doing so, the
further elaboration of deliberative democratic theoretical and practical
models could be, for instance, a good starting point.
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